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The commencement of China’s market reform, and the emergence of property-led urban 
development in Chinese cities, has given rise to residents’ resistance against displacement, and 
the emergence of grassroots protests campaigning for higher compensation. Consequentially, 
questions of how to mediate contestations and social conflicts in the urbanization process has 
become a focus of policy reforms in China at both the central and the local levels. This research 
focuses on urban development in Qingdao, a coastal city in China, and seeks to explore, and 
understand, local reform initiatives relating to displacement. The focus is the emergence of new 
forms of governance through the context of local Residents’ Committees (RCs), or community 
based, non-government organizations, increasingly responsible for policing social conflicts and 
resistant activities related to urban renewal and regeneration projects. 
 
In the current literature, residents’ involvement in, and protests against, China’s urban renewal 
and regeneration programmes have been given scant attention. Likewise, while there is an 
emerging literature about the role of RCs, and their governance roles in the vacuums left by a 
shrinking socialist welfare state, knowledge on how they are shaping urban governance, and 
urban renewal and regeneration, is under-developed. This thesis addresses these knowledge gaps, 
by focusing on one grassroots organization in the city of Qingdao, Nan Shan Residents’ 
Committee’s (NSRC), and its involvement in No.19 Fushun Road’s regeneration in 2012. Drawing 
on in-depth interviews with Qingdao’s officials, NSRC’s staff and Fushun community’s residents, 
this research shows how the NSRC operates to manage and marginalise residents’ opposition and 
resistant to regeneration. In doing so, the research contributes to the understanding of Chinese 
governmentality in the reform and transition period, and explores how far ideas, based on 
Western (liberal) societies, including arguments about governing at a distance and through 
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The commencement of China’s market reform and open door policy in 1978 brought many new 
dimensions to Chinese urbanism, including property-led urban development, rapid urbanization, 
and the emergence of an entrepreneurial local state shaping growth coalitions with developers in 
chasing land-based interests at the expense of demolishing long-existing urban neighbourhoods, 
and marginalizing people’s use value demands. These urban phenomena and processes have been 
given extensive attention, argued by many as evidence of China’s neoliberal transition (Logan, 
2002; Ma, 2002; Wu, 2003, 2010; Harvey, 2005). However, another key dimension in China’s 
neoliberal urbanism, which has been given comparatively less study, is social conflicts and 
contestations that have accompanied market reform and urbanization. In the past thirty years, 
residents’ protests and resistance against demolition and displacement have increased in number 
and are a constitutive part of the Chinese urbanization process. Forced demolition activities by 
China’s local state, in which residents are forcefully evicted from housing and their properties are 
expropriated without consent, have been accelerating land clearances but also galvanizing 
residents’ protests and exacerbating social conflicts. China’s previous Prime Minister Wen pointed 
out, in 2011, at the Eleventh National People’s Congress, that social conflicts aroused by land 
expropriation and housing demolition are primary challenges for government and the focus of 
future reforms. 
 
Social conflicts during China’s neoliberal transition, and, more specifically, residents’ protests and 
resistance against forced demolition and displacement in urban renewal and regeneration, 
therefore, signify a central dimension in Chinese urbanism, a primary concern of Chinese 
politicians, and a key agenda of policy reforms. But how are they addressed by government policy, 
political and institutional reforms? This research sets out to answer this question. In 2010, China’s 
central state sponsored reform initiatives to regulate land clearance processes at a local level. 
These included the publication of a series of legal documents, such as the Ordinance of 
Expropriation and Compensation of Housing on State Owned Land, which forbad the forced 
eviction of residents and the forced expropriation of urban housing, encouraging localities to seek 
more consensual, and less confrontational, ways of conducting community development projects. 
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In addition, the central state intensified political controls over local officials, punishing local 
politicians issuing forced demolition orders, and who were accused of harming residents’ interests 
in the land clearance process. The hope is to mitigate social conflicts in China’s urbanization 
process, and restore social stability and political order in Chinese society. 
 
This research also sets out to understand China’s neoliberal transition. Following Larner (2000), 
this research defines neoliberalism not only as a policy framework, but also as ideology and 
governmentality, “the principle and method for the rationalization of governmental practices” 
(Burchell, 1993: 269). Neoliberal governmentality, which is also termed by others as (neo)liberal 
government strategies or (neo)liberal arts of government (Burchell, 1993; Rose, 1999), is 
characterized by, in the Foucauldian view, “governing at a distance”. The neoliberal government, as 
Burchell (1993) points out, not only upholds the traditional liberal spirit of minimal government 
interventions, but is also characterised by the enabling state, which governs in the name of an 
“artefact freedom”, the freedom that must be cultivated by the state (Rose, 1999; Dean, 2002). 
The rationality of an enabling state, according to Rose (1999), underpins the flagship political 
programmes in advanced liberal societies, such as those enshrining the spirit of empowering 
communities and shaping active citizenship.  
 
For many researchers, Chinese society, since market reform, is also witnessing a similar neoliberal 
transition, where the omnipotent state, that assumes to know all and intervenes in every domain 
of social life, is fading away, and where the cultivation of civil society and the ability of 
self-government signifies a central theme of institutional reforms; or, as many researchers point 
out, the phrase “big society, small government” captures China’s reforms and changes in the 
post-reform period (Ru, 1998; Jia, 2002; Luo and Ding, 2004; Sigley, 2006; Jiang, 2008). There is an 
emerging literature exploring China’s neoliberal government strategies and their embodiment in 
many social domains and policy areas in China. Sigley (2006) points out, on a broader level, that 
China’s neoliberal transition is embodied in the dissolving of the central planning regime and the 
implementation of a competition mechanism into the economic domain. There is also a corpus of 
work pointing out China’s transformation from government to governance, embodied in the 
emergence of NGOs and business organizations which function as the sites of government beyond 
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the state and are rescaling the boundaries and functions of the state (see for example, Howell, 
2004; Lieberthal, 2004; Saich, 2004). In addition, through studying Chinese university graduates, 
who are no longer assigned with jobs by the state, but find their own jobs from the market in the 
post reform period, Hoffman (2006) shows that Chinese society has transformed into one that 
values individuals’ freedom and responsibility of choice. But less is addressed about how urban 
renewal and regeneration speaks to China’s emerging neoliberal government rationality, as well as 
whether, and in what sense, this neoliberal governmentality is characterized by “governing 
through freedom”, (re)structuring the process of urban regeneration in China. This research aims 
to address this knowledge gap.  
 
The first aim of this thesis is to explore the interrelationships between the Chinese central state’s 
reform initiatives and urban renewal and regeneration at a local level, with the focus on Qingdao, 
a coastal city in China. In 2012, in response to the central state’s orders forbidding the use of 
forced demolition, Qingdao’s municipal government sought a new approach for conducting land 
clearances and community development. This research explores such reforms that, in Qingdao, 
are characterized by the emergence of new forms of governance, that is, the use of Residents’ 
Committees (RCs), or community based, non-governmental organizations, in delivering 
community renewal and regeneration. Drawing upon a case study, the redevelopment of No.19 
Fushun Road in Qingdao in 2012, and through semi-structured interviews, this research finds out 
that in No.19’s development, Nan Shan Residents’ Committee (NSRC) plays a key role in the 
community’s regeneration, not only in terms of drawing residents’ support and consent for 
government planning, compensation policies and relocation schemes, but also in pacifying local 
residents’ oppositional voices and resistance activities. As Qingdao’s municipal government claims, 
the RCs’ involvement in community regeneration carves out a new approach for conducting urban 
development, signifying alternatives to the forced demolition approach and the use of coercive 
power in promoting land clearance. 
 
A second aim of this research is to understand the RCs’ roles in urban governance more generally. 
There is a significant literature addressing this theme, that considers organisations such as the RCs 
as part of newly decentralised government functions, such as welfare services provision and 
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community security, operating in the vacuum left by the shrinking socialist welfare state (Mok, 
1988; Read, 2000, 2003; Derleth and Koldyk, 2004; Yan and Gao, 2005; Bray, 2006, 2008; Gui, 2007; 
Geoghegan and Powell, 2008; Shieh and Friedmann, 2009; Mowbray, 2011). Based upon and 
developing these arguments this research contributes to understanding not only the RCs’ agendas 
and functions, and in what sense they are playing key roles in urban governance, but also 
addresses the RCs’ relationships with local government authorities and local residents. Such 
relationships have received scant attention, but, as this research argues, are important in 
understanding Chinese residents’ lives in urban communities, as well as the transformations and 
changes in modes of China’s urban governance. It is through performance evaluation, competitive 
funding and personnel controls, a series of techniques that signify “governing at a distance”, that 
Qingdao’s local government authorities prescribe NSRC’s agendas and mobilize the committee 
staff’s enthusiasm at work. This research also observes NSRC’s relationships with local residents, in 
terms of how it addresses local residents’ voices, desires and interests in its daily work. It argues 
that the committee showcases dislocated accountability from local residents and sees its priority 
as meeting government evaluation criteria. In urban renewal and regeneration, NSRC has been 
active in following government orders, that is, to vacate the community as soon as possible, 
accelerating the land clearance process, and policing residents’ oppositional voices, regardless of 
marginalising residents’ voices in local development agenda-setting and making them experience 
discrimination and oppression. 
 
A third aim of this thesis is to explore residents’ experience in, and their subjective voices about, 
urban renewal and regeneration. It shows that in Qingdao, residents’ experiences of 
redevelopment projects is characterised by, not only empowerment and participation that are 
brought about by local policy reforms, nor simply marginalization and exclusion in which RCs play 
a key role, but both. In unpacking residents’ experiences in urban renewal, this research gives 
attention to a special group of residents, namely the “nail” households, or the residents refusing 
to vacate the community identified for development and demanding higher compensation and 
central relocation sites. As a marginalised and powerless group and whose very existence signifies 




I argue that in Qingdao, local policy reforms in terms of urban renewal and regeneration embody 
new calculations and strategies that speak to neoliberal governmentality. This research finds that 
empowerment of communities and mobilization of residents’ self-government activities signify 
key reform initiatives in Qingdao. Or, quoting Rose (1999), in Qingdao, a key strategy of liberal 
government, is, “a double movement of autonomization and responsibilization” of community 
(1999: 174), characterising local policy reforms in terms of conducting urban regeneration. As the 
case of No.19’s redevelopment shows, local residents have participated in the decision-making 
process, and, Qingdao’s government authorities claim this signifies, apparently, the community’s 
involvement in, and democratic control over, the future of the area. Underpinning this initiative is 
a sentiment that empowerment and democratization signify political progress and area source of 
the government’s political legitimacy. The rationality held by an omnipotent state, which exerts 
control and intervenes in the name of promoting social welfare and justice, and asserts the 
efficiency of policies, in itself would signify legitimacy, therefore, fades away in Qingdao. It is not 
through forced eviction and demolition, an approach signifying the use of too much violence and 
coercive power, that the community’s nail households are dealt with. Instead, local residents are 
mobilised, by drawing on their sense of obligation towards the community, into persuading nail 
households to drop their blocking actions and vacate the properties, that the problem of nail 
households in No.19 is solved. But simultaneously, Qingdao’s municipal government has 
regrouped its functions, towards better coordination, by intensifying its controls over NSRC. It is 
through the committee that local residents are mobilised into a series of self-government 
activities, and, oppositional voices are suppressed and controversies are stifled. I argue that in 
Qingdao, the local state restructures its functions, redrawing its boundaries, assuming a less 
interventionist role, but, is still powerful in different ways. 
 
To summarise and recount, this research aims to examine policy reforms in terms of conducting 
community renewal and regeneration in Chinese cities, exploring how local policy reforms are 
addressed through shaping RCs’ vanguard roles in urban regeneration, and, on a boarder level, to 
understand RCs’ roles in urban governance and reflect on China’s neoliberal transition. This 




l What are RCs’ functions and agendas in community regeneration and urban governance? 
l Which government techniques are used in governing RCs, whether, and in what sense, have 
these techniques (re)shaped and prescribed RCs’ agendas and accountability? 
l What are residents’ experiences in community regeneration, and how does this relate to RCs’ 
activities? 
l How do we understand China’s neoliberal transition, in relation to RCs’ roles in urban 
governance? 
 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 examines urban phenomena, processes and 
problems related to China’s market reforms, and addresses these as key dimensions of China’s 
neoliberal urbanism. These include the dissolving of central planning regimes, the privatisation of 
urban land and housing, and the emergence of property-led urban development, large-scale 
demolition and rapid urbanization; the pro-development/pro-interests state at the central and 
local levels, which pursue their own political and economic interests in, and through accelerating, 
the rapid urbanization process; as well as the economic dispossession, political 
disenfranchisement, and geographical displacement, of masses of urban residents in urban 
renewal and regeneration. I accentuate that low compensation, and displacement of residents 
from urban central locations, signify key points in investigating China’s urbanization and neoliberal 
transition. They tell us about how private developers seek profits through accumulation by 
dispossession in Chinese cities, and through which Chinese government authorities realise 
ambitious plans of gentrifying inner city places, and they form a primary source of urban 
grassroots mobilization and protest around Chinese cities. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of social conflict, urban contestation and governance issues in 
Chinese society, in the post-reform period. In China’s urbanization and development, economic 
interests and political rights are contested between residents and local government authorities, 
embodied in residents’ protests against displacement and fights for higher compensation, and in 
local government authorities’ forced eviction and demolition activities, to suppress resistance and 
accelerate the land clearance process. This kind of urban contestation has been the focus of the 
central state’s reforms. A series of reform initiatives sponsored by China’s central state in 2010, 
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which focus on forbidding the use of forced demolition activities, signify, as this chapter argues, 
efforts to renew and generate better governance processes at the local level. At the end of this 
chapter, I present the questions I will explore in the remainder of this thesis: how, and in what 
ways, will the central state’s reform initiatives induce changes in the localities, and in urban 
renewal and regeneration processes, in terms of state functions, boundaries, power forms, and 
governmentalities or the art of government. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses methods and methodology issues. It briefly introduces the city of Qingdao 
and No.19 Fushun Road, the case study of this research, and illustrates the reasons why I chose to 
focus on these places. This chapter also reviews and reflects on how to use data collection 
methods, including semi-structured interviews, participation observation, and documents, as well 
as thematic analysis, in addressing the research aims and solving the research questions. I also 
reflect on different forms of power relationships I have confronted, and have to address, in the 
field, including how to access elites such as government officials; how to build rapport with, and 
protect the confidences of, the powerless people such as normal residents; as well as how to 
conduct research on Chinese cities while urban paradigms in urban research and policy have been 
built upon experiences and knowledge of cities in advanced industrial societies. 
 
Chapter 4 examines Qingdao’s development and planning in the last century, outlining the city’s 
development trajectory through time: from a colonial city, to an industrial city with a socialist 
regime, to a place experiencing market reform and neoliberal transition after the 1990s. The aims 
of this chapter include to provide a deeper context of Qingdao’s planning and development, social 
transformations, renewal of landscape, changes in urbanism, and through these, respond to 
Robinson’s (2004, 2008, 2011) calls to give an account of ordinary cities’ particularities in 
development and urbanism and dissolve an urban paradigm in urban research. In addition, this 
chapter also seeks to unpack, following Castells (1983), whether, and in what senses, urban 
contestations signify an inherent part of Qingdao’s urbanization and development; as well as to 
discover, and understand, different forms that urban contestations have taken in different 
historical periods in Qingdao, and how these contestations are embedded in the social and 
political particularities of the time. Since the 1990s, Qingdao’s development has resembled a 
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neoliberal transition: there is an entrepreneurialised local state which prioritises investment, 
land-based accumulation and property-led development. Residents’ protests and resistance 
against demolition, displacement and low compensation have been the primary urban 
contestations in Qingdao, signifying people’s fight for economic and political rights in the 
urbanization process. How to mediate such urban contestations is a primary concern for the local 
state in Qingdao. 
 
The remaining chapters turn to examine policy reforms in terms of urban renewal and 
regeneration in Qingdao, and how these relate to shaping the vanguard role of RCs in delivering 
policies and policing oppositional voices. Chapter 5 introduces NSRC in Qingdao, including its 
agenda, activities, personnel arrangements and funding sources. It unpacks the relationships 
between NSRC and Qingdao’s local state, by addressing issues, including how the local state 
decentralization process restructures NSRC’s functions and responsibilities, which techniques are 
applied in governing NSRC and how efficient they are in prescribing the committee’s priorities, 
agenda, and accountability. This chapter contributes on a broader level to an understanding of RCs’ 
functions and roles in urban governance. This chapter accentuates the point that NSRC follows a 
top-down agenda and dislocates its accountability from local residents, because Qingdao’s local 
state controls its funding sources and personnel arrangements. In urban renewal and regeneration, 
NSRC’s priorities and agendas are prescribed by the government authorities, which are, to police 
resistance and accelerate the land clearance process. 
 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I turn to focus on NSRC’s roles in, and residents’ experiences of, No.19 
Fushun Road (re)development in 2012, which is one residential compound in the committee’s 
neighbourhood. Chapter 6 addresses issues relating to residents’ participation and empowerment 
of the community in urban renewal and regeneration. It finds that, in No.19, participation is 
conducted in circumstances that policy agendas and parameters are already settled, by the 
government authorities., Instead of real empowerment of the community, or when “community 
and neighbourhood groups take their own decisions and control resources” (Carley et al, 2000, 
quoted from Ball, 2004: 124), residents’ participation signifies a rubber-stamp of government 
decisions, and an instrument for providing government with political legitimacy. It is through NSRC 
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that such an instrumentalised participation process is facilitated. The committee plays a key role in 
marginalising residents’ oppositional voices, subduing local debates and creating consensus 
among residents which show people’s consent for relocation and their willingness to accept the 
government’s compensation offers. Participation could become, as Labonte (1999) warns, an 
approach of control if it is “being organized towards someone else’s ideas” (1999: 432). 
 
Chapter 7 examines the governance of nail households in No.19, the people who refuse to vacate 
their properties and claim higher compensation and better relocation sites. This chapter builds 
upon discussions on social capital, which is defined, following Putnam (1996), as certain 
dimensions in inter-personal relationships, including friendship, trust, reciprocity, a sense of 
obligation, which could be exploited for government purposes. This conceptualization of social 
capital also underpins reforms in Qingdao, concerning how to deal with nail households. Instead 
of using forced eviction and demolition activities, Qingdao’s government authorities mobilise local 
residents and NSRC staff, who are friends, or old colleagues, and have built trust and reciprocal 
relationships with, the nail households, to persuade the latter to drop their resistance actions. 
Following Wakefield and Poland (2005), I argue that using social capital in the governance process 
informs a “neo-liberalist approach to social relations” (2005: 2820), at the heart of which is the 
state’s “intervention in community life” (2005: 2829), for the purpose of cultivating community 
responsibilities and their abilities to conduct self-government. I also examine how, and in what 
sense, nail households experience oppression in facing the persuasive tactics of neighbours and 
NSRC staff. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes with the research findings, recounting how the research questions are 
addressed in the thesis, and summarising how this research contributes to an understanding of 
China’s neoliberal transition. China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism lies in, but not simply, certain 
urban phenomena and processes such as property-led development, the entrepreneurial 
transition of the local state, and the contestations over economic and political rights in the 
urbanization process. It is also embodied in the restructuring of state functions, the emergence of 
a less interventional state which no longer wishes to administrate in every domain of social life, 
but is rolling out a more enabling role, as well as a more inherently embedded process, a changing 
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Chapter 1   The dark side of China’s development: from the pro-development state to the 
disenfranchised mass 
1.1. Introduction 
During China’s market reform, which was initiated by the central state in 1978, the country’s 
economic, social and political regimes were significantly restructured. Socialist public ownership 
was dissolved along with privatization reform, including the privatization of land and housing, 
which gave rise to the real-estate market becoming the new economic engine of the country. 
Meanwhile, central-local relationships were rescaled along with decentralization and the fading 
away of the centralized planned economy, which led to the emergence of an autonomous local 
state that became increasingly more pro-development, entrepreneurial, willing to absorb risks, 
and eager to join the competition for capital. It is against this background that China’s 
property-led development projects have emerged, which are pervasive around Chinese cities and 
are conducted at a large scale. On the one hand, Chinese cities have witnessed rapid urbanization 
and the modernization of urban landscapes; on the other hand, property-led redevelopment 
projects also bring a new urbanism to the country. This new urbanism is characterised by new 
urban phenomena and problems, including demolition and displacement, gentrification and 
spatial differentiation. This chapter examines the emergence of China’s property-led urban 
redevelopment, a relatively new, post 1978, process, illustrating its emergence, political-economic 
dynamics, as well as the social, spatial, and political consequences. Responding to He and Wu, this 
chapter argues that property-led urban development “has emerged in the forefront of (China’s) 
neoliberalization” (2009: 282). 
 
This chapter highlights the point that China’s urbanization and urban development in the 
post-reform period is part of a process of accumulation by dispossession, through which the state 
and developers are pursuing their own political and economic interests, and contributing to the 
creation of acute social inequality, hierarchical citizenship, and causing displacement, 
dispossession and disenfranchisement of residents. By drawing on the discourse of the right to the 
city, this chapter argues that China’s urban development signifies a process that privileges the 
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minority but marginalises the majority (Nonini, 2008); or, as in Harvey’s sense, in China as well as 
in advanced capitalist countries, “the actually existing right to the city, as it is now constituted, is 
far too narrowly confined, in most case in the hands of a small political and economic elite who 
are in a position to shape the city more and more after their own particular needs and hearts’ 
desire” (2012: 24). China’s urban inhabitants, who are increasingly more discontented about the 
dispossession and disenfranchisement they confront, initiate protests and resistance activities. I 
will examine these protests and property activism, the new urban crisis in post-reform China, in 
the next chapter. As mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to examine how urban protests and 
resistance activities caused by urban renewal and regeneration are governed at China’s local level. 
This chapter provides the broader context on the emergence of China’s property-led urban 
redevelopment projects, and indicates the political roots and institutional sources of urban 
protests. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. Section 1.2 outlines China’s market reform 
and the emergence of property-led urban development in Chinese cities. I examine several market 
reform initiatives, including the privatisation of urban housing and land which gave rise to the 
real-estate market, the downsizing and squeezing of State Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) 
responsibilities of housing provision and renewal which are being replaced by market mechanisms, 
and the national opening up of policies that allow private and foreign capital flux into China’s 
real-estate market. Around the early 1990s, China witnessed the prosperity of the real-estate 
market, which became the economic engine of the country. Chinese cities were enwrapped in a 
frenzy of conducting property-led urban development, which induced rapid GDP growth, fast 
urban development and modernization, as well as large-scale demolition and displacement. 
Section 1.3 focuses on the political-economic dynamics behind China’s large-scale urbanization, 
urban renewal and regeneration. It argues that rapid urbanization and urban development are 
reinvented by China’s central state as processes, that both central and local government acquire 
their own political interests and economic benefits; and therefore, China’s incessant urban 
expansion, urban renewal and regeneration are propelled together by both central and local 
government. Section 1.4 offers a critical view on the social and political consequences of China’s 
property-led urban development. It shows that Chinese citizens, especially disadvantaged groups, 
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are made to experience economic dispossession, displacement, spatial differentiation, as well as 
inequality and marginalization, caused by an emerging hierarchical citizenship. By drawing on the 
discourse of the right to the city, this section argues that China’s urbanisation in the post-reform 
period informs the dispossession of inhabitants’ rights and causes acute disenfranchisement. 
 
1.2. Market reform and the emergence of property-led development in Chinese cities 
In 1949, the socialist regime was established in China, and along with it, the centralized planned 
economy, public ownership of land, housing, as well as other assets and resources. Before 1978, 
when market reform was initiated and reshuffled these economic and political institutions, China’s 
urbanization was strictly supervised and controlled by a powerful central state, implementing a 
production-centred urban planning and development approach. On the one hand, China’s cities 
experienced rapid industrial development and expansion, and the cities functioned as “the 
(physical) site of production” (Wu, 2003: 1333). On the other hand, an anti-urbanism urban policy 
was enacted, which constrained urban consumption functions for the purpose of conceding 
funding and capital to production (Wu, 2003; Lin, 1998; Yin, 1987; Ma, 1976). Recounting this 
point, Huang points out a “production first, consumption second” principle that prescribed 
Chinese cities’ planning, construction and public funding schemes before the late 1970s (2003: 
593).  
 
The work units, also known as Danwei, referred to specific kinds of workplaces in socialist China: 
state-owned enterprises, government departments and institutions (Wu, 1996; Bray, 2005). By 
using their retained profits or surplus, with the supervision and permission of the government 
authorities, each work unit provided exclusive, club-like welfare services to its own workers, and 
usually free of charge. These services included a wide range, such as medicine care, nursery 
centres, training schools, and canteens. The list and the quality of services will be different in each 
work unit’s case depending on their economic capabilities. It was through the work units that the 
majority of China’s urban population were capable of accessing basic services and survived in 
anti-consumption cities where services were usually nowhere to be purchased. But this was at the 
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expense of the exclusion of a small number of citizens who were unemployed and did not belong 
to any work units – such as disabled people, people with criminal histories, and those who had 
“political issues”, such as those who used to be capitalists and prostitutes. 
 
Providing free housing and ameliorating workers’ living conditions through housing renewal were 
also among work units’ important responsibilities (Hui, 2009). When the communist state was 
established in 1949, the country’s inner cities were filled with old housing and shanty towns that 
lacked modern living facilities such as sewer systems, electricity, running water, and heating 
devices. During the socialist transformation movement that was initiated by the central state 
during the 1950s, which involved the expropriation of private properties to public ownership, 
inner city housing became a state-owned resource. This housing was allocated to the work units, 
and then assigned to the workers as shelter, providing overcrowded, insanitary, and inconvenient 
living conditions for China’s urban residents. Denouncing the miserable housing conditions of 
England’s working class in the 1840s, Engels presents a classic picture, by describing the living 
environment in London’s St. Giles, a place near Oxford Street and Regent Street: “It is a disorderly 
collection of tall, three- or four-storied houses, with narrow, crooked, filthy streets .… The houses 
are occupied from cellar to garret, filthy within and without, and their appearance is such that no 
human being could possibly wish to live in them .… Heaps of garbage and ashes lie in all directions, 
and the foul liquids emptied before the doors gather in stinking pools” (1892: 27). Chinese 
inner-cities before market reform seemed to some extent analogous to the UK’s situation in the 
1840s.  
 
Work units began to be at the vanguard of housing renewal projects during the 1960s. Before this, 
there was a short period of central state sponsored slum clearance, through which Chinese cities’ 
housing conditions were improved. These central-state funded renewal projects were imbued 
with symbolic and political meanings – to demonstrate that the new communist state was 
dedicated to and was also capable of providing a better life for the people (Xie and Costa, 1993; 
Chen, 2006). One of these politically high-profile state-led housing renewal projects was the 
redevelopment of one of Shanghai’s shanty towns into the famous Caoyang New Workers’ Village 
in 1952. This was the very first modern working class community in socialist China (see Figure 1.1). 
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However, since the mid 1960s, when numerous renewal projects were completed, the central 
state felt these demonstrations were sufficient, and public funding was gradually withdrawn from 
supporting housing renewal. Instead, the work units were required to fund the renewal projects. 
(Re)developing new housing and upgrading workers’ living conditions became one of the work 
units’ responsibilities, and was added to the list of welfare services they provided to the workers. 
Capturing this change, Chen (2006) points out that China transformed from a state-led, movement 
style of urban renewal to a self-dependent, work unit-led urban renewal mode in the 1960s. 
 
Figure 1.1. Caoyang New Workers’ Village 
 
Dates : 1952, September 
Source: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%9B%B9%E6%9D%A8%E6%96%B0%E6%9D%91 
 
The work unit-led urban renewal projects were conducted at slow speed and small scale. This was 
due to the lack of funding and resources, the strict state control of land allocation, and the 
socialist political culture – the “mass line” which encouraged citizens’ participation in the decision 
making process, had seriously fettered the speed and the scale of the renewal projects. Thompson 
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(1975), a British planning professional who conducted field work in Chinese cities in 1974, 
documents how a work unit-led renewal project would proceed and why it was slowed down 
under the socialist regime. To start with, the work unit would have to hold several consultation 
meetings to find out people’s views and needs, including whether they welcomed a renewal 
project and how they wanted the new accommodation to be, including the size of the flats and 
the number storeys of construction; then there would be the tough, time and energy consuming 
canvassing of government authorities to gain access to public-owned land. Following this, the 
work units needed to find temporary accommodation for the workers, and it was normally the 
work units’ responsibilities to pay for the rent. Then, the old housing was demolished and the 
construction work would start, but this process was very likely to be interrupted and delayed due 
to a lack of funding, labour, and construction materials such as wood and cement, and sometimes 
the work units’ workers themselves would have to contribute their labour to the construction 
project. 
 
The work unit-led renewal projects were totally welfare oriented – they were for the purpose of 
ameliorating workers’ housing conditions and the newly developed flats would normally be 
allocated to the people free of charge. The principles of allocation included age, the size of the 
family, or one’s positions in the work unit. For example, a family with children would normally be 
allocated with a larger flat than a family comprised of only one couple; and the elderly would 
normally be allocated with lower level flats than young workers, considering their physical 
difficulty in climbing the stairs in housing with no elevators. While the housing allocation 
principles could be interpreted as reinforcing the unequal and hierarchical relationships among 
workers, it also embodies the needs-based allocation principle which is central to China’s 
communist ideology (Lim and Lee, 1990; Walder, 1992; Wu, 1996; Zhou and Logan, 1996; Logan, 
et al, 1999). 
 
Work unit-led urban renewal was the product of its own time. It informs how urban land and 
resources were allocated and accessed under socialist public ownership; how urban production 
and reproduction processes were assigned importance; and how urban changes were brought 
about under the anti-urbanism and under-urbanization policies which fettered urban 
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development and modernization. The market reform process that was initiated by China’s central 
state in 1978 brought about privatization, market competiveness, the minimised state, and 
individual choices to China’s society. Chinese society experienced a neoliberal transition, in the 
sense that the relationship between the state, market and society was significantly restructured, 
with market norms becoming the new “social integration and governing mechanism” (Wu, 2010: 
628; see also, Nee, 1989; Hoffman, 2006; Liew, 2005; Ma, 2005; Kipnis, 2007; Walker and Buck, 
2007). On the state side, the rolling out and rolling back processes occurred simultaneously, with 
the state changing from a production organizer to a “market manager” (Gordon, 1991; Larner 
2000; Peck, 2001; Wu, 2003). 
 
In this context, the work units, especially the SOEs, were restructured, downsized, and squeezed 
of their social responsibilities to be more efficient and competitive (Fan, 1994; Broadman, 1995; 
Hu, 1996; Hu, 2000). Out there, the “market” was cultivated to fill the gap left by the shrinking 
work unit system: urban consumption functions were resurgent to provide people with the 
services that were released from the work units; the market mechanism gradually replaced the 
administrative approach to resource allocation, allowing private enterprises to participate in 
service provision. Not only in welfare provision, but in broader economic, social and political life, 
the work units’ roles were significantly marginalised, replaced by markets that “have been created 
for a vast range of commodities, resources, and services” (Pieke, 2012: 150). Housing renewal and 
regeneration were no longer the responsibility of the work units; and, in fact, the work units were 
gradually excluded from this domain by private capital that was flowing in. Since the late 1980s, 
work unit-led, welfare oriented urban renewal was replaced by property-led, market-oriented 
urban redevelopment. 
 
Among all the marketization policies and reforms that directly and indirectly led to the popularity 
of property-led development in China, land and housing reforms were essential. Land reform was 
initiated by China’s central state in the 1980s, through giving public owned land a market 
dimension: the use-right and ownership of land were identified and separated, and the former 
was commodified and allowed to be transformed on the market (Lin and Ho, 2005; Hsing, 2010). 
With Shenzhen as the first laboratory for land auction, other Chinese cities gradually gave up the 
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administrative way of land allocation and adopted land auction and tender in the 1990s. Private 
developers and private capital were more capable of accessing land resources through an 
increasingly open and transparent land market, and moved into the domain of urban land and 
housing redevelopment (Zhu, 2005).  
 
China’s housing reform involved a sequence of initiatives that lasted from the late 1980s to the 
late 1990s. State-owned housing was privatised through subsidised selling to individuals, and the 
socialist welfare housing system was dissolved which meant that housing was no longer a welfare 
service provided by the state free of charge. Instead, housing was gradually commodified, 
becoming a market good. Based upon this new conceptualization of housing, new rules of housing 
redevelopment took over. In principle, housing redevelopment was seen as market behaviour, 
involving individuals selling their properties to developers, receiving money compensation 
according to the property’s market price, and then purchasing new houses, either through the 
market or the relocation housing provided by the developers with some discount. The in-kind and 
on site relocation policies, which were enacted in the pre-reform era, adopted in work unit-led 
housing development, were gradually replaced by the monetary compensation approach (Wu, 
2004). In Dowall’s (1994) sense, China’s urban development policies are increasingly 
market-driven, and to some extent resemble its neighbouring capitalist cities such as Hong Kong, 
Seoul and Singapore, where property development policies provide valuable experience in 
engendering a transparent and rapid accumulation process (see also, Schiffer, 1991; Zhu, 1997; 
Haila, 2000). 
 
Finally, the housing and land reforms cultivated mature and prosperous property markets around 
Chinese cities. On the supply side, speculative investments increased and were encouraged 
somewhat by deregulation of the local state. Private developers exploited the gradient of land 
prices in Chinese cities; this action pushed up land and property prices; and this further stimulated 
investment and a new round of price rises; and created a vicious circle. On the demand side, the 
state was engaged in cultivating needs and manufacturing affordability, by developing a bank 
credit system, and establishing a residents’ housing provident funding system, compulsorily 
extracting part of an urban resident’s salary to be used as to fund housing purchase (Rosen and 
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Ross, 2000; Hui, 2009). So far, we can already see that in China, the emergence of the property-led, 
market oriented urban development approach is not only based upon the ideological redefinition 
of urban land and housing, where land is no longer seen as a collectively owned product material 
but a market commodity with exchange values, and housing is a market good instead of part of 
socialist state welfare (Hui, 2009). It is also based upon the ideological redefinition of individuals 
themselves, as rational and responsible consumers, to play along with the market norm, to invest 
wisely in the property market and therefore cater for their own housing needs (Rose, 1992, 1996; 
Davis, 2000; Ngai, 2003; Zhu, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Hui, 2009; Kipnis, 2007).  
 
Property-led urban development proceeded at a rapid speed and generated significant changes in 
Chinese cities. This is evidenced by the data provided by some writers. A property boom emerged 
in many Chinese localities. In Shanghai’s case, there was the widely discussed “Shanghai bubble” 
(Ramo, 1998; Haila, 1999; Harvey, 2005), characterised by the super-fast speed of 
(over)construction of skyscrapers, smart hotels and offices – by the end of 1995, “13.5 million 
square feet of office space” was built, which was “five times the 2.7 million square feet in 1994” 
(Harvey, 2005: 133). Massive foreign investment went into Chinese real-estate development. As 
Wu (2001) indicates, in Shanghai’s case, it was 1.05 billion dollars in 1996 and increased to 1.33 
billion dollars in 1997. Meanwhile, large-scale urban demolitions and relocation were conducted 
in Chinese localities, creating vacant land for property development. From 1990 to 1998, 4.2 
million m² of housing were demolished in Beijing, and 33 million m² residential buildings were 
dismantled in Shanghai, causing 745,000 households to be relocated (He and Wu, 2007; Klimova, 
2010). Large-scaled demolitions happened not only in Chinese metropolises but also in other 
smaller cities. For example, from 2012 to 2014, approximately 20,000 households were relocated 
in Jinan’s shanty town remodelling projects; in Chengdu, 410 m² buildings were demolished and 
114,000 households were relocated between 2002 to the end of 2004; in Mu Danjiang, a 
small-sized city in the northern part of China, similarly ambitious as other Chinese cities, 1 billion 
RMB were invested to remodel 44 shanty towns and led to 36,000 households being removed 
from 2008 to 2010; and the list continues. In China, the emergence of large-scale demolition was 
combined with the creation of a new “urban problem”: associated with the imperative to remodel 
old and dilapidated inner city slums, the ruthless eviction and relocation involved in Chinese 
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state-led demolition were legitimised. In this sense, Zhang and Fang (2004) argue that China’s 
urban demolition resembled the USA’s “state bulldozer” of the 1950s and therefore that history 
was indeed repeating itself to some extent. 
 
Therefore, we can see an indication of the state playing an important part in China’s property-led 
development. While Chinese cities had become “venues for frenzied real-estate development and 
property speculation” (Harvey, 2005: 133), behind this, it was not only the in-flow of private 
capital which injected a dynamic into the property market. More importantly, there was a 
pro-development state, at the central and the local levels, preoccupied by a “casino mentality” in 
its policy making (Harvey, 2005), which plotted the property boom and rapid urban 
(re)development and pursued its own economic profits, political interests, and policy goals 
through these processes. 
 
1.3. The pro-development/pro-profit state: The political economy behind China’s rapid 
urbanization and urban development 
China’s market reform and “open-door-policy” were initiatives in response to the crisis of state-led 
accumulation. Due to an anti-urbanism policy and lagging urban consumption functions, China’s 
state-led industrialization and accumulation processes finally reached their limits in the 1970s. 
There was a “lack of effective demand, especially outside the state sector” (Wu, 2003: 1333), and 
“state-led accumulation thus was unable to tap into a pool of idle production factors (labour in 
particular), which could not be combined and recycled through an economic system that 
possessed no alternative accumulation space” (Wu, 2010: 622). Market reform was sponsored to 
open up new accumulation spaces and to generate new forms of economic growth. These aims 
were met by the new economic opportunities brought about by China’s marketization and 
globalization, such as China’s expanding export economy, its endless efforts in attracting foreign 
investment and its incorporation into the world financial system, and its prioritised development 
of high-tech sectors and the tourism industry (Harvey, 2005, 2007). Above all, the real estate 




Since the late 1980s, China’s real-estate industry entered a period of rapid development and 
reached its golden years in the 1990s. The real-estate business stimulated the development of 
many other industries, such as iron, cement, machinery, and furniture, to name a few. More 
importantly, China’s real-estate industry produced high volume, and increasingly more expensive 
housing for Chinese people, and through this, created China’s domestic demand and stimulated 
the Chinese economy (Lin, 2000; Wu, 2001). Becoming the economic engine for the UK around the 
1960s, for Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1980s (Schiffer, 1991; Zhu, 1997), the real estate 
industry has emerged as China’s “new growth pole of the economy” since the 1990s (Wu, 2001: 
277). In addition, massive housing construction sites around Chinese cities provided millions of 
jobs for rural to urban migrants and for urban residents who were laid-off during the downsizing 
of SOE’s during the 1990s. China’s prosperous real-estate market thus absorbed the idle labour 
created during China’s economic reform, which could otherwise have caused acute social 
instability. Given all this, the real-estate industry was seen by the Chinese central government as a 
panacea for a series of social and economic problems emerging during China’s transition period. 
The real-estate industry formed an increasingly larger percentage of China’s GDP, amounting to 16% 
in 2013, an arguably dangerously high percentage that signified an economic bubble. However, 
with the importance of the real-estate business, rapid urbanization, large scale urban demolition 
and housing redevelopment projects in China’s cities never stopped accelerating in speed and 
expanding in numbers. China’s urbanization in the post-reform period, therefore, forms “part of 
neoliberal projects to provide a spatial fix to the crisis in the accumulation of capital” (Shin, 2011: 
3). 
 
In the pre-reform period, China’s central state drew its political legitimacy by sticking closely to a 
series of socialist ideologies, values and norms, such as working class leadership, egalitarianism, 
and the concept of the superiority of socialism over capitalism. This political strategy lost its 
efficacy during China’s market reform and transition, as all those values that were once drawn 
upon by the central state were fragmented, and it faced new phenomena and social problems, 
such as regional uneven development, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the 
increasingly acute social resentment of privatised and unaffordable services such as schools and 
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healthcare. Generating rapid development and economic success became the new strategy to 
replace the failed old one (Shin, 2004; Nonini, 2008; Wu, 2010). Since the 1980s, a new political 
rhetoric has been created and disseminated around the country, by China’s central state, to forge 
economic development and modernization as new sources of political legitimacy. These included 
the well-known “Xiao Kang society” discourse, made during Deng’s leadership in the 1980s, 
setting up the building of a wealthy society as the new political pursuit of the nation; and the 
more recent “Chinese dream” concept that was proposed by current president Xi, which offered 
the Chinese people an image of a bright future with a wealthy society and the great renaissance of 
the Chinese nation. In practice, China’s economic development and modernization have indeed 
successfully boosted the central state’s legitimacy. Evidencing this point, Liu and Raine (2015) 
indicate that in the past three decades, China’s economic success has strengthened citizens’ trust 
and faith in the central government, which further added to its political legitimacy. This process is 
accompanied by a “bizarre citizen psychology” which attributes the economic achievements and 
success to the central state, while the local state is at fault for the problems (such as increasingly 
serious corruption and inequality). According to Pieke, in the political domain, China has 
experienced a “neo-socialist transition”, in the sense that “the communist utopia has been 
replaced by a technocratic objective of a strong, peaceful, and modern China” (2012: 150). 
Recounting this point, Bresline comments that China has been “moving from a politically to a 
more economically mobilised society” (1996: 689). Successfully focusing on economic 
development as its new source of legitimacy, increasingly “China’s socialist governance and a 
capitalist economy are now locked in a symbiotic relationship” (Pieke, 2012: 149), in the sense 
that their survival in China is dependent on each other’s prosperity. 
 
In this context, rapid urbanization is reinvented by China’s central state as an important indicator 
of China’s economic success, and therefore, an important strategy for restoring its political 
legitimacy. Since the 1980s, China has experienced rapid urbanization and large-scale inner city 
renewal and regeneration, through which the modern urban landscape has been shaped around 
the country, arguably based upon a certain “urban paradigm”. Similar images can be found around 
Chinese cities, such as CBDs composed of skyscrapers and office buildings with glass curtain walls, 
assemblages of smart shopping malls and classic hotels, and cultural sites like museums, theatres 
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and galleries. Indeed, the modern urban built environment, as directly lived and experienced by 
individuals, and compared with some abstract economic indicators such as China’s rapid GDP 
growth of 8% annually, provides concrete and persuasive evidence to the Chinese people about 
the nation’s economic success and rapid development. Meanwhile, China’s central state has also 
engaged in reproducing the new conceptualization of the urban environment representing 
modernity, wealth, and a happy life. Many efforts have been made, such as propagandizing the 
beautified urban lifestyle through news reports and TV programmes, and inventing rhetoric such 
as the “City makes life happier”, which was the slogan of Shanghai 2010 World Expo (Shin, 2014). 
Therefore, according to Shin (2014), China’s urbanization in the post-reform period should be seen 
as an ideological and political project to regenerate people’s conceptualization and imagination 
about lifestyle and modernity, and how these relate to the urban environment and political 
legitimacy. 
 
In summary, it is through facilitating rapid urbanization and large-scale urban renewal projects 
that China’s central state is solving the accumulation crisis and restoring its political legitimacy in 
the post-reform period. This explains the pro-development attitude of China’s central state and 
why it has so firmly proposed rapid urban development since market reform. In the post-reform 
period, Chinese cities have taken on new meaning. They are no longer the “physical site(s) for 
containing industrial production”, but are “becoming the physical and functional means of 
accumulation” (Wu, 2003: 1333). Chinese cities are also being reinvented as symbolic spaces for 
the contestation of wealth, modernization, happiness, prosperity, as well as more political issues 
such as equality, people’s political rights and government’s legitimacy. While China’s central state 
has successfully manoeuvred economic success and rapid urbanization as sources of legitimacy, 
problems such as social polarization and disenfranchisement have become increasingly more 
acute. Therefore, China’s economic development and urbanization projects somehow enable the 
country to evade its real legitimacy problem (Shin, 2004). The social tensions caused by these 
“real problems” have led to the explosion of the 1989 protests movement. Although the 
movement is now pacified, the problems behind it remain strong and generate persistent 





In the 1980s, China also witnessed the dissolving of the centralized planned economy along with 
decentralization and empowerment processes. Chinese localities became increasingly more 
autonomous over local development and urban planning, and gained increasingly more discretion 
in allocating land and financial support, attracting investment, and building infrastructure. The 
central state cut its intervention role in local development, and shrank back to the domain of 
“foreign policy, national defence, and birth planning” (Zhang, 2006: 108; see also, Naughton, 1987, 
1996; Walder, 1994; Wang, 1994, 1995). Given this, many writers comment that China is turning 
towards a de facto federalism, in the sense that central–local relations in China are “functioning 
more and more like federalism” (Zheng, 2006: 101); and that it is “market preserving federalism" 
(Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000: 2), in the sense that greater empowerment and decentralization in 
China is providing market incentives for engendering rapid local development (see also, Qian and 
Weingast, 1997: 83; see also, Oi, 1992; Montinola, et al, 1995; Lin, 2000; Zhang, 2006). Therefore, 
as a result of China’s market reform, Chinese localities have replaced the central state and have 
become the new decision-making centres and the engines of China’s economic development. 
 
While decentralization has occurred for economic decisions, China has remained politically 
centralized, and therefore the central state can still exert effective influence over local 
development, but, in Foucault’s (1978) terms, “at a distance”. One embodiment of China’s political 
centralization is Communist Party rule and the central state’s absolute control over the selection 
and promotion of local officials. A key standard adopted by China’s central state in promoting local 
officials is their performance in promoting local economic development. According to Li and Zhou 
(2005), in post-reform China, the top provincial leaders presiding over better economic 
performance during their tenure have better chances of being promoted as central state leaders. 
This injects strong pro-development sentiments into China’s provincial officials, who will, in turn, 
enact similar promotion criteria to encourage good economic performance from lower-level 
officials (see also, Chen, et al, 2005; Maskin et al, 2000; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000; Whiting, 
2001). An incentivised personal control mechanism, also termed “yardstick competition” (Zhang, 
2006) or a “promotion tournament” (Zhou, 2007), has been created within China’s government 
structures, activating Chinese officials to generate rapid economic growth. Large-scale urban 
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construction, including highways, housing, power plants and theatres, which stimulate local 
real-estate development, contribute to local rapid GDP growth, and bring about significant urban 
changes and visible achievements for the leaders to see, have become Chinese officials’ trump 
card to win in their career contests (Guo, 2009). China’s official promotion mechanism therefore 
informs a political dynamic behind China’s rapid urbanization. 
 
In addition, China’s central state can also influence localities’ development agendas and policies 
through adjusting certain national policy frameworks, such as the fiscal regime. Since the early 
1990s, Chinese cities have faced an acute mismatch between income and expenditure. This was 
due to two simultaneous processes: on the one hand, the decentralization of health care, 
affordable housing, and many other responsibilities to the localities; and on the other, the 1994 
fiscal reform through which the central state took a larger share of local revenue (Oi, 1992; Walder, 
1994; Tsai, 2004; Zhang, 2006). To balance localities’ financial deficit, and to mediate their 
resistance to the new revenue regime, China’s central state chose to leave a particular local 
income, from the sale of land, as localities’ own revenue. Chinese localities’ land-based finance 
was therefore shaped, and it was the product of central-local negotiation and compromise in the 
face of fiscal reform. With land-based finance in place, land auction and land leasing became the 
primary measures for Chinese localities to increase their revenue. Urbanization and inner city 
redevelopment projects held a new dimension of meaning for Chinese localities, as the processes 
to expropriate land from the famers and the urban residents’ hands and to acquire the “source” of 
local revenue. Therefore, China’s central state’s fiscal reform was responsible for Chinese localities’ 
turning towards “land developers” and the pursuit of economic incentives and exchange values of 
urban land (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009). Land-based finance, a unique fiscal regime shaped 
during China’s market reform period, became a primary political-economic mechanism for the 
spread of ambitious urbanization programmes and large-scale demolition projects around Chinese 
cities.  
 
As the above argument shows, it is through facilitating rapid urbanization projects that China’s 
localities acquire their political and economic interests; and, “urban modernity, more than 
industrial modernity, now captures the political imagination of (China’s) local state leaders” (Hsing, 
35 
 
2010: 6). Increasingly, urbanization (re)defines China’s local state policy agendas and their 
relationship with the central state, market and society. It is in this sense that Hsing comments that 
“it is the dialectical ‘urbanization of the local state’– more so than the linear concept of ‘state-led 
urbanization’– that characterizes the relationships between the local state and the urban process 
in China today” (2010: 7). With the local state’s pro-development and pro-urbanization sentiment 
becoming dominant, new urban phenomena and processes have emerged. In order to accelerate 
rapid urban development, China’s local state shapes growth-coalitions with developers (Molotch, 
1976, 1999; Stone, 1989; Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002; He, 2007; Xu and Yeh, 2009); and there is also a 
widely documented entrepreneurial transition within China’s local government, passionately 
attracting investment, willingness to absorb risks, and ambitiously taking part in the global 
competition for capital (Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1990; Healey, 1991; Harding, 1992; Peck, 2001, 
2004; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Wu, 2003, 2008). In the end, as a result of 
Chinese cities’ opening up to global investment, Chinese localities have become closely connected 
with global financial systems and the global capital accumulation process. China, therefore, has 
developed into “one epicentre for an urbanization process that has now become genuinely global” 
(Harvey, 2012: 12), and global-local discourses are increasingly more pertinent in explaining 
China’s urbanization and local development (Swyngedouw, 1997; Wu, 1997, 2010; Ma, 2004). 
 
Also widely documented as another urban phenomenon caused by China’s rapid urbanization is 
the marginalisation of residents’ benefits. In the past three decades, China’s urban development 
has involved “speculative urbanization projects”, which, in Shin’s sense (2014), have focused on 
the extraction of exchange values and accelerated capital accumulation process. Recounting this 
point, He and Wu point out that China has experienced an “increasingly neoliberalized urban 
redevelopment” in the sense that urban redevelopment in China “has became an important 
component of spatialised capital accumulation … (which) has a preference for seeking short-term 
returns from subsidised real-estate investment” (2009: 283). On the other hand, Chinese residents’ 
experiences of the urbanization process include economic exploitation, displacement, spatial 
differentiation, and disenfranchisement. In fact, as I will show in the next section, China’s 
urbanization and rapid urban modernization processes were premised upon dispossessing Chinese 
residents’ economic benefits and political rights. I call these the dark side of China’s development. 
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1.4. The rights to the city and the dark side of China’s development 
According to Harvey, “the corporatization, commodification, and privatization of hitherto public 
assets have been signal features of the neoliberal projects”, because they extend and deepen the 
process of accumulation by dispossession, by opening up “new fields for capital accumulation in 
domains formerly regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability” (2007: 35). Illustrating this 
point further, Harvey exemplifies with Thatcher’s privatization reform of social housing in the UK, 
an initiative that would “create a rent and housing price structure throughout the (London) 
metropolitan area that precludes lower-income and now even middle-class people from having 
access to housing anywhere near the urban centre”(Harvey, 2012: 20). Somewhat analogous to 
the UK, China’s privatization reform of publically owned housing in the 1980s (see section 1.2) also 
started the process of displacement and dispossession around the country. Chinese citizens, who 
became property owners during the privatization process, before enjoying their new identities and 
rights for too long, were evicted from central urban locations during urban renewal. 
 
Yet central urban location informs the “privileged place(s)” (Lefebvre, 1991; in Kofman and Lebas, 
1996: 34), with “an artificially and colossally increasing value” (Engels, 1845; in Harvey, 2012: 17), 
and bears witness to intense competition among different social classes. This competition started 
more than one hundred years ago in the UK, and, as Engels (1845) described, was embodied in 
extruding “low valued” working-class residential housing from the city centre which was then 
replaced by more profitable workshops and warehouses. In advanced capitalist countries, 
especially in US metropolises, after a short period of “inner city decline” through the 1950s to the 
1970s, the urban centres began to regain their attractiveness in the 1980s due to culture-led 
regeneration projects (see for example, Smith, 1982, 2002; Mills and Price, 1984; Massey and 
Denton, 1988; Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Champion, 2001; Cameron, 2003; He, 2007). In 
China’s context, where the urbanization process started in the 1980s and the history of rapid 
urban development has been short, inner city areas are the places where high quality urban 
services and facilities, such as transportation, residential housing, shopping malls, and schools, are 
concentrated. Meanwhile, uneven development between inner city and suburban areas is 
significant. It is usually the case that Chinese suburban places lack proper planning and 
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development. For Chinese people, central urban locations are the most desirable places for living, 
investment, and doing business. China’s inner city cores bear the dreams of different social groups: 
they provide luxurious and privileged (consumption) spaces for the rich, meet middle class 
aspirations for better housing and a modern urban lifestyle, and provide a response to 
disadvantaged groups’ desires for access to better opportunities (for jobs, education, etc.). Since 
market reform, China’s central urban locations, where housing prices are rising fast and customers 
are concentrated, have also become increasingly more attractive for business and for speculative 
investment (Li and Siu, 2001; Purcell, 2002; Ma, 2004).  
 
However, central urban locations are reserved for the rich and elites, in China as well as in other 
places, during the urban planning process. In advanced capitalist countries, as Imbroscio observes, 
urban planning and public policies have been prescribed by a “mobile paradigm”, which is 
“marked by a strong emphasis on facilitating population movement as a means of addressing 
urban social problems” (2011: 1). In essence, this planning paradigm holds that “few people in a 
given metropolitan area actually live in the place where they are supposed to”; and, based upon 
this perspective, urban planning informs a process to re-arrange and re-shuffle urban populations 
throughout urban space, in a way that keeps the middle-class in the urban centres and disperses 
the less-well-to-do residents to urban margins, the so-called “opportunity areas” for the poor 
(Imbroscio, 2011: 6). In China’s context, while central urban locations were planned with factory 
workshops and working class communities before market reform, since the early 1990s, Chinese 
planning officials have sought alternative schemes for the inner city - as the location of the CBD, 
classic shopping malls, tourist destinations, culture centres, and exclusive residential communities. 
The original inner city residents – mostly workers in state owned factories, so many of whom were 
laid off during the 1990s SOE reforms – are no longer considered a desirable population for central 
locations where land has become so expensive and competitive under China’s current urban 
planning schemes. Their homes are demolished in the name of clearing away urban slums, and 
they are dispersed to outer urban areas and experience forced residential mobility, in the name of 
mitigating over-population (see for example, Rex, 1971; Logan et al, 1999; Wang, 2000; Ma, 2004; 
Liu and Wu, 2006). In Chinese cities as well as in other capitalist cities, such as Manhattan, New 
York, the inner city areas are being gentrified and reshaped as “one vast gated community for the 
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rich” (Harvey 2012: 23). Throughout the world, therefore, the gentrification of urban cores forms 
part of a central planning strategy (see for example, Glass, 1964; Smith, 1982, 2002; Hamnett, 
1984, 1991; Berry, 1985; Bourne, 1993; Butler, 1997; Cameron, 2003). 
 
In addition, low compensation is a key economic mechanism in facilitating the forced residential 
mobility that is experienced by the poor; or, in other words, it is through offering residents low 
compensation rates for their properties that the planning goal of gentrifying inner city places is 
realised. On the one hand, relentless renewal and regeneration create expansive inner city places; 
on the other, the low compensation that is offered to residents deprives them of the affordability 
to remain in the city centre. Therefore, Wu suggests that low compensation is at the core of a new 
sorting mechanism, through which Chinese residents are relocated “according to their varied 
socioeconomic status”, and this informs a broader socio-spatial restructuring process that is 
currently underway around Chinese cities (Wu, 2003: 1337; see also, Smith, 1982; Wu, 2004; He, 
2007).   
 
The reason why developers are capable of conducting demolition through offering low 
compensation rates, is because they have more control over the urban development agenda. 
Evidence comes from Atlanta, USA, where developers have shaped growth coalitions with the 
local state and penetrated the decision making process (Stone, 1989); or from Moscow, Russia, 
where developers have built close personal connections with urban administrative elites and 
therefore gained the power to decide compensation (Badyina and Golubchikov, 2005). In China’s 
context, while the local state used to set minimum compensation standards in the early 1990s, it 
gradually pulled back in subsequent years amid claims to let the market do its job. The result of 
this is that developers gained increasingly more power in setting compensation, and depressed 
compensation levels considerably. During China’s urban renewal and regeneration, it is often the 
case that the targeted properties are stigmatised, by the developers, as “dilapidated”, “blighted”, 
and “obsolete”. It is through this stigmatising strategy that developers devalue properties’ 
exchange and use value and justify offering low compensation to residents (Beauregard, 1993; 
Page, 1999; Fogleson, 2001; Weber, 2002). In addition, in China’s context, the compensation 
offered to residents is always based on the “current price” of properties, that is, the price before 
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redevelopment. Therefore Chinese residents are excluded from enjoying the added value brought 
about by urban development. Because of the low levels of compensation, the less-well-to-do 
residents, after their houses are demolished, find themselves unable to afford the expensive 
properties in the inner urban areas and have to move to the outer urban districts where property 
prices are comparably low. Meanwhile, developers try their best to lure the less wealthy residents 
away to suburban areas, by constructing relocation communities at these places and offering 
attractive discounts. In addition, affordable housing constructed by China’s local government is 
normally located in suburban places instead of inner city areas, providing accommodation for the 
poor who cannot buy properties. 
 
In the past three decades, so many large-scale development projects have occurred around 
Chinese cities and have repeated the processes of displacement and gentrification. At the end of 
section 1.2, I outlined some figures which showed that in many Chinese cities, hundreds of 
thousands of households were displaced during urban development projects in just a few years. 
Many of these displaced residents have been relocated to outer urban areas, realising planners’ 
ambitions of gentrifying the inner city and accelerating the suburbanization process. In Liao Ning 
Province, the remodelling of industrial brown field sites, has induced 706,000 households to be 
displaced from 2005 to 2009, with one quarter of them being relocated to newly developed 
suburban satellite towns. In Qingdao, a large-scale suburban residential community, Fu Shan Hou, 
with capacity for accommodating 400,000 households, has been constructed since 1998, providing 
for more than 100,000 households displaced during the inner city redevelopment projects.  
 
Displacement forms one of the most significant problems suffered by urban residents, in China’s 
context as well as in other places. Displacement and residential instability are blamed for 
shattering residents’ social networks and attachment to place, uprooting them from the 
place-specific socio-spatial context where “a world of predictability and confidence” has been 
created, and where practices and daily life“tend to get routinized, and for very good reasons ... [as] 
they not only facilitate realization of individual ends” (Cox and Mair, 1988: 312). In addition, 
residential instability is also criticised as “deleterious to political life”, in terms of corroding a sense 
of belonging, willingness to participate, and levels of civic involvement (Elkin, 1987; Dagger, 1997; 
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Williamson, 2010; Imbroscio, 2012). 
 
In China’s context, gentrification and displacement induce similar, but also additional far more 
significant social and political consequences. This relates to how one’s citizenship is (re)defined. 
While remaining in central urban locations is becoming increasingly more difficult for the poor and 
even for other people, due to rising property prices and the dispersal plans made by planning 
officials, living in urban cores is also becoming increasingly more crucial to acquiring proper 
citizenship. In China, the household registration system, which was established during the 
pre-reform period and still functions today, registers people belonging to certain places, rural or 
urban, this city or that city, and determines people’s rights to access urban services, welfare, job 
and education opportunities. While the household registration system remains an important 
dimension in defining Chinese citizenship and political identity, its dominant position, to some 
extent, is undermined and eroded, if not replaced, by property rights. Since the year 2000, many 
Chinese cities have witnessed unstable real-estate markets with a roller-coaster of property prices 
and falling demand. To stimulate real-estate markets, many Chinese cities, including Qingdao, 
Dalian and Shenyang, have enacted new policies: those who are not registered as local citizens will 
acquire formal citizenship and enjoy local welfare services, if they purchase newly developed, 
large-sized flats (normally larger than 100 m²) in the city. It seems that China’s household 
registration system, the citizenship regime, and the urban welfare system, which used to be 
strictly controlled, impermeable, and closed to outsiders, now are rendered porous by property 
ownership. In addition, within Chinese cities, property ownership also decides citizens’ access to 
good quality education. Around Chinese cities, from kindergartens to senior high schools, seriously 
uneven resource distribution exists that separates these schools into so called “privileged schools” 
and “normal schools”. The former have sufficient funding support, provide high quality education 
and offer their students better opportunities to access other privileged schools (for example, the 
students in privileged elementary school normally have a better chance of being accepted by 
another privileged junior high school than those in normal elementary schools). To decide who 
can access which school follows a so-called “adjacent principle”, that is, the property owners of 
the houses near the schools have access to them. However, it is always the case that the houses 
near the privileged schools are extremely expensive, sometimes up to ten times more than the 
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average property prices in the city, and far beyond the affordability of normal people. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that property ownership redefines Chinese hierarchical citizenship which is 
privileging the rich and the powerful (Solinger, 1999; Keane, 2001; Smart and Smart, 2001; 
Goldman, 2005). 
 
The above argument is evidence that China’s urban development forms part of a process of 
accumulation by dispossession, which is “founded on the exploitation of the many by the few” 
(Harvey, 1976: 314). In many senses, China’s urbanization informs a politics and policy approach 
that is against the claims of the right to the city discourse. According to Harvey, “the right to the 
city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it after our heart's 
desire” (2003: 939). The right to the city, therefore, informs a right to alternative urbanism, “the 
right to remake ourselves by creating a qualitatively different kind of urban sociality” (Harvey, 
2003: 939), and it is “not merely a right of access to what the property speculators and state 
planners define, but an active right to make the city different, … and to re-make ourselves thereby 
in a different image” (2003: 941). To bring about an alternative urbanism, as Harvey claims, it is 
crucial to exert “greater democratic control over the production and use of the surplus” (2012: 23); 
or, according to Purcell, we must confront “capital’s ability to valorise urban space, establishing a 
clear priority for the use value of urban residents over the exchange value interests of capitalist 
firms” (2002: 103). According to Lefebvre, the right to the city “cannot be conceived of as a simple 
visiting right… (but) can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life” 
(1996: 158). Lefebvre claims that the right to participation and appropriation over the production 
of urban spaces must be given to all urban inhabitants, those who live in the city and “contribute 
to the body of urban lived experience and lived space” (Purcell, 2002: 102). In a radical Lefebvrian 
notion, to claim the right to the city, citizenship and political membership must be redefined to 
transcend the political order that defines inclusion/exclusion as an urban process (Dikec, 2001, 
2005; McCann, 2002; Purcell, 2002; Brenner et al, 2012). Under the lens of the right to the city 
discourse, Chinese urbanization is seriously problematic: it is a process that prioritises the pursuit 
of exchange value and rapid capital accumulation, creating displacement, dispossession and 
economic exploitation, (re)producing marginalization and discrimination, and perpetuating 
disenfranchisement, a process that, as Mayer comments, “entails enormous losses of rights – civil, 
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social, political, as well as economic rights (2009: 367). 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the new urban phenomena, urban processes and urban problems related 
to China’s political and market reforms. These include the emergence of property-led urban 
development, the pro-development/pro-profits behaviour of central and local government, as well 
as the large-scale demolition, displacement, dispossession, and disenfranchisement of urban 
inhabitants. These, as this chapter argues, form the crucial dimensions of Chinese neoliberal 
urbanism, and are constitutive parts of the process of the neoliberalization of social, political and 
economic relations in Chinese society. 
 
According to Harvey, “urbanization, we may conclude, has played a crucial role in the absorption 
of capital surpluses and has done so at ever-increasing geographical scales, but at the price of 
burgeoning processes of creative destruction that entail the dispossession of the urban masses of 
any right to the city whatsoever” (2008: 37). In this chapter, by examining China’s urbanization in 
the past three decades, we come to the same conclusion as Harvey. I highlight the point that 
China’s urbanization informs a process of accumulation by dispossession, a process that is “funded 
on the exploitation of the many by the few” (Harvey, 1976: 314). I have shown how urban renewal 
and regeneration cause dispossession of residents’ economic benefits and their rights to stay in 
central urban locations; the sense in which Chinese urban development informs discriminatory 
urban policies that remake Chinese cities as “one vast gated community” for the rich to enjoy 
(Harvey, 2012: 23), but deprive disadvantaged groups of rights to live in the city; and how, and in 
what ways, in post-reform Chinese society, property ownership is (re)invented as a privilege for 
the rich and powerful and an important dimension in redefining Chinese citizenship, political 
identity, and the right to the city. With the pro-development sentiment becoming dominant at 
China’s central and local state levels, it is quite unlikely that Qian and Wong’s expectation that “the 
fruits of market reforms will hopefully be shared by all social groups through the regulative role of 
the government”, will be realised in China (2000: 125).  
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Low compensation levels and displacement, as I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, are two 
correlated processes under China’s urbanization, with the former as a primary economic 
mechanism that induces the latter. While western countries have already passed the phase when 
large-scale urban demolition and displacement engendered an urban crisis and became the target 
of urban protests and movements (Mayer, 2009), this is the phase that Chinese cities are now 
entering. In China’s context, since the early 1990s, low compensation and displacement started to 
arise as the most direct issues suffered by Chinese residents, and became new points of focus for 
urban contestation and political mobilization in the country. Around these issues, Chinese 
residents are sponsoring protests fighting for their economic and political rights, the central and 
local state is (re)inventing new governance initiatives, and trying to redress the balance between 
rapid development and social (in)stability. I will examine these social contestations and 














Chapter 2   Contesting the urbanization process: state policy, forced demolition, and the role 
of grassroots protests 
2.1. Introduction 
In chapter 1, I examined market reform and the emergence of property-led urban development 
projects in China. I highlighted China’s urbanization process as characterised by low compensation 
for dispossession, the displacement of residents, and the adoption of a class dimension in the 
sense that the urbanization process is reinforcing the rights and power of the rich while sacrificing 
the rights of the poor and disadvantaged groups. But it is exactly based upon such a biased 
urbanization process that China’s central and local states are developing their own political and 
economic interests. Since the early 1990s, residents’ protests and resistance activities started to 
emerge around Chinese cities, focusing primarily on claims against displacement and low 
compensation. Responding to these urban grassroots struggles, China’s central and local states 
sponsored a series of new government initiatives and policy reforms, to govern, pacify, and 
suppress, residents’ resistance activities and to maintain China’s urban development and 
urbanization at a rapid pace. In this chapter, I will examine these contestations around China’s 
urbanization process.  
 
As this chapter shows, Chinese urban residents’ protests against demolition and low 
compensation are usually suppressed by the local state, through forced expropriation, eviction, 
and demolition practices. This intensifies social resentment, galvanising a new round of resistance 
activities which usually take more extreme forms, such as self-immolation. The proliferation of 
urban grassroots protests and the increasingly more confrontational urban development process 
has finally alerted China’s central state to social instability and the imperative for reform. A series 
of policy and institutional reform initiatives were published by the central state in 2010 and 2011, 
for the purposes of regulating development and urbanization processes at the local level, with 
special focus on restricting the use of forced eviction and demolition approaches in the land 
clearance process. This chapter examines China’s urban grassroots mobilizations and resistance, 
exploring their political opportunities under China’s political regime as well as their power in 
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bringing about social and political changes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. Section 2.2 examines the emergence of 
residents’ protests and resistance activities in Chinese cities against low compensation and 
displacement. It also analyses why these protests take an individualised form and adopt a blocking 
strategy, and how these relate to China’s specific political regime. While Chinese residents’ 
protests, with a specific form, discourse and strategy, have limited political significance, as they 
inform no particular urban social movement which challenges urban meanings and structures; I 
argue that they inform a creative way of protesting under the Chinese political regime and state 
repression institutions, and, more specifically, they inform how Chinese residents skilfully capture, 
exploit, and engage with “the structure of domination (and pierce the hegemony) at its weakest 
point” (O’Brien, 1996: 55). Section 2.3 focuses on the forced expropriation, eviction and 
demolition issues in the Chinese context. It examines the reason why the forced eviction and 
demolition approach is widespread around Chinese cities, and in what sense they are efficient 
tools used by a pro-development state to accelerate land clearance and the urban development 
process. However, the over-use of forced demolition activities have induced a new urban crisis in 
the Chinese context, embodied in the emergence of more violent resistance activities that 
endanger political legitimacy and social stability. To address this, the central state initiated new 
policy and institutional reforms in 2010 and 2011. I will examine these reforms in section 2.4. 
Section 2.5 concludes the arguments of this chapter. 
 
2.2. Protests under China’s political regime: Individualised resistance activities with pragmatic 
goals 
Examining the “shifting mottos of urban social movements” in advanced capitalist countries, 
Mayer (2009: 362) points out that in the 1960s and the 1970s, among anti-war movements and 
contestations on urban collective consumption, there were protests and resistance activities 
against urban renewal projects and displacement which formed another primary force in urban 
grassroots mobilisation. The latest kinds of movement are also termed as urban struggles against 
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“the inhospitality of our cities” (Mitscherlich, 2008: 55, in Mayer, 2009: 363), or resistance against 
“the barrenness which Fordist zoning of urban space and suburbanization had brought about” 
(Mayer, 2009: 363). At the time, in London, Berlin, New York, and many other capitalist cities, 
urban political groups and grassroots organizations, such as tenants’ committees, and homeowner 
groups, were galvanized against government highway construction projects, inner-city remodelling 
plans, and the displacement that was induced (see for example, Castells and Sheridan, 1977; 
Castells, 1983; Mayer, 2009; Holm and Kuhn, 2011; Harvey, 2012). While fading in western 
countries in subsequent decades, in terms of state-led, large-scale urban demolition, displacement 
and the resistance activities against them, they are relatively new, and predominant, urban 
phenomena and processes in developing countries, dating from the early 1990s. In Rio, Delhi, 
Bombay, Istanbul, Seoul, and many other places that are labelled as “Third World cities”, organised 
and collective forms of resistance have been observed that are challenging the urban renewal and 
displacement that is conducted in the name of development and modernization (see for example, 
Ramanathan, 2005; Bhan, 2009; Shin, 2008, 2009; Loveringa and Türkmen, 2011; Uysal, 2012; 
Karaman, 2014).  
 
In China’s context, since the early 1990s, large-scale urban renewal and regeneration have created 
massive displacement and started to form an “accumulation by dispossession” process (see 
chapter 1). Residents’ protests and resistance activities have sprung up. Yet it is not urban renewal 
projects and demolition per se, but the low compensation levels, forced displacement, and 
economic exploitation, which are relentlessly produced throughout the urban renewal and 
regeneration process (see chapter 1), that generate acute resentment from Chinese urban 
residents and become the targets of grassroots protests (see for example, Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 
2006; Phan, 2005; Ren, 2008; Lee, 2008; Hsing, 2009; Weinstein and Ren, 2009; Yip and Jiang, 
2011). A typical demand by Chinese protesters is for higher compensation or better relocation 
housing in more central locations. The requirements of higher compensation and better 
resettlement housing, within a central location, are usually seen by Chinese protesters as 
interchangeable, given that they are so in both symbolic and material terms. In China’s context, 
with a prosperous real estate market in place, and with expensive new house prices in central 
urban locations, accessing higher compensation means that residents could purchase high-value 
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properties around urban centres, after the demolition of their old housing. This would not only 
guarantee residents’ rights to stay in, and enjoy the lifestyle and privileged citizenship attached to, 
the urban cores (see chapter 1); but also, this guarantees them promising economic returns in the 
future, by “cashing in on the rising value of their property … (which) became a convenient cash 
cow, a personal ATM machine” (Harvey, 2012: 48). Therefore, behind Chinese protesters’ claims 
for higher compensation and (centrally located) better relocation housing, there lies the 
requirement for both economic and political rights. 
 
In Chinese cities, those who protest against displacement and low compensation are homeowners, 
the individuals who have ownership over real-estate properties. More specifically, homeowners 
here refer to two kinds of people: those who became private owners through purchasing public 
owned housing during the 1980s’ housing reform (see chapter 1); and those public renters, the 
quasi-homeowner of the work unit, local state, and other types of public owned housing, who 
only pay a nominal fee but are guaranteed stable and permanent use rights. The private renters, 
referring to the people who are renting properties owned by private homeowners and public 
renters, however, seldom protest during urban renewal and regeneration. There are several 
reasons for this, such as that private renters are not being dispossessed of privately-owned 
properties, which is so crucial in motivating Chinese quasi-/homeowners to act. Also, Chinese 
private renters, who have experienced frequent moves and live unstable lives in the cities, bear 
less resentment to demolition induced displacement, than the quasi-/homeowners who desire a 
stable lifestyle. However, the reason why Chinese private renters seldom protestis not only 
because they lack the motivation, it is also because they have been deprived of such rights. In 
China’s current urban policy relating to urban renewal and regeneration, it is clearly stated that 
only the individuals with legal ownership of properties will be compensated for their expropriation. 
This reflects how China’s urban policy, by valuing and respecting private ownership, is deeply 
rooted in neoliberal economic and political principles, which are becoming increasingly more 
dominant, and established, in Chinese society since market reform. Chinese private renters are 
deprived of the right to receive compensation, and, they are, therefore, not given a proper role in 
the fight for higher compensation and other rights in the urbanization process (such as the right of 
residential stability) (Rancière, 1999; Rancière, et al, 2001). 
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Commenting on Chinese homeowners’ protests against low compensation and displacement, 
Perry sees this as informing Chinese emergent “rights consciousness”, and reflecting a meaningful 
“bottom-up claim to citizenship and auguring a fundamental breakthrough in state-society 
relations” (2008: 37). More specifically, many writers reduce this “rights consciousness” to the 
rights over private property, which is behind the mobilization of Chinese homeowners. 
Responding to Harvey’s argument on “intense possessive individualism”, a neoliberal ethic under 
which the “the defence of property values becomes of such paramount political interest” (2008: 
32), Shin (2013) comments that it also underpins the protests by China’s homeowners. Explaining 
further, Shin argues that in Chinese cities, homeowners have acquired a new, and important, 
political identity, and their “political interests are centred around preserving (and increasing) 
property values” (Shin, 2013: 20; see also, Keane, 2001; Perry, 2008). Concurring with Shin’s 
viewpoint on China’s emerging property rights consciousness and its political mobilization 
functions, many writers term Chinese homeowners’ protests as property rights activism or protest 
(Lee, 2008; Hsing, 2009; Shin, 2013), or describe it in a more general way as “Chinese 
homeowners’ defence of their homes” (Cai, 2007: 175). 
 
While in the past in western countries and currently in developing countries, protests and 
resistance activities against urban renewal and displacement normally take an organized, 
collective form, as mentioned earlier, this is not the case in China. Instead, Chinese homeowners’ 
protests are more often conducted as individualised activities, that is, they are conducted by 
single individuals or one single family, as isolated resistance activities instead of in alliance with 
other protesters. The reason for this has its roots in China’s political regime and political culture. In 
the past three decades, China’s central and local states have been ruthless towards suppressing 
citizens’ collective political actions; and, through many events, such as the suppression of the 
1989 Tiananmen cross-class alliance demonstration, and the poll plan protest in Hong Kong in 
2014, have given citizens explicit warning that collective actions are intolerable in the country, 
although much more political freedom has been given to Chinese citizens now.  
 
Harvey also discusses the implications of the Chinese state’s harsh suppression of collective 
political action. This resulted in China’s absence from the global anti-Iraq war rallies in 2003 which 
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occurred in so many cities including “Madrid, London, Barcelona, Berlin, and Athens, … in New 
York and Melbourne, and … in nearly 200 cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America” (Harvey, 2012: 
116). Absence from this indicates China’s missing presence from a significant moment of “the first 
expressions of global public opinion” (2012: 116). Also, as many news reports and research have 
shown, in the Chinese context, during the past three decades, in fighting for compensation and 
relocation, those homeowners’ protests and activism which have taken collective form have been 
confronted with harsh suppression. Chinese homeowners who organise street demonstrations 
denouncing delayed compensation payments usually end up with the leaders being arrested. 
Residents, angry about the local state’s corruption and collusion with developers, when travelling 
to Beijing to hand in their collective petition letters to the central state, are usually blocked by 
local officials and the police, and will sometimes be sent to detention centres; while lawyer Zheng, 
when representing a group of evicted residents suing Shanghai municipal officials concerning 
corruption, was arrested and charged for “circulating state secrets” in 2003 (see for example, Hand, 
2006; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 2006; Cai, 2007; Hsing, 2009; Kurtenbach, 
2009; Weinstein and Ren, 2009; Shih, 2010; Yip and Jiang, 2011). China’s political regime and state 
repression have gradually ground down and destroyed Chinese citizens’ confidence and courage in 
taking collective resistance actions. Because of this, China’s resistance activities, and Chinese 
homeowners’ protests against displacement and low compensations, are seldom conducted in 
collective form but more usually as individualised actions. Recounting this point, Zhang comments 
that in terms of Chinese homeowners’ protests, the “shadow of the Falun Gong repression and the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown lingered” (2004: 273). 
 
Indeed, as Scott implies, the forms and parameters of resistance activities are set not only by “the 
institutions of the repression”, but also by the sociology of the protest groups (1985: 299). Let us 
remember that what are being demolished during China’s urban renewal projects are usually the 
poor neighbourhoods, the homes of the less-well-to-do people. In Chinese cities, the poor 
residents are the primary victims of urban demolition, suffering from dispossession caused by low 
compensation and displacement. Therefore, except for a few cases when wealthy neighbourhoods 
are demolished and the rich residents protest, it is the poor and disadvantaged groups who are 
the primary forces against China’s urban renewal and displacement. While the state’s repressive 
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institutions channel Chinese homeowners’ protests towards an individualised form, the social and 
economic disadvantaged status of these protesters prescribes the strategies being adopted. 
 
Therefore certain protest strategies, which require well developed economic and social capital of 
the protesters, such as lawsuits and media exposure, are less popular, and only occasionally, 
adopted by Chinese homeowners, most of whom are poor and disadvantaged. In the past three 
decades, there have been some cases when Chinese homeowners have tried to seek legal justice 
and sue developers and the local state, for example, for low compensation, poor quality housing, 
contract fraud and corruption. However, in China as well as in other countries, the lawsuit is a 
game for the rich, given all the time and money required. In addition, specific to China’s context, 
where the courts and juridical system are not independent from, but undergo control and 
intervention from, the local state, it is less likely that residents will have a chance to win a lawsuit 
against the local state and developers, who shape growth coalitions for exploiting land-based 
interests. Recounting this point, Shin comments that Chinese homeowners’ “law suit attempts are 
often marred by bureaucratic processes that act as barriers to plaintiffs, and the existing judicial 
processes tend to work in greater favour of the government and developers” (2013: 6; see also, 
O’Brien and Li, 2004; Johnson, 2006; Weinstein and Ren, 2009). Some Chinese homeowners also 
seek media exposure. The hope is that the public media, such as newspapers, will report their 
family’s story about how miserable their life has been/ will be, because of the low compensation, 
and through this, to win public support and sympathy, mounting pressure on local government 
and developers to force them into concessions by raising compensation levels. However, Chinese 
public media discourses confront strict government censorship and the public media institutions 
themselves are usually straitjacketed by strict government controls in terms of licence issuing, 
personnel control and funding allocations (Van Dijk, 1996; Zhao, 1998; Li, 2000; Donald et al, 2002; 
Lee, 2003; Zhao and Sun, 2007; Shirk, 2011). Therefore, only if homeowners can manage to build 
up strong enough personal connections with the journalists and leaders of public media 
institutions, which is less likely given the homeowners’ disadvantaged status, is there is a chance 
that the public media will represent their opposition to the local state.  
 
Instead, the cost-free “stand-off actions”, or “blocking strategy”, which involve “physically 
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occupying homes and farms slated for demolition” (Hsing, 2010: 18), is the most popular protest 
strategy among Chinese homeowners in fighting for higher compensation and better relocation 
housing. This strategy is also adopted by residents in other countries. In Seoul, South Korea, a 
group of tenants, who refused to move out of their properties and hindered the construction 
project, successfully won higher compensation and 50 years tenure over public rental flats as 
relocation properties (Shin, 2009). In Cardiff, UK, some local small businesses refused to vacate the 
land scheduled for comprehensive regeneration, with the hope of fighting for a better offer that 
would cover their loss of business (Imrie and Thomas, 1997). Also, in the USA, during the state-led, 
large scale urban renewal movement in the 1950s, individuals holding out– being the last to sell 
and therefore to capture the inflated prices in an assembly of properties - became a major 
problem for the state but also a key strategy for individuals to win higher compensation (see for 
example, Munch, 1976; Imrie and Thomas, 1997; Dobbs, 2002; Olds, et al, 2002; Pritchett, 2003). 
In China’s context, the blocking strategy used by homeowners is, in essence, “betting on time”. 
Explaining this, Zhang comments that Chinese homeowners who adopt a blocking strategy “know 
from the beginning that they will have to leave eventually, but they hope that the delay may put 
pressure on the counterpart who is eager to clear the ground for construction” (Zhang, 2004: 268). 
Underpinning homeowners’ blocking strategy is an assumption that the developers will act to 
maximise economic benefits. In other words, the residents expect the developers to make 
concessions and pay them higher compensation, which is a relatively small cost when considering 
the huge risks and costs induced by a delayed project, such as the substantial administrative 
penalty for not completing the project by the due date, and the risk that the bank cuts off loans if 
construction is delayed too long. By adopting a blocking strategy, many Chinese homeowners 
successfully win the opportunity to negotiate with the developers, and many of them get better 
compensation offers.  
 
However, for a long period, Chinese homeowners’ blocking actions have formed de facto illegal 
behaviour. This is due to China’s unclear private property rights, induced by the partial land and 
housing reforms failing to provide a proper legal basis for homeowners’ stay-put activities. As 
chapter 1 has shown, in the 1980s, the use right of China’s urban land was marketised, but the 
ownership remained with the state, meanwhile housing was privatised through selling to the 
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individuals but there were no formal legal documents to enforce their property rights. Under this 
background, the illegality of China’s homeowners’ stay-put action lies in the contradictions 
between the clearly defined state’s rights and the unclearly defined individuals’ rights. In other 
words, Chinese homeowners’ blocking action involves individuals occupying the properties that 
they have no legal ownership over, and hindering the local state in enacting its legal rights over 
reclaiming publicly owned urban land. 
 
The publication of the property rights law, by China’s central state in 2007, which prescribed 
individuals’ legal rights over private properties, including housing, finally provided the legal basis 
for Chinese homeowners’ blocking strategy. One of the most well-known blocking actions 
happened in Chongqing, was carried out by one family in 2007 just after publication of the new 
law. Claiming higher compensation, the family refused to move out of their house and occupied 
the property while the entire neighbourhood was demolished. The family hung out banners 
outside their house, on which they quoted from the new property rights law, “individuals’ legal 
private property should be protected and should not be violated” (see Figure 2.1). It is not only 
that the legal arguments started to be used by Chinese homeowners, but, using legal discourse 
itself meant that Chinese homeowners’ protest actions adopted a new form, that is, so called 
“rightful resistance”. According to O’Brien, rightful resistance involves the “innovative use of laws, 
policies, and other officially promoted values” to defend one’s legal rights (1996: 33); and, 
therefore, it is one type of resistance that “operates partly within (yet in tension with) official 
norms, … depends on a degree of accommodation with a structure of domination, the deft use of 
prevailing cultural conventions, and an affirmation - sometimes sincere, sometimes strategic - of 
existing channels of inclusion” (1996: 32). According to O’Brien, rightful resistance, which uses 
“the vocabulary of the regime to advance … claims”, is in its nature “disruptive” but not “unlawful”; 
it informs an attempt to seek a “contractual approach to political life”, and is a quintessential 
“critique within the hegemony” (1996: 34-5). This form of resistance could provide people with 
certain political “protection when their plans go awry” (O’Brien, 1996: 35), and this is why, under 
China’s political regime which enforces strong repression over individuals’ resistance activities, 
many of China’s popular protests adopt the form of rightful resistance. In terms of China’s 
property rights activism, following the Chongqing family, many other homeowners started to use 
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legal discourse during their (blocking) protest action. While rightful resistance is primarily, and 
most usually, observed in Chinese rural areas, it seems that now Chinese urban homeowners are 
starting to join the tide of rightful resistance. 
 
Figure 2.1. Chongqing resident occupying the house 
 




This Chongqing family’s blocking action was extensively reported by the Chinese media back then 
and became one of the most well-known and famous property rights protests in China. Reporting 
this event, the Chinese news media invented a new nickname for the family, the “nail household” 
(Ding Zi Hu). The term “nail household” compares the family who refuse to move and are blocking 
the progress of the construction project to the nail that fixes into the land, and which is hard to 
remove and clear away. Many writers imply that the term is discriminatory. In Shin’s sense, with 
the name nail household, the protesters “have been portrayed in negative images by government 
officials who may claim them to be of nuisance or the occupiers as trouble-makers” (2013: 7). Also 
according to Hsing, by calling the residents nail households, they are “presented as uncooperative 
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and opportunistic negotiators for higher compensation and are accused of sacrificing the public 
interests for personal gain, and even of causing housing price hikes” (2010: 78). However, in fact, 
the name nail household is rather contradictory in meaning. In reporting Chongqing family’s 
blocking action in 2007, the Chinese news media used the term nail households in an unqualified 
way: some of them used it as a negative term as Shin and Hsing have interpreted; but others, by 
calling the family nail household, actually complimented their stubborn but heroic and vanguard 
behaviour in claiming citizens’ legal rights, and in confronting the developers and the powerful 
local state. Now in China, those homeowners who protest and take blocking action, are normally 
called nail households, and, by using this term, the contradictory attitudes towards the protesters 
remain. The Chinese news media’s contradictory attitudes towards nail households actually 
reflects the Chinese state’s ambivalent attitudes. The state’s repressive regime, which used to be 
ruthless towards suppressing Chinese homeowners’ protests, has now softened in the face of the 
protesters’ rightful claims to their legal property rights that the state has granted to the people.  
 
According to Castells (1983), urban struggles can be classified as urban social movements “only 
when they combine activism around collective consumption with struggles for community culture 
and political self-management, … that is, capable of transforming urban meanings, and to produce 
a city organized on the basis of use values, autonomous local cultures and decentralized 
participatory democracy” (quoted from Mayer, 2009: 364). Against this rather normative 
definition, Chinese homeowners’ protests cannot form urban social movements in any sense. They 
are, instead, individualised protests, which are criticised by Shin as lacking meaningful alliance not 
only among homeowners themselves but also among homeowners and private renters, and 
reflecting only Chinese homeowners’ “selfish pursuit of the notion of ‘just us’” (2013: 11). In 
addition, Chinese homeowners’ protests focus on issues of compensation and relocation housing, 
and have no such ambition of gaining better control over the decision making process and the 
urban development agenda. What Chinese homeowners’ protests form, therefore, in Hobsbawm’s 
words, is grassroots struggle and “working the system to their minimum disadvantage” 
(Hobsbawm, 1973: 7, in Scott, 1985: 301). 
 
However, Chinese homeowners’ protests and resistance activities have their own significance. As 
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the previous argument has shown, by adopting individualised forms of protest, Chinese 
homeowners skilfully avoid the political risks attached to a collective movement; a most 
impressive achievement is how Chinese homeowners have exploited the discourse of the new 
property rights law and used it in their rightful resistance and to soften the state’s repressive 
power. Chinese homeowners’ protests, in their specific forms, strategies and discourses, therefore, 
are a creative way of protesting under the Chinese political regime and state repression 
institutions. Even more so, they inform how Chinese homeowners skilfully capture, exploit, and 
engage with “the structure of domination (and pierce the hegemony) at its weakest point” 
(O’Brien, 1996: 55). 
 
Over the past three decades, China’s urbanization and urban redevelopment projects have are 
been conducted at such a large-scale and have proceeded at a rapid pace. Substantial funding, 
deregulated land use planning, and other policy supports, have been provided by China’s local 
state, paving the road for rapid development to continue in the future. However, residents’ 
blocking strategy signifies a major hindrance to this ambition. Residents’ blocking actions have 
become so common, and, sometimes seriously, delay the progress of the construction work, 
raising developers’ costs, including the extra salary paid to construction workers and company 
employees during the protracted negotiation process, or the higher compensation offered to the 
residents to make them move. Forced expropriation, eviction and demolition forms such an 
efficient approach to tackle residents’ blocking actions, by compulsorily removing people and 
bulldozing any obstacles in the way of development. In China’s context, legislation and urban 
policies have prescribed the local state’s power, as well as its legitimacy, in using a forced eviction 
and demolition approach in urban development projects. As I will demonstrate in the next section, 
forced expropriation, eviction and demolition form crucial government strategies in China’s 
urbanization process. 
 
2.3. Rapid development as priority: Forced eviction and demolition in China’s context 
Residents’ blocking strategy, in Phan’s sense, signifies a way in “which the economically and 
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politically disadvantaged can carve out a space for themselves, in a world of competing interests” 
(2005: 36). Forced expropriation, eviction and demolition are how the public authorities usually 
react. In China as well as in other countries, these approaches have been used so often in urban 
renewal and regeneration. In the USA, it is through the power of eminent domain that the state 
compulsorily expropriates the land and property of those who refuse to sell; in the UK, it is 
through issuing Compulsory Purchase Orders that the municipal government acquires people’s 
properties, creating integrated land sites from fragmented ownership, for comprehensive 
regeneration projects; in Istanbul, Turkey, a brutal forced eviction and demolition process has 
occurred, involving the use of police power and “high-pressure water cannons to disperse” the 
residents (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011: 90; see also, Agbola and Jinadu, 1997; Olds, et al, 2002; 
Dobbs, 2002; Du Plessis, 2005; Shin, 2008; Farouk and Owusu, 2012; Harvey, 2012; Uysal, 2012). 
Forced expropriation, eviction and demolition, as in Harvey’s sense, informs one of “those 
moments of creative destruction where the economy of wealth-accumulation piggy-backs 
violently on the economy of dispossession” (2012: 25). 
 
While forced expropriation, eviction and demolition form a violation of people’s private properties, 
in China as well as in other countries, endless efforts have been made to reinvent these as “acts of 
governance rather than violation” (Bhan, 2009: 131). This is done, primarily, through seeking 
legitimacy under the existing legal framework. In Delhi, India, it is through defining the poor as 
illegal citizens in the courts that the forced demolition of their housing, the so called urban slum, 
is justified; in the USA, while the Fifth Amendment “limits eminent domain to the taking of 
‘private property… for public use’”, contestations and reinterpretations over the meaning of 
“public use” finally extended it to equal “public purpose”, so that nearly any development projects, 
as long as they produce certain economic benefits, can be said to be fitting public purpose and 
legitimise using eminent domain (Kelly, 2006: 10). Analogous to these countries, China’s state 
authorities also seek to justify forced demolition through interpreting the law. In doing this, a 
central legal clause being drawn upon is one in the property rights law, which dictates that “for 
public interests, and according to legal procedures, land under collective ownership, and the 
real-estate properties under work units and individuals’ ownership, can be forcefully expropriated”. 
However the meaning of the “public interest” is never clearly defined, either in the property rights 
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law itself or by other laws. This leads to the abuse of the use of “public interest”, as well as the 
forced eviction and demolition conducted in its name, around Chinese cities. Chinese localities 
have found the ambiguous term “public interest” as a convenient master key that can be applied 
to nearly every situation– giving it the ability to construct new roads, public schools, or to develop 
new shopping malls, high-tech parks and even golf courses - all can be interpreted as fitting the 
“public interest” in certain ways. In the past three decades, the houses of millions of Chinese 
families have been demolished in the name of enhancing the “public interest”- an ambiguous 
term and in so many cases a cover for commercial interests. Indeed, as Imrie and Thomas 
comment, the public interest informs a legal ideology which serves to enable certain material 
interests and overwhelm the others (1997; see also, Blackman, 1991). 
 
Besides the instrumentalised “public interest” discourse which provides legitimacy for the 
government’s forced expropriation process, the reason why a forced eviction and demolition 
approach is abused in Chinese cities is also due to the fact that the local state, a key party in the 
urban development process, seeking land-based interests and shaping growth coalitions with 
developers, is empowered to issue forced demolition orders. As stated in Urban Housing 
Demolition Management Ordinance (UHDMO), a policy document published by the central state 
in 2001, the local authorities, usually urban planning, or municipal land resources and property 
management departments, when facing “residents who refused to move out by the due date”, 
have the power to decide whether to issue forced demolition permissions to the developers and 
the demolition companies. This clause is criticized by Chinese researchers and legal commentators 
as giving the local state unrestricted and unsupervised power in the land clearance process, and 
that China’s local state is both player and judge in the game. One consequence of this is that 
China’s local state, which is keen to end the residents’ blocking strategy, rubber-stamps developers’ 
applications for forced demolition. 
 
A prominent element of the forced eviction and demolition process is the use of coercive power, 
defined by Allen as “the ability to influence conduct through the threat of negative sanctions” 
(2003: 60). In the Chinese context, forced eviction and demolition will usually proceed in the 
following way. It will start with the local authorities, normally the street offices, sending warning 
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letters to the targeted residents, which, by adopting harsh and unpleasant tones, urge them to 
move out by the due date. This will normally be followed by the action of painting the Chinese 
character, “Chai”, meaning to demolish, on the walls of the targeted buildings (see Figure 2.2). 
According to Chau (2008), painting the character Chai on the wall informs power-infused “text 
acts”, through which Chinese public authorities intend to exert command over, instead of 
communication with, their audience. While Chai means “to demolish”, Chau implies that the 
character not only expresses the semantic meaning, but it also delivers other symbolic meanings 
through the form it takes, such as that the word Chai is usually painted in red to forcefully attract 
attention, and the word is intentionally drawn in an ugly way to uglify the building targeted for 
demolition. In the end, the demolition companies’ construction teams and bulldozers will arrive 
and dismantle the housing. The residents who still refuse to leave at this point will be forcefully 
dragged out of their rooms. The scene is supervised by public sector staff, usually from the urban 
management department (Cheng Guan Zhi Fa), who dress in uniforms to announce government 



















Figure 2.2. The symbol of “Chai” 
 
Dates: 2012, October 
















Figure 2.3. Uniforms on the scene of forced demolition 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
Outside the local authorities’ purview, developers also conduct illegal behaviour, without 
government permission, in order to accelerate the land clearance process. This usually involves 
the developer contracted demolition companies, and thugs hired by the latter, to create a difficult 
living environment for the residents, and even to threaten residents’ personal safety, with the 
purpose of forcing the residents to end their blocking actions and to drive them out of the 
community. Typical situations include cutting the electricity wires and breaking the water pipes, 
pouring garbage on the doorways, and smashing windows. Sometimes more violent situations 
occur, such as described by Weinstein and Ren, that “hired thugs have been known to set fire to 
houses, or to tear them down when residents are not home or in the night when they are sleeping” 
(2009: 420); or the story told by Hsing, that “residents were blindfolded and taken from their 
homes by force, when blindfolds were removed, the only thing the residents saw was the rubble 
of their former homes” (2009: 31). Similar illegal, and brutal land clearance processes also happen 
in other countries, such as in Seoul, South Korea, where, according to Harvey, in the 1990s, “the 
construction companies and developers hired goon squads of sumo-wrestler types to invade 
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whole neighbourhoods and smash down with sledgehammers not only the housing but also all the 
possessions” (2012: 19). 
 
This type of forced demolition is also termed by Chinese writers as “barbarian demolition” 
(Weinstein and Ren, 2009), or considered as informing some kind of “property management 
terrorism” that uses violence to “silence and intimidate homeowner activists… who dare challenge” 
(Lee, 2008: 17). This is illegal behaviour which China’s local state claims to have stopped. However, 
in the past three decades, developers’ illegal forced demolition behaviour has never stopped 
being popular in Chinese cities. The widespread extent is partly due to the leniency of government 
regulations. As stated in UHDMO, only a small penalty, in a “range from twenty to fifty RMB for 
each square meters being demolished”, will be charged if the demolition company does not gain 
government permission beforehand. No further liabilities will be pursued.  
 
Many Chinese legal commentators and scholars criticise this regulation as signifying China’s 
central and local state’s strong pro-development sentiment, and that they never really mean to 
stop developers’ illegal forced demolition behaviour, which works so well in ending residents’ 
blocking actions. They only care enough to make a gesture to show people that they have tried. In 
other words, what Chinese intellectuals imply is that China’s pro-development state takes rapid 
development as its priority, and it would rather close its eyes to developers’ illegal behaviour as 
long as it brings rapid development. This is reflected in policymaking which connives with 
developers’ illegal forced demolition behaviour. The critique of China’s pro-development state and 
its pro-development urban policy making can also be applied to another policy clause, which is 
also included in UHDMO. It declares that, within three months of receiving the government’s 
forced expropriation orders, “residents with different opinions can charge a law suit, … but during 
the law suit the forced demolition process should continue and should not stop”. The litigation 
right is granted to residents but not at the expense of sacrificing rapid development. 
 
With pro-development as the dominant government rationale, China’s forced eviction and 
demolition process is (re)created like a griffin, with government orders and developers and thugs’ 
threats being issued side by side, the government officials, police forces and developers’ 
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canvassers cooperate with each other. So many legal and illegal behaviours are weaved together 
that the forms they take are less important than accelerating the land clearance and development 
process. An appropriate case to illustrate how bizarre China’s forced eviction and demolition 
process can be, is Jiahe township’s development of a small-business convention centre in 2004. 
The project involved demolishing several residential communities and relocating approximately 
one thousand households. More than three hundred households refused to accept the 
compensation offer and chose to undertake a blocking strategy. Responding to this, Jiahe’s local 
authorities hung out threatening slogans around the town, which, arguably followed the 
suggestions of the developer, stating that those “who dare to slow down Jiahe’s development for a 
while, will be punished for a lifetime”. The government officials, including those from the street 
offices, urban planning, land resources and property management departments, visited the 
residents and persuaded them to move out. Simultaneously the residents were also harried by the 
thugs that were hired by the developer, who blocked door locks, smashed windows and destroyed 
the community’s garbage bins. Many residents were also suspended from their jobs, no matter 
where they worked, government departments, SOEs or private companies, and received warnings 
from their bosses that they would be fired if they did not move out by the due date. In the end, 
dozens of police officers forcefully dragged residents out of their rooms, while the developers’ 
bulldozers demolished the communities to the ground (Xin Lang News Archive). 
 
China’s forced eviction and demolition process has been created as a leviathan, so powerful and 
violent, that no residents can possibly fight back. While it has accelerated China’s urbanization, the 
forced eviction and demolition process has overturned residents’ blocking actions, and the best 
chance for people to win higher compensation and better relocation housing (see section 2.2), is 
violent resistance. These resistance activities sometimes involve extreme behaviour, such as 
self-immolation, through which the residents no longer seek rights but only aim to declare their 
anger and pursue revenge. The most well-known such incidents include Tang, a female resident 
who set fire to herself in 2009, denouncing the developers for demolishing her house without 
consent; and also this year, male resident Xu used a self-made bomb to target the demolition 
companies’ office buildings. These events are intensively reported by Chinese and foreign public 
media, and are recorded and used by international human rights organizations. The number of 
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such violent resistance incidents has increased significantly in the past decade, and, in a cruel way, 
they have finally alerted China’s central state of a coming storm which could endanger the state’s 
political legitimacy and cause social instability. Since the mid 2000s, the central state has held a 
series of internal meetings to discuss and conceive reform initiatives. These have finally led to the 
publication of a series of governmental documents and policies in 2010 and 2011, through which 
the central state has instituted political and institutional reforms, to regulate the forced eviction 
and demolition process at the local level. 
 
2.4. Balancing social stability and rapid development: Central state interventions and new 
government initiatives 
As discussed in chapter 1, while Chinese localities have become increasingly more autonomous 
over local development agendas, China’s central state retains strong political control over local 
officials, deciding their promotion and the future of their political careers. Because of this, taking 
and following the central state’s will and orders are important for local officials in order to 
accumulate political capital and attain a better chance of promotion. A primary mechanism for the 
central state to deliver its will and exert control, as well as for the local officials to perceive, follow 
and enact, is the various government internal documents that are issued by central state 
departments, including various types of Decisions, Ordinances and Notices. It is also through 
issuing a series of governmental documents that the central state seeks to regulate the land 
clearance process conducted by China’s localities.  
 
In 2010 and 2011, three of China’s central state departments issued a series of governmental 
documents, which accentuated two points: that localities should ban the illegal forced demolition 
behaviour, and the local state should reduce the use of forced demolition orders. The first of these 
documents, named Urgent Notice of Further Regulating Land Expropriation Work and Protecting 
People’s Legal Rights, was published by the General Office of the State Council in 2010. It defines 
illegal forced demolition activities, which include “cutting off the water, electricity and destroying 
the roads and transportation, … and other violent and threatening approaches, … as well as 
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involving thugs and abusing the police forces in the land expropriation process”. It orders the 
localities to stop using this illegal behaviour during land clearance, otherwise local government 
leaders and directors will be “held responsible and traced for legal liability”. In addition, the 
document also suggests that local officials “strictly censor the enactment of forced expropriation 
orders, … (making sure the expropriation process) abides by the legal procedures, and is based 
upon appropriate compensation and relocation arrangements”. Responding later that year, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources issued a document of Notice of Further Regulating the Work of 
Land Expropriation, further detailing how local land resource departments should behave in the 
land expropriation process. Besides echoing the General Office’s orders on banning illegal 
activities, this document also suggests that the local land resource departments should “engage in 
policy propaganda, explaining, and thought grooming of the mass, focusing on winning people’s 
understanding and support, instead of using a compulsory expropriation approach”. Also, in 2011, 
the Discipline and Inspection Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a central state 
institution responsible for supervising and punishing party members, issued a document, Notice 
of Further Supervision, Inspection and Regulation of the Land Expropriation Process. The 
document recounts the General Office’s orders on “banning illegal behaviours such as cutting off 
water, heat and electricity … and other violent, threatening approaches … in the land 
expropriation process”. It also warns local officials that they will be “strictly punished” if they are 
“not following the orders, violating the bans, continuing to use police force in the land 
expropriation process, and causing negative social events because of improper working styles and 
dereliction of duty”.  
 
The central state’s actions of issuing orders and warnings have quickly escalated to punishing the 
violators. In 2011, the central state announced a total of fifty-seven local officials, including one at 
province-level, and four at municipal-level, accused of violating the central state’s orders, as they 
had connived in the involvement of thugs, using violent activities, threatening the residents, as 
well as other illegal behaviour in the land clearance process; and these officials were also accused 
as being responsible for residents’ injuries and death. This announcement was reported and 
disseminated around the country through news programmes on CCTV (China Central Television), 
the mouthpiece of the Party. When reporting the central state’s decision on punishing the 
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fifty-seven officials, CCTV focused on the city of Changchun, where one resident was buried and 
died when the demolition company forcefully dismantled the building during the night. The focus 
on Changchun was because the punishment there was harsh: the mayor was ordered by the 
central state to make a public apology to Changchun citizens, the deputy mayor received the 
punishment of recording a demerit, and another nine local officials, including those from the 
police force, land resources and property management, were dismissed and charged with legal 
liability. The public conviction and punishment of these officials forms a typical approach of how 
China’s central state exerts its political power, namely focusing on creating an example, through 
punishing a few in high-profile ways, thus warning the others and leaving them in awe of what 
might happen to them. 
 
Besides exerting political control over local officials, the central state also sponsors institutional 
reform in regulating the land clearance process at the local level. According to the previous section, 
a primary reason for the abuse of a forced demolition approach in Chinese cities is that the local 
state is empowered to issue forced demolition orders. To deal with this, under a new policy, 
Ordinance of Expropriation and Compensation of Housing on State Owned Land, which was 
published by the central state in 2011, the local state no longer has such power. Instead, issuing 
forced demolition orders is reserved as a power of the court, with the policy stating that, “when 
the residents refuse to accept compensation offers and refuse to move out by the due date, the 
municipal and township people’s government can apply to the court for enacting forced 
demolition”.  
 
In section 2.2, I point out that in China’s context, the legal system is not independent from 
administrative power and the local state often intervenes in court decisions. Therefore the new 
policy, although giving the courts’ power to issue forced demolition orders, does not signify that 
courts will not rubber-stamp the local state’s applications for enacting forced eviction and 
demolition. Although this curbing of the local state’s powers is only in appearance, the new policy 
still brings significant changes in the meanings and power relationships involved in the land 
expropriation process in Chinese cities. Forced expropriation and demolition is no longer an 
unrestricted and unsupervised power of the local authority, or a convenient tool used by the 
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pro-development local state to accelerate the land clearance process without any thirty-party 
intervention (see section 2.3 for more detailed discussion). Instead, the issuing of forced 
demolition orders has now become a legal process that the local state has to abide by, at least on 
the surface. Or, in other words, as many Chinese legal commenters point out, now China’s local 
state has a new “law abiding responsibility” during the land clearance process, that is, it has to 
play along with the regulations in the new policy, apply to the courts and wait for the completion 
of the protracted legal process to issue forced demolition orders. During this process, the local 
state has no legal rights to remove people and end their blocking strategy. The local state’s power 
over using a forced demolition approach in the local urban development process is, therefore, 
weakened. 
 
China’s central state’s reforms, therefore, at least, seek to induce face-saving effects in the 
urbanization process - to eliminate illegal and violent behaviour and restrain the abuse of 
government power, and to reshape the land clearance process to be less confrontational but more 
ordered and law-abiding. But deep down, the fundamental economic and political regimes 
underpinning China’s urbanization process remain unchanged and the desire and motivations for 
accelerating the land clearance process and urban development are still strong. More specifically, 
in the Chinese context, rapid urbanization is still essential for China’s central state to restore its 
political legitimacy, and for the local state to resolve its financial crisis (see chapter 1). Therefore, it 
remains a central interest for the Chinese state to maintain the land clearance, urban 
development and urbanization process at a rapid pace. 
 
The real intention of the reforms by China’s central state is therefore to renew the governance 
processes so that land clearance and urban development at the local level can continue at a rapid 
pace, but involve alternative and better government initiatives. This point can be evidenced from 
the speech of the Chinese Prime Minister Li. In a State Council executive meeting that was held in 
2013, commenting on the recent reforms in urban land expropriation, Li accentuated that the 
localities should continue to “accelerate the remodelling of inner city shanty towns, promote 
economic development as well as people’s lives, … (but) people’s will should be respected, forced 
eviction and demolition should be strictly banned, people’s legal rights should be protected, things 
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should be done in a better way” (Li, 2013, no page, emphasis added by the author). The Prime 
Minister’s viewpoint is also repeated through other Party and central state mouthpieces, such as 
the People’s Daily News Paper. In 2011, when commenting on the publication of the new policy, 
Ordinance of Expropriation and Compensation of Housing on State Owned Land, the People’s 
Daily encouraged localities to explore new governance initiatives and conduct land expropriation 
in a more civil and harmonious way; and, it pointed out that the real intention of the policy reform 
was to enhance localities’ governance capability,  
 
“China’s urbanization is a megatrend. We understand the local governors’ hardships and 
difficulties during this ‘demolishing the old and building the new process’. … When some localities 
cut off the water supply and electricity, using forced and illegal ways to evict residents, other 
places are actively exploring new mechanisms in conducting compensation and 
relocation. …Behind different expropriation and demolition behaviours lie the differences in the 
ability of governance. … Whether the localities can properly handle the relationships among 
economic development, social stability, and protecting people’s well-being, whether they can 
realize legal, civil and harmonious land expropriation process, signify the localities’ governance 
capability.” (People’s Daily, 2011, no page). 
 
China’s central state’s reforms put the localities into a quandary: on the one hand, the localities 
must manage to continue the rapid urban development and urbanization process, because the 
central state requires this, as well as urbanization being key to solving the local financial crisis and 
for local officials to accumulate political capital; on the other hand, the localities are deprived of 
one of their most powerful and efficient tools in accelerating urban development, that is, forced 
eviction and demolition, because using this presents high political risks and confronts them with 
institutional constraints. Therefore, for Chinese localities, reforms and changes are urgent and 
imperative, and the reforms should inform new government initiatives that can fulfill the aims of 
both rapid urbanization and alternatives to forced demolition. How, then, facing these challenges 
and imperatives, will Chinese localities respond? What new government initiatives, measures and 
processes will they sponsor? How will these new government initiatives inform new forms of 
governmentality, new power relationships between the central and local, the state and society? 





This chapter examines the contestations around China’s current urbanization process. The 
contestations are embodied in grassroots resistance activities and protests, through which 
residents are fighting for higher compensation and better relocation housing; as well as the forced 
expropriation, eviction and demolition process that is sponsored by China’s local authorities, with 
the purpose of accelerating the land clearance process and bulldozing any barriers in the way of 
rapid development. I argue that the forced demolition approach is abused in Chinese cities, 
analyse the reasons for its rampancy, and point out how it leads to serious social instability and 
has finally induced the central state’s interventions and reform initiatives. 
 
By examining the central state’s reform initiatives, I argue that they are not to slow down the rapid 
urbanization process, but for the purpose of reshaping and readjusting the governance process at 
the local level. I outline the questions that this research seeks to explore: how will the reforms by 
the Chinese central state induce changes in the government initiatives, governance process, and 
the adoption of new forms of governmentality, at the local level? In particular, how true is Pieke’s 
claim that the transformation in Chinese governmentality informs a “more powerful and 
resourceful and less direct and invasive” state (2012: 149)? I will examine these questions through 
focusing on one of Qingdao’s regeneration projects in 2012. Before turning to focus on Qingdao’s 













Chapter 3    Studying Chinese cities: methods, practices and reflections 
3.1. Introduction 
This research explores one residents’ committee (RC) and its role in a regeneration project in 
Qingdao, a coastal city in China. I explore the committee’s activities in community regeneration, 
and seek to evaluate how far it is indicative of new approaches to conducting community 
regeneration. On a broader level, this research seeks to understand Chinese RCs’ functions in 
urban governance, addressed through exploring the restructuring of state functions, the rescaling 
of state-society relationships, and how these processes relate to the emerging agendas and 
activities of RCs.  
 
The fieldwork was conducted from September 2012 to May 2013, a period in which the case study 
neighbourhood, No.19 Fushun Road in Qingdao, was enlisted into an inner city redevelopment 
plan, and the residents were being relocated and their buildings demolished. In this chapter, I 
discuss the study’s aims and objectives, and outline the research design, data collection and 
modes of analysis deployed. Section 3.2 outlines the research questions. Section 3.3 discusses the 
reasons to study the city of Qingdao, and draws and reflects on a post-colonial urban studies 
which claims to take marginalised urban experiences into account (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 
2002). Section 3.4 reviews the literature on case studies and introduces the case of this research, 
No.19 Fushun Road community in Qingdao. Section 3.5 examines data collection and analysis 
methods adopted by this research. Section 3.6 explores issues of accessing and research ethics 
and draws reflections on power relationships I have confronted in the field with research subjects. 
Section 3.7 concludes the arguments in this chapter. 
 
3.2. Research questions 
This research explores the following questions,  
 
l What are RCs’ functions and agendas in community regeneration and urban governance? 
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l Which government techniques are used in governing RCs, whether, and in what sense, have 
these techniques (re)shaped and prescribed RCs’ agendas and accountability? 
l What is residents’ experience in community regeneration, and how does it relate to RCs’ 
activities? 
l How do we understand China’s neoliberal transition, in relation to RCs’ roles in urban 
governance? 
 
The primary aim of this research is to understand reform initiatives at China’s local level, 
concerning urban renewal and regeneration, with a focus on one RC’s role in delivering policies in 
the community. I explore the RC’s relationships with local government authorities to understand 
whether, and in what ways, the latter may be shaping the committee’s agendas and activities in 
community redevelopment projects. In addition, the reason I am also studying the RC’s 
relationships with local residents, is to develop a critical vision of the nature and agendas of the 
RC. More specifically, I examine whether, and in what sense, the RC locates/dislocates its 
accountabilities from local residents; and in what sense its (dislocated) accountability is the reason 
for residents’ experiences in urban regeneration, especially those which I call oppression and 
domination (see chapter 7). Based upon an understanding of this RC’s activities in urban renewal 
and regeneration, I will shed light more broadly on the role of RCs in urban governance. The latter 
aim will be addressed by exploring whether, and how far, RCs’ functions and agendas signify the 
restructuring of state functions, and the changing relationships between state and society, as well 
as the changing calculation and rationality of government in China’s society. 
 
3.3. Qingdao, an “ordinary city”: From paradigmatic urbanism to comparative urban study 
Urban experiences and practices in advanced liberal societies dominate the field of production of 
urban theory and knowledge (Keil, 1998; Dear, 1999; Robinson, 2002). Recounting this point, 
McFarlane (2010) comments that urban studies were, and are still, framed by a paradigmatic 
urbanism. Many metropolises in the US and cities in the UK, are the focus of urban research, as 
well as the sites where knowledge is produced and reproduced. Urban experiences in these places, 
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somehow, signify “urban paradigms”, dominating our understanding on urban modernization, 
good planning practices and development policies. In addition, these cities’ experiences also 
signify a deeply embedded standard that prescribes our perceptions on “other kinds of urban 
possibilities or imaginaries” (McFarlane, 2010: 725-6). More specifically, as McFarlane explains, 
“our conceptions of the city are often premised on the experiences and theoretical work based 
upon cities in Western Europe and North America, and cities outside of the ‘global North’ are thus 
often understood in relation to those referent objects” (2010: 276). Responding to this point, 
Robinson (2001, 2008) comments that in urban studies, we still meet with a colonial culture, 
embodied in the lack of recognition of cultural diversity, local intellects, and specificity of local 
development trajectories. 
 
To challenge the paradigmatic urbanism in urban studies, McFarlane proposes a comparative 
urban studies approach, which involves seeing comparison not just as a method, but as a strategy 
for doing urban study, “a mode of thought that informs how urban theory is constituted” (2010: 
725). Comparison as a research strategy entails a reflection on, as in McFarlane’s words, how the 
experiences of non-western cities “might cause us to rethink urban knowledge and urban theory”, 
as well as “how we might bring other urban experiences, knowledges and theories into a more 
horizontal comparative field” (2010: 726). In other words, we need to draw upon a process to 
reflect upon the dominations of culture and current structures and modes of knowledge 
production, to “think about comparison politically” (Mcfarlane, 2010: 726).  
 
The reason for choosing Qingdao as the site of study is, partly, a response to these discussions and 
to engage in a practice of dissolving the paradigm in urban studies. In the past two decades, while 
an emerging literature gives interest to Chinese cities, it focuses on limited metropolises such as 
Beijing and Shanghai. Qingdao, and many other smaller Chinese cities’ experiences are less known 
and represented in the existing writing. By studying Qingdao, this research echoes Robinson’s calls 
for a post-colonial urban studies, to give an account of those urban experiences which have been 
until now marginalised, and, to restructure a knowledge reproduction process in urban studies 




The city of Qingdao is located in Shandong Province (see Figure 3.1). Currently the population size 
of Qingdao is 8.7 million. Qingdao’s urban landscape represents a visual clash. The spatial 
differentiation between the coastal zone and inner city area is sharp, and has been shaped, since 
the early 1990s, by property-led development, which has (overly) invested in the high-value 
coastal land. Along the coastline, and around the edge of the city is a “modernized landscape” 
where elegant skyscrapers stand, and through which Qingdao exports to the world its globalized 
image. The inner city contains massive shanty towns, and, many working class neighbourhoods 
that were constructed, between the 1950s and the 1980s, by state-owned factories. Along with 
market reform and the bankruptcy of large numbers of state-owned factories since the 1990s, 
Qingdao’s inner city became a place where jobless people congregate. Many residential buildings 
in the inner city are now considered problematic by the urban planners, because of their lack of 
modernized facilities such as heating and water systems, and private toilets. For Qingdao’s 
planners and officials, the inner city lacks a sense of modernization, and is a tainted part of the 
urban landscape. 
 
Figure 3.1. Location of Qingdao 
 




In the past twenty years, Qingdao’s inner city has witnessed relentless demolition plans sponsored 
by the local government authorities. A recent plan was sponsored by the municipal government in 
2010, aiming to redevelop 1.7 million m2 of the inner city, within a five year period (2012-2016), 
and affecting 50,000 households (approximately 200,000-300,0000 people). The task for 2012 was 
to “dismantle 20 dilapidated communities and clear an area of 320,000 m2” (Qingdao Government 
Work Report, 2012). 9,754 households (approximately 35,000-55,000 people) would be displaced 
in 2012 and awaited rehousing opportunities. The case of this research, No.19 Fushun Road, 
would be the first residential compound to be demolished in 2012. 
 
3.4. Case study  
In order to understand how Qingdao’s local government authorities conceptualise, design, and 
implement policy reforms in terms of conducting community (re)development, this research 
focuses on one case, the development of No.19 Fushun Road in 2012, a residential compound in 
Qingdao, located in Nan Shan Residents’ Committee’s neighbourhood (see Figure 3.2). Drawing on 
the redevelopment project for No.19 in 2012 as a case study, this research explores the 
Committee’s activities, agendas and functions in urban renewal, and unpacks the Committee’s 
relationships with local government officials and local residents. A case study approach, as Yin 
(2005) points out, offers “both descriptive richness and analytic insight into people, events, and 












Figure 3.2. No.19 Fushun Community 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
Yin argues that the case study is “the best strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context” (1984: 1). Shavelson and Townes (2002) also 
comment that the case study method is useful to resolve “either a descriptive question 
(what happened?) or an explanatory question (how or why did something happen?)” (2002: 99). 
This research sets out to answer descriptive questions, such as, in the face of the central state’s 
orders forbidding the use of forced demolition activities, what changes and reform initiatives are 
taking place in Qingdao, and what are residents’ experiences of urban renewal and regeneration. 
However, it also seeks to explain, and interpret, the politics and power relationships behind the 
phenomena, posing the questions of how the state exerts its power, where RCs’ accountabilities 
lie, and how we should understand certain residents’ experiences in community redevelopment 
projects as oppression. 
 
Making valid generalizations from a small number of cases is often questioned (Platt, 1992). 
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Sceptics of case studies suggest they are incapable of generalization. Eckstein (2000) argues that 
case studies are better in testing hypotheses rather than generating theories. Also according to 
Platt, an individual case only shows “sympathetic pictures” of human society, which are not valued 
in themselves to produce valid generalizations (1992: 26). Flyvbjerg (2006) provides a persuasive 
discussion on why the case study provides a valuable method of gaining knowledge in social 
science, and he confronts critics concerning the generalization, reliability, and validity of a case 
study approach. Flyvberg’s discussion includes, firstly, there is only “context-dependent knowledge 
and experience” (2006: 392), which is the heart of the case study as a method of learning. 
Secondly, Flyvbjerg argues that “one can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the 
case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or 
alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific 
development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated” (2006: 393). This viewpoint is 
echoed by Yin (2003), who argues that the goal of doing a case study is to “expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” 
(2003: 10). In addition, Flyvbjerg contends that the case study is “useful for both generating and 
testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these research activities alone” (395). Further, he 
suggests that the “case study contains no greater bias, instead, it contains a greater bias towards 
falsification of preconceived notions than towards verification” (2006: 399). Lastly, he reminds us 
that “properties of the reality play a crucial role in the problems of summarizing case studies 
rather than the case study as a research method. Good studies should be read as narratives in 
their entirety instead of summarizing and generalizing case studies” (2006: 401-2). Following 
Flyvbjerg, I argue that using a case study approach will contribute to the development of a 
contextualised knowledge of No.19’s regeneration, but will also contribute to understanding 
politics in terms of China’s urban renewal and regeneration more broadly, because, as Mitchell 
(1983) comments, the case study bears “the cogency of the theoretical reasoning” (1983: 207), 
and, according to Bryman, we can making the generation from a single case to theory rather than 
to populations (2008). 
 
No.19’s (re)development represents a typical case. The residential compound was constructed as 
a workers’ dormitory and a product of the socialist planned economy, which was problematised 
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after market reform. It mirrors a common fate of many inner city neighbourhoods around Chinese 
cities. No.19’s rise and fall relates to broader economic reform and institutional transformation in 
China. Indeed, as Flyvbjerg comments, studying atypical case will “clarify the deeper causes 
behind a given problem” (2006: 95), such as the social and economic regime in a given society, 
and the rationality of planning. 
 
3.5. Data collection and analysis 
The case study is a research design that can incorporate multiple methods of data collection (De 
Vaus, 2001). A case study approach usually combines qualitative methods with participant 
observation and in-depth interviews (De Vaus, 2001). The combination, as Jackson (1985) 
comments, enables the researcher “to convey the inner life and texture of the diverse social 
enclaves and personal circumstances of societies” (Jackson, 1985: 157), as both the case study 
design and the qualitative methods pay attention to details, to the complexity of human 
behaviours, sensing people’s feelings and the inner meanings behind the words through human 
interactions. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the data collection and analysis 
methods I use, including document analysis, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, 
and thematic analysis. 
 
3.5.1. Document analysis 
“… (Document analysis is) as a mean of enhancing understanding through the ability to situate 
contemporary accounts within an historical context. It could also allow comparisons to be made 
between the observer’s interpretations of events and those recorded in documents relating to 
those events. These sources may also be utilized in their own right. They can tell us a great deal 
about the way in which events are constructed, the reasons employed, as well as providing 
materials upon which to base further research investigations.” (May, 2011: 191) 
 
According to Merriam (1988), different types of documents can help the researcher to “uncover 
meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (1988: 
118). A wide range of documents can be used for this purpose, including public, private and 
personal documents, such as governmental publications, minutes of meetings, personal records, 
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diaries, journals, books, newspapers, radio and television program scripts, photo albums (Bowen, 
2009). In this particular study, the documents I have collected include urban planning, government 
work reports, policies published by both the central state and Qingdao’s local state relating to 
urban renewal and regeneration, as well as officials’ speeches, media reports, journals, online 
forums and personal diaries published on the internet, which will tell us about the stories and 
residents’ experiences in the community’s redevelopment and relocation (see Table 3.1). 
 
Documents are socially structured, being produced by social practice (Bryman, 2008), or, as in 
May’s words, documents are embedded in “social, political and economic environments of which 
they are a part” (May, 2011: 199).When analyzing documents, we should be critical of the purpose, 
values and power relationships embedded in the production of the documents. This is especially 
pertinent when analysing news reports on community development. China’s news media, 
including newspapers, and TV news reports, are under strict supervision of the local state and 
usually function towards propagandising government policies. In Qingdao, while local news 
reports claim that regeneration is for the welfare of communities, the residents, however, usually 
hold different opinions. Some residents see their community’s redevelopment as a violation of 
their legal rights, even a disaster in their life because they are forced to leave their homes. 
Discovering and interpreting these voices is a primary aim of this research. 
 
According to May (2011), we should not only attend to the intended purpose of documents but 
also the received components of meaning. Atkinson and Coffey (2004) refer to this as discerning 
the “authorship” and “readership” of documents. More specifically, documents are produced with 
certain values and purposes from its “author”, which are usually received and interpreted 
differently by its audience. A typical document of this type is “a letter to the residents”, which is 
usually drafted by RCs and dispatched to local residents. The letter uses up-beat words, telling the 
residents that the community’s redevelopment is a valuable opportunity for improving their living 
conditions, and having a better life. But, this letter is usually satirized by the residents, and seen as 
proof that the committee is trying hard to push the people out of the community, and to please 
the government authorities. This attitude of residents may reveal to us the inherent tensions, and 




In addition, I have accessed archive data, primarily from Qingdao’s urban archive, for the purpose 
of understanding Qingdao’s history and local culture, and through this, engaging in what is called 
by May and Powell (2008), a reflection on our relationships with the surroundings and our 
positionality in the history. It is primarily based upon these archive data that I have written 
chapter 4 on Qingdao’s planning, development, and social changes in the last century. 
 
Table 3.1. Documents collected and analysed (selectively outlined) 
Name Description Time of publication 
Ordinance on Urban Housing Demolition in 
Qingdao 
Public policy 2005 
Ordinance of Expropriation and 
Compensation of Housing on State Owned 
Land 
Public policy 2011 
Urgent Notice of Further Regulating Land 










Chinese Prime Minister Li’s speech to State 









Forced demolition, when should it stop? News reports on 
People’s Daily 
2011 
The awesome nail household in Chongqing News reports  2007 
Jiao Ao Development Memo Government work 
report 
1908 




A legend of Qingdao’ alleys Literature 2009 
Fighting for my home Online blog 2007 
How to be a good nail household Online blog 2004 
 
3.5.2. Participant observation 
Participant observation is a popular method used by anthropologists in field study, and is 
employed in this research. According to Schensul et al (1999), participant observation is “the 
process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of 
participants in the researcher setting” (1999: 91). It involves a variety of activities and 
considerations, such as "fitting in, active seeing, short-term memory, informal interviewing, 
recording detailed field notes, and, perhaps most importantly, patience" (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 
17). As Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest, participant observation can help researchers to 
check definitions of terms that participants use in interviews, and observe whether situations 
informants have recounted in interviews are being distorted or are accurate.  
 
After No.19 was enlisted into the city’s development plan, Qingdao’s municipal government and 
Shi Bei sub-municipal government held many governmental meetings, some of them attended by 
NSRC staff, to discuss progress and study strategy. NSRC also organised many meetings in the 
community, some were for the purpose of propagandising policies. I have participated in and 
observed nine such meetings (see Table 3.2). Participating in these meetings not only let me 
detect potential interviewees, such as government officials playing key roles in planning and the 
decision-making process concerning community development; but also, these meetings were very 
revealing of the power relationships between RC staff, government officials, and local residents, as 
how they talk and communicate indicates power and position in the hierarchy.  
 
The role that researchers should play at participation meetings has been widely discussed. A 
"peripheral membership role" is taken, which can enable the researcher to "observe and interact 
closely enough with members to establish an insider's identity without participating in those 
activities constituting the core of group membership" (Adler and Adler, 1994: 380). Whether the 
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researcher adopts an ‘overt’ or ‘covert’ role in the observation process can directly influence the 
activities being observed (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007). In this case, I adopt an overt approach. 
I introduced myself at the start of meetings and told them I would observe the meetings and make 
field notes.  
 
Table 3.2. Meetings observed 
Date Description Location 
05 September 2012 Policy propaganda meeting held by 
NSRC 
NSRC’s meeting room 
12 September 2012 Meeting held by NSRC for explaining 
compensation policies to local 
residents 
NSRC’s meeting room 
13 September 2012 Community representative work 
meeting held by NSRC 
Home of one representative 
20 September 2012 Private meetings attended by NSRC 
staff, representatives from 
development companies and nail 
households in No.19 
Office of the development 
company 
14 September 2012 NSRC work report meeting with Shi Bei 
sub-municipal government 
Shi Bei sub-municipal 
government’s meeting room 
09 September 2012 Consultation meeting held by 
Qingdao’s municipal government 
NSRC’s meeting room 
02 September 2012 NSRC internal meeting NSRC’s meeting room 
02 September 2012 Fu Xin street office’s internal meeting Fu Xin street office’s meeting 
room 
04 September 2012 Urban planning Bureaucracy’s monthly 
work report meeting 






3.5.3. Semi-structured interviews 
Interviewing is a process that seeks to build up interactions between researchers and participants, 
and through which to “yield rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values, 
aspirations, attitudes and feelings” (May, 2011: 131). Similarly, according to Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009), semi-structured interviewing, based upon guidelines of questions, has advantages of 
flexibility which enables the interviewer to “probe beyond the answers”, thus reshaping the 
interviewer-interviewee interactions as dialogues (May, 2011: 134).It also provides direction for 
the interview process, to a large extent avoiding the embarrassment of the talk being too 
discursive as in an un-structured interview. 
 
In choosing the interviewees, I use a selective (purposive) sampling approach, that is, the selection 
is based upon consistent reflection on the research aims. Explaining selective sampling, Schatzman 
and Strauss (1973) point out that it is a practical strategy that is “shaped by the time the 
researcher has available to him, by his framework, by his starting and developing interests, and by 
any restrictions placed upon his observations by his hosts” (1973: 39). Interviewees of this 
research include: Qingdao government officials from Shi Bei sub-municipal government, Fuxin 
street office, and departments involved in urban renewal and regeneration, such as urban 
planning, land resource, and housing management; residents from No.19 Fushun Road; NSRC 
ex-/staff; and employees of private companies including a development company and real-estate 
evaluation company. A total number of forty four people have been interviewed (see Table 3.3 for 












Table 3.3. Interviews completed 
Identity/institution Number of interviews 
Government officials 14 
Residents from No.19 Fushun Road 16 
NSRC ex/staff 9 
Employees of private development companies 2 
Employees of real estate evaluation companies 3 
Total=44 
 
3.5.4. Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis, as defined by Braun and Clarke (2006), is a method “for identifying, analysing, 
and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (2006: 83).The data collected during my fieldwork 
were coded and categorised into themes. In doing this, I followed guidelines provided by Braun 
and Clarke (2006), engaging in six steps including familiarizing with data, generating the initial 
codes, searching for themes, reviewing and refining themes, defining and naming themes to 
showing the results, to producing the report. The whole process of data analysis was interactive 
and reflexive, in which the constant comparative analysis of similarities and differences of 
concepts, codes, sub-themes, and themes was conducted to fully understand the meaning of data. 
 
Specifically, I firstly familiarized myself with all the data from participant observation, document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews by reading/re-reading three times. Since the data were 
analyzed manually, the verbal data from interviews were transcribed into written form and all the 
data were printed out to prepare for the further coding work in subsequent steps. Although it was 
time-consuming, the reading and re-reading work proved to facilitate my understanding of the 
depth and breadth of the content of the data. As Bird (2005) argues, it is a “key phase of data 
analysis within interpretative qualitative methodology” (2005: 227). 
 
Driven by the research questions outlined at the start of this chapter, I then moved on to the next 
step to generate the initial codes for the coding process, as argued by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
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The codes refer to “the most basic segments, or elements, of the raw data or information that can 
be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1996: 63). With the 
research questions in mind, I undertook substantial coding of the data by identifying and naming 
the concepts which had close relationships with the research questions. Some small aids were 
used, such as using colourful pens and post-it notes, and these proved quite helpful. 
 
Following this, the focus of the next step, searching for themes, is to identify the relations among 
different codes I generated to find the most suitable. It involves “sorting the different codes into 
potential themes and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 19). A constant comparative method was employed in this stage, in 
which comparisons concerned with similarities and differences among codes were conducted. 
Some themes consisting of codes with similar characteristics were present, while some codes 
seem to belong nowhere, and might be temporary. All the codes should be kept until the end of 
data analysis. 
 
Moving on to next stage, reviewing the theme, I reviewed and refined all the themes produced by 
identifying the relations between each other by rereading the collated extracts for each theme. 
Some themes were kept and some were broken down into different themes or combined into a 
new theme with others. As Braun and Clarke suggest, “data within themes should cohere together 
meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes” (2006: 
20). Through understanding the relations among themes, I have a clear indication in terms of what 
the themes are, how they cohere together, and the whole story they tell about the data. 
 
The next step is to define and refine the themes produced, which means “identifying the essence 
of what each theme is about and determining what aspects of the data each theme captures” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 21). Under this guideline, I returned to the extracted data for each theme, 
organised them and tried to describe the scope and content of each theme in a few sentences. 
During this process, some themes were renamed concisely. Then, the final step, I brought together 
the results of the thematic analysis to build the story of the data, and combined with the research 
questions in this study to provide analysis and accounts in subsequent chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. The 
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research findings have been discussed with supervisors and have been presented in two academic 
conferences in 2013 in the US, which to some extent increases the validity of the data for this 
research. 
 
3.6. Access and power relationships in the field 
As Okumus et al. note, “issues related to access vary to a considerable extent with the kind of case 
being investigated” (2007: 8). For this research, problems concerning accessibility are related to 
the topic of community regeneration, which is, as I will discuss later, a sensitive issue in China. 
Also critical to the research and embedded in China is the social and political culture, a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic, and acquaintance society, where access hinges on the help of 
gatekeepers. 
 
Gatekeepers, as defined by Okumus et al., are people who can “provide and facilitate access for 
the researcher” in conducting fieldwork (2007: 10). As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest, 
gatekeepers are the initial contacts for the researcher and can help to find other informants to 
participate in the research. However, gatekeepers also have the power to prevent the researcher’s 
entry. In addition, according to Lee and Renzetti (1990), powerful gatekeepers can “impose 
restrictions on researchers in ways that constrain their capacity to produce or report on findings 
that might threaten the interests of the powerful” (1990: 515). An important gatekeeper for this 
research is a senior official at the municipal level in Qingdao, with whom I have built personal 
connections. It is through this person that I have gained access to interviewees in urban planning, 
land resources, and many governmental departments. A primary way I interacted with this 
gatekeeper, and other key informants in different government departments he introduced to me, 
was by attending banquets, an important socialising approach that is deeply embedded in Chinese 
culture. At these banquets, I developed friendships and built trust with many Qingdao officials. In 
addition, certain information, that the officials would not normally provide at formal interviews, 
was gained at these banquets. For example, one official from Shi Bei sub-municipal government 
said this to me during one dinner, “You have asked me what is my opinion on forced demolition 
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activities. … I will now tell you privately as a friend, I think forced demolition is necessary in China, 
because accelerating development is still the priority in China’s society. … The central state orders 
the localities to stop using forced demolition, this might be out of good intention, but is not 
practical because we rely on it to conduct work.” 
 
It is also through this gatekeeper that I accessed NSRC staff and residents in No.19 Fushun Road. 
He made phone calls to officials in Shi Bei sub-municipal government, giving explicit orders, 
effectively saying “I have a friend who wants to do research with Nan Shan Residents’ Committee 
in your domain, arrange this.” A similar process happened when officials in Shi Bei sub-municipal 
government called officials in Fu Xin street office, and the latter then called the head of NSRC. The 
whole process functioned in the way of delivering administrative orders through the government 
hierarchy. This is also revealing in the sense of NSRC’s relationships with government authorities: 
it is treated, actually, by government officials as one level (the lowest) in the government system, 
and NSRC staff will normally follow government orders. 
 
NSRC’s head then introduced me to other staff in the committee, and via these I was introduced 
to the residents of No.19. NSRC staff helped me to gain access to local residents and to win their 
trust, but, primarily because of how the staff introduced me, as a researcher sent by the 
government, some residents were reticent during interviews, because, as one resident explained, 
“I hope you understand we cannot be totally open to government people because you may report 
to the officials”. I needed to spend time explaining my background before and during interviews, 
and this would usually reduce the time I had to interview them. 
 
According to Lee (1993), a sensitive topic is a “research topic which potentially poses a substantial 
threat to those who are or have been involved in it” (1993: 4). As Lee and Renzetti (1990) point 
out, sensitive topics refer research which explores deviant or illegal activities, or exposes the 
vested interests of powerful people or those engaged in coercive or domineering behaviours. The 
aims of this research, including exploring residents’ protests against demolition, nail households’ 
experiences and voices, and power relationships between government authorities and RCs and 
local residents, therefore signify a sensitive topic. In addition, as Lee and Renzetti note, the reason 
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why a research topic is sensitive lies “less in the topic itself and more in the relationship between 
that topic and the social context within which the research is conducted” (1990: 513). When I 
conducted my research in 2012, it was an especially sensitive time for doing research on 
community regeneration and residents’ protests in China. This was because, as one Qingdao 
official pointed out, “you choose this time to do your research is unwise, because the central state 
has taken strict measures in punishing localities for enacting forced demolition, I think many 
officials (in Qingdao) will not be honest to you because they are afraid you may be a threat in 
exposing their behaviours.” Also, as Sieber and Stanley warn (1988), studying a sensitive topic may 
not only put the researched, but also the researcher, at risk. In China, people are normally not 
allowed to take photos of the areas targeted for redevelopment, primarily to prevent journalists 
writing news reports that might be against the developers’ interests. When I took photos at No.19, 
I was faced with vocal threats from the gangs hired by the developer and my camera was taken 
and damaged. 
 
In the field, I found myself enwrapped in, and having to deal with, different forms of relationships 
with different research subjects. Government officials, staff from development companies and 
real-estate evaluation companies form what are called by Henn et al. (2009), the elites who have 
professional knowledge and who, as Richard (1999) notes, “hold or have a privileged position in 
society and are likely to have had more influence on political outcome than general members of 
the public” (1996: 199). Interviewing these people, as Ostrander (1993) points out, signifies 
potential risks that the researcher might lose control of the interview, such as direction, scope and 
pace, while the interviewees begin to drive and determine the research focus. It is necessary, for 
researchers, to demonstrate their credibility and expertise in the field of research, to show they 
are well prepared and knowledgeable about the research subject and the interviewees in order to 
win interviewees’ confidence and respect (Liu, 2015). In addition, as Feldman et al. (2003) argue, 
identity is an important vehicle for researchers in gaining access and exerting certain control over 
interviews. I introduced myself to government officials and staff from private companies as a PhD 
student of King’s College London, and through this, I was perceived as professional and ‘‘someone’’ 




Residents from No.19 however, signify powerless people, as many of them are jobless, poor, and 
lack a good educational background. I have built relationships of trust and rapport with these 
people, and showed sympathy to their difficulties in life when doing interviews. Sometimes I 
offered my help to these people, such as helping one female resident drafting a petition letter to 
the municipal government, and through these efforts, I developed reciprocal relationships with 
many residents in No.19. In addition, when interviewing these people, I paid attention to the use 
of language and avoided jargon. For example, following local residents, I used the term 
“community demolition and relocation”, instead of “community redevelopment” or “regeneration”, 
when interviewing them. The reason why residents choose to use this term may be because 
demolition and relocation are their direct experiences in the urban development process. For 
Qingdao officials, however, the popular term is “old city remodelling”, and this may show that 
officials see many inner city neighbourhoods, such as No.19, as “problems” and which need to be 
remodelled and rebuilt.  
 
Four broad ethical principles are proposed by De Vaus (2001): voluntary participation, informed 
consent, no harm to participants and confidentiality. Bryman (2008) also offers four ethical 
principles: whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a lack of informed consent; 
whether there is an invasion of privacy; and whether deception is involved. For ethical reasons, I 
sent information sheets and consent forms to participants before interviews, and explained the 
research aims to them, telling them about their rights to withdraw or stop the interview at any 
time, and that they could refuse to answer any particular questions. Thirty seven interviews were 
tape recorded with the participants’ consent, while the remaining seven interviews were recorded 
by writing notes. Each interview took approximately between one and a half and two hours, and 
those thirty seven tape-recorded sessions were subsequently transcribed into text documents for 
further data analysis. 
 
As May (2011) notes, researchers should reflect upon their relationships with, and their positions 
towards, the research subject. More specifically, researchers should consider how far they should 
establish an inter-subjective dialogue with participants and adopt empathy towards their 
experiences, and how far to keep a neutral and objective position. During fieldwork, I tried to 
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adopt a balance between these two positions: I sought to develop “inter-subjective depth” and 
“deep mutual understanding” via interactions with participants (Miller and Glassner, 2006: 127), 
while at the same time I would “try to represent the person’s view fairly and to portray it as 
consistent with his or her meanings” (Charmaz, 1995: 54).  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
According to Bourdieu (1996), social scientists do research in a real world filled with power 
relationships that they themselves, and their research practices, are part of; and researchers will 
be confronted with real people who are resistant to objectivation and (re)define research 
relationships by seeking to “impose their own definition of the situation and turn to their 
advantage” (1996: 25). In this chapter, I examine how my research is embedded in, and affected by, 
China’s social and political culture, as well as in what sense, and to what extent, my fieldwork 
practices are enwrapped in different power relationships. I have also drawn reflections on how 
these social relationships and powers have affected access, validity of the data and research 
ethics. 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed a paradigmatic urbanism in urban studies, a structure of 
knowledge production in urban research, that gives an uneven account of urban experiences and 
practices in western cities. Against this, Robinson (2008) calls for treating every city as an ordinary 
city, and through this, breaking hierarchies between different, western and eastern, developed 
and developing, north and south, rich and poor, central and peripheral, cities. To do this, we 
should, as Robinson suggests, give every city’s experience an equal chance to be accounted for in 
urban studies. Responding to this viewpoint, in the following chapter, I will examine Qingdao’s 
development, planning and social changes in the last century, and through this, engage in an effort, 
in Robinson’s words, to represent the “unique combinations of social, political, and economic 





Chapter 4   From the colonial city to the modern global city: urban planning, social change, 
and urban transformations in Qingdao  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines Qingdao’s urban planning and development in the last century. It depicts 
Qingdao’s development trajectory and transformation, from a place which used to be a colonial 
city in the first fifty years from the 1900s, to an industrial city under the socialist regime since the 
1950s, and which then experienced market reforms in the 1990s and is now transforming into a 
tourist city and global financial centre. This chapter describes Qingdao’s urbanisation, its 
transformations through time, in relation to urban landscape, architectural form, lifestyle, political 
regime, cultural experience, and more.  
 
Responding to Castells (1983), this chapter finds that social conflicts and urban contestations are 
an integral part of urban development and transformation in Qingdao, where urban contestations 
have accompanied local development, but taken different forms through different historical 
periods. There used to be local resistance to cultural prejudice and racial domination in the 
colonial period; followed by citizens’ resentment to public ownership and austerity lifestyles under 
the socialist regime. Since the early 1990s, the primary conflicts and contestations around 
Qingdao’s urban planning and development appear to resemble those fundamental ones 
underpinning China’s urbanization process in the post-reform period. These are contestations 
aroused by large-scale demolition, displacement, low compensation levels, and the local state’s 
forced eviction activities, which take the form of protests and resistance by residents against local 
state development plans. It is for the purpose of pacifying residents’ resistance and restoring 
social stability that Qingdao’s local state sponsored a series of policy reforms in 2012 (see 
following chapters). 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 introduces Qingdao’s 
urbanization from 1898 to 1914, a period of German colonisation. It examines the resistance that 
arose against the German colonisers’ planning and transformation of Qingdao from an agricultural 
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society into a European-style, modern port city, as well as the policies and compromises taken in 
mitigating the conflicts. Section 4.3 focuses on Japanese colonisation from 1914 to 1922, a period 
when Qingdao was re-planned as a backyard industrial park for Japanese textile factories. It points 
out that the racial segregation policies, and the design of a special architectural form, the so called 
workers’ prison, signify policing techniques which contributed to pacifying local residents’ acute 
resistance. From 1922, Qingdao experienced almost thirty years of war. It was since 1949, when a 
new political regime, the People’s Republic of China was established, that Qingdao entered 
another period of rapid development. Section 4.4 looks at Qingdao’s development from 1949 to 
the late 1980s, a period characterised by a socialist regime and strong centralised control. It 
unpacks the primary urban contestations during this period, including uneven development of 
urban production and reproduction functions, the overlap of workplace into private life domains, 
as well as male domination over female, and explores how these were dealt with through a 
particular architectural design, barrack housing. Lastly, section 4.5 explores Qingdao’s market 
reform, neoliberal transition, and urban development since the early 1990s. In the name of 
pursuing urban modernization and modernity, Qingdao’s municipal government sponsored 
large-scale demolition projects, which caused serious displacement, and were confronted by 
residents’ protests and resistance activities. The primary urban contestations in Qingdao occurred 
between the pro-development local state and the displaced residents claiming economic and 
political rights over accessing higher compensation and staying in the city centre. Section 4.6 
concludes the discussions in this chapter. 
 
4.2. Planning a modern port city: The political process and the urban form in the métropole and 
the outré-mer 
Since AD600, during China’s Tang Dynasty, Qingdao started to emerge as a military fort on China’s 
sea coast, with an important role in defending the occasional invasions of the Korean and 
Japanese armies. Alongside a series of wars with Japan, the military forces in Qingdao kept 
expanding in the following centuries, reaching approximately three thousand soldiers around 1110. 
It was also at this time that a small-scale township, Ban Qiao Town, emerged on Qingdao’s east 
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coast and became a well-known port and commercial centre in Shandong Province. The 
commerce and shipping business in Ban Qiao Town developed very fast in the following decades, 
and by the end of the twelfth century, Ban Qiao had become one of the largest coastal commercial 
towns and sea ports in the country. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the 
shipping business in Qingdao’s Ban Qiao Town kept expanding and the town attracted large 
numbers of immigrants, including businessmen and coolies, from other places around China as 
well other Asian countries such as Japan. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, Ban Qiao 
Town’s development accelerated, due to the close commercial relationship with other Asian 
countries such as Japan and India. The town reached its heyday in the nineteenth century, a 
period ruled by China’s Qing Empire. Around the 1880s, Qingdao had become a populated place 
with 70,000 residents, and Ban Qiao Town was a hub between South and West Asia and China’s 
hinterland, with massive amounts of freight flooding in and out every day. To govern the local 
population and local businesses, the Qing Empire established Qingdao’s first local government in 
1892, with a series of responsibilities ranging from policing, justice, conscription and construction 
(Qingdao Online Archive). 
 
Against the relatively bright scene in Qingdao, the overall tendency around the country in the 
1880sand 1890s was serious economic recession, political corruption and instability. The politically 
and economically weakening Chinese central state was forced by Britain, France, as well as other 
Western countries, to open up many coastal cities, such as Tianjin, Dalian and Guangzhou, as free 
ports for these countries to export products. In 1897, the German navy invaded Qingdao and 
intended to establish a German settlement there. Unable to defend and defeat the German army, 
China’s Qing Empire signed a contract with Germany in 1898, agreeing to lease Qingdao to 
Germany for one hundred years. It was then that Qingdao entered a period as a German colony. 
 
In 1898 the German Emperor appointed Jaeschke as Qingdao’s Satrap, the principal governor of 
Qingdao. In this year, Jaeschke and the German Emperor, two of the most powerful politicians 
governing Qingdao’s social and political affairs, agreed upon Germany’s strategy in this new 
overseas settlement: to build Qingdao as a first-class colony, which must have a prosperous 
economy, pleasant environment, and good social and political order. Within this overarching 
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strategy, they also agreed on the development of Qingdao: it must be built into a first-class colony 
in a short period of approximately ten years; in the near future, Qingdao should be economically 
more successful than those more famous and older Asian colonies, including Britain’s Hong Kong; 
also, the German government would give generous financial support to ensure Qingdao’s rapid 
development (Yuan, 1928, from Qingdao Online Archive). 
 
While sponsoring this ambitious plan in Qingdao, Germany was haunted by a series of social and 
political problems back home. At the end of the nineteenth century, Germany’s political and 
economic powers in Europe were seriously weakened by Britain, Italy, Austria, and other European 
countries which had built overseas colonies and realised rapid wealth accumulation. Germany’s 
marginalized role in Europe caused a series of domestic political crises, including fragmented 
national identity, the decline of people’s trust and confidence in the government authorities, as 
well as proletarian social movements against the ruling class (Chen, 2012).  
 
These two seemingly unrelated stories, of Germany’s ambitious planning in Qingdao, and the 
gloomy scenes back in Germany, appear to be highly inter-related and mutually-constitutive, if 
Wright’s (1991) arguments on the linkages between colonial urbanism and the domestic political 
process is drawn upon. In Wright’s studies of French colonies of Morocco, Indochina and 
Madagascar, she finds that these overseas settlements are laboratories for a series of bold 
planning schemes and development policies, providing a stage where French politicians, planners 
and technicians could display their wisdom, professionalism and power, as well as a platform to 
lever in political support for reforms and changes back home. 
 
Analogous to Wright’s findings in the French colonies, the German ambition with Qingdao was 
beyond simple economic exploitation, but was supported by deeper political and symbolic 
aspirations. For sure, Germany saw Qingdao as an overseas market and also targeted Qingdao’s 
raw materials such as coal and cotton; but behind the ambitious plan to build Qingdao as a 
first-class and successful colony, there was also a political agenda to make Qingdao the showcase 
of German national power. The German politicians believed that to remodel Qingdao, a rural and 
seriously underdeveloped place, into a prosperous and modern city, which could rival other 
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European countries’ colonies, was essential to regain Germany’s international political standing. To 
Germany, the plan of (re)building and developing Qingdao around 1900 could be seen as similar to 
the Iraqi war for America in the twenty first century– these nations needed overseas battlefields 
to transfer people’s focus and to relieve domestic political tensions. Success overseas would 
restore people’s political support, trust, and national unity at home. 
 
From 1898, German urban scholars, planners and engineers/technicians started to engage in the 
planning and development of Qingdao. Their work responded to the German Emperor and 
Jaeschke’s political imagination about building Qingdao as a first-class colony. Qingdao’s first urban 
master plan was drafted by German planners and was published in 1900. The master plan 
designed a port city in the coastal area of Qingdao. It identified two port sites along Qingdao’s 
coastline, a large Port to the north and small Port to the south. Behind the ports a small-scale city 
was planned to accommodate 50,000 people. Three functional zones comprised the city: an 
industrial and storage zone; a small business zone located near the ports; and a residential district 
located away from the port sites and factories, allowing a quiet and pleasant living environment 
(see Figure 4.1).The master plan started Qingdao’s rapid urbanization. From 1900, large-scale land 
purchase and demolition commenced within the planned urban area. Approximately 2,000 
villagers were evicted from the coastal area and were relocated inland in the following three years 



















The displacement confronted intense resistance from the local villagers, who were strongly 
attached to their homes, were hostile to the German colonisers, and, many were reliant on fishing 
and concerned about losing their livelihood by moving inland. To deal with this, the Germans 
raised the compensation payments offered to the villagers, built high-quality relocation housing, 
and promised them job opportunities in the city and port construction projects. In addition, the 
German planners and officials also brought in some local leaders who enjoyed prestige and 
authority among the villagers, to persuade people to move inland. The German colonisers’ 
exertion of power in Qingdao was therefore, different to what was usually observed in colonies, 
less coercive and less confrontational. 
 
The port city design adopted in Qingdao’s master plan is, according to King (1989), a paradigm of 
colonialist urbanization and urban planning in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
reason for the popularity of building colonial port cities at that time was because, as King suggests, 
the port city design was seen as an effective way to boost rapid economic development and 
urbanization, through marine shipping, the dominant transportation at the time, thus 
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incorporating the colonies into the international division of labour (see also Basu,1979; Dossal, 
1989).  
 
Conceiving the port business as Qingdao’s pillar industry, the German politicians and planners 
insisted that a top-ranking modern port must be built at any expense, in order to support the 
sustainable development of Qingdao’s economy. Five hundred million Marks, substantial funding 
equal to approximately two years of Germany’s GDP at the time, was allocated by the German 
government to support the Qingdao port project. The abundant financial support gave the 
German engineers/technicians the opportunity to install bold, innovative and expensive designs in 
Qingdao port. To guarantee safety, the port design was a semi-circular harbour basin to defend 
against storm waves, a copy of Genoa in north west Italy, a famous model of a modern European 
port at the time. Also, high-technology facilities, including rail tracks, eclectic cranes, and a 
large-scale floating shipyard capable of manufacturing 10000-ton freighters, were used in Qingdao 
port to create massive cargo throughput capacity. German technicians and engineers’ work in 
Qingdao port was applauded by many German politicians, including the German Satrap Jaeschke 
(Ma, 2009). In his work report to the German government in 1906, Jaeschke praised Qingdao 
port’s vanguard design. As the following quotation suggests, the use of high technology was 
perceived by Jeaschke as a convincing proof of Germany’s strength and power: 
 
“Qingdao port already exceeds any other ports in Asia. In many ports which have a much longer 
development history, such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nagasaki and Kobe, loading the 
large-tonnage freighters still requires sampans and a lot of manpower. But in Qingdao, we have 
automatic mechanisms for this task… We have well designed lighthouses, and the ideal shape of 
coastline which can keep the ships safe from sea storms. To a large extent, we have conquered the 
influence of weather on the shipping business… In East Asia, there are no better ports than 
Qingdao.” (Jaeschke, 1906, no page) 
 
In contrast with Wright’s observation son the French colonies, where the planners were oscillating 
between conservation and modernization, German planners were clear in erasing Qingdao’s 
traditional landscape and modernizing Qingdao’s environment. European urbanism was perceived 
by the German planners as a natural, unquestionable standard by which to measure 
modernization. In 1898 the German government published the Architecture Control Ordinance, 
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regulating that the city of Qingdao should comprise only European style architecture and no 
Chinese-style buildings. The Ordinance also attached importance to architectural aesthetics. The 
understanding of aesthetics embodied in the Ordinance, included a diversity of design genres 
within the overall requirement for European-style design, as the Ordinance regulated that no 
similar architectural design should co-exist on one street. The result of this regulation was, as 
observed by Chinese researcher Tan, that “substantive Western architectural and cultural symbols 
influx to Qingdao at this time, such as Classic Revival, Baroque, Rococo, the Art Nouveau 
movement, the Column and the Arch” (2009: 23-4).  
 
Yet reshaping a city containing only European style architecture meant the large-scale demolition 
of the original Chinese style buildings, and this galvanised protests by local Chinese people. The 
most intense resistance occurred when the German authorities decided to demolish a temple 
more than four hundred years old, which enshrined and worshipped the God of Qingdao’s local 
fishermen. Local protests were conducted in the form of street parades, collective demonstrations, 
and petitions to the German Satrap’s offices. Finally, compromises were made, on both sides. The 
temple was conserved while all the other local buildings were demolished. The temple became 
the only Chinese style building remaining in a city filled with European style architecture (Cao, 
2003). 
 
Besides architectural regulations, other efforts were made to transplant European urbanism into 
Qingdao. To enhance urban sanitary standards, German engineers imported facilities invented and 
widely used in Europe at the time, such as tap water, an underground sewer system, bathhouses, 
suburban rubbish dumps, and a well equipped abattoir. To create a modern lifestyle, the German 
government invested in schools, churches, hospitals, post offices and other urban services, and 
introduced electricity and automobiles to Qingdao. 
 
Qingdao was not only Europeanized but more specifically, Germanized. For the German planners, 
making Qingdao a European style city was not enough; they were obsessed with planning Qingdao 
as a place like home, an overseas “heterotopia” which enshrined German social and cultural 
textures (Foucault and Miskowiec, 1986). Streets in Qingdao were named after German celebrities 
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and famous cities. A main road located at the very centre of the city was named Berlin Street, 
known today as Qu Fu Street, following a medium-sized city in Shandong; another main road at 
the south waterfront area was named Emperor William, known today as Tai Ping; to the north of 
Emperor William Street was Prinz Heinrich Street, changed to Guang Xi after the 1940s. Multiple 
leisure facilities were established in the city, including the Marine Club, with billiards, bars and 
dancing, which became the primary leisure and socializing location; the Prinz Heinrich Hotel, 
equipped with the first cinema and theatre in Qingdao, was the place where one of the most 
popular European orchestras, the German Marine Orchestra, frequently played. German food and 
drinks were also produced in Qingdao. The first Café opened on Kroprinz Street in 1903, named 
Café Flossel, and was owned by a Swiss businessman. It sold traditional German food and was 
called the “German Bakery” by local people. In the same year a German businessman Heinrich 
invested in the Anglo-Nordic Brewhouse in a marginal area neighbouring the German barracks. 
Equipped with an up-to-date production line and hiring Germany beer makers, the Brewhouse 
promised to provide “original German beer” to the soldiers and citizens (Yuan, 1928, from 























By 1912, the primary construction of Qingdao was complete. Qingdao’s urban landscape 
resembled European cities in many ways, such as an ordered road network, open squares, public 
parks, as well as the dominant European style architecture (see Figure 4.2). The German planners 
and politicians, including Qingdao’s Satrap Jaeschke, celebrated their achievements in Qingdao. In 
his work report to the German government, Jaeschke asserted that the German remodelling of 
Qingdao from primitive farmland into a modern, European style port city was a great 
accomplishment: 
 
“Qingdao used to be a rural and uncivilised place. The vanguards of our business men, officials and 
soldiers, had to bear the dilapidated bothies and unpleasing Chinese style buildings. Proper street 
grids and sanitary facilities were totally absent… Now Qingdao shows a sharp contrast: replacing 
the villages and Chinese barracks is a well planned, large-scale city, representing a European urban 
vision… In the urban area we have a well developed street grid for automobile transport, a 
functional underground urban sewer system, tap water and electricity supplies. There are also 
Churches and schools that open for both the Europeans and the Chinese… We have made 
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prominent achievements on this land.” (Jiao Ao Development Memo, 1908, no page) 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, behind German celebration of their achievements in Qingdao, 
there is a covert cultural dichotomy and prejudice, which prioritises the sanitary environment, 
aesthetic architecture, or more generally, European urbanism, over the non-European and rural 
lifestyle. This cultural prejudice is at the centre of colonialism and colonial oppression (Wright, 
1991; Robinson, 2006; Rabinow, 1989). Qingdao’s urban planning and development in the 
1900swas not only supported by German political ambition to restore power and realise overseas 
economic exploitation, but also prescribed by a culturally informed understanding of what a good 
(urban) environment is. It was the intersection of these social, political and cultural processes that 
(re)shaped the urban form in Qingdao, at the expense of demolishing local lifestyles, Chinese 
architecture and cultural traditions. 
 
With German planning, the city of Qingdao achieved success in the way that the German 
politicians had imagined. Qingdao was a showcase of German’s power and a place to accumulate 
wealth. The city’s port business and economy have been prosperous since 1900. In 1901, German 
Hamburg Ocean Shipping became the first European shipping corporation attracted to 
headquarter in Qingdao, and was later joined by British, French, Japanese and another four 
German sea trading enterprises. Under these companies’ operations, sea-lanes from Qingdao port 
soon expanded from Asia to many large European ports, such as Hamburg and Amsterdam. Along 
with the development of rail transportation and the shipping business, a large number of shops 
and banks moved to Qingdao from other parts of Shandong Province, including Yan Tai, which was 
Shandong’s biggest port and commercial centre at the time. In a few years Qingdao replaced Yan 
Tai to be the commercial centre of the Shandong area. In 1907, total exports from Qingdao port 
exceeded Dalian and Tianjin, which made Qingdao the second largest port in north China. Along 
with Qingdao’s fast development, taxation income from Qingdao expanded approximately twenty 
times, increasing from 0.36 million Marks in 1989 to 7.28 million Marks in 1913. Tourists, 
businessmen, coolies engineers and politicians were attracted to Qingdao. The population in 
Qingdao expanded to 57,578 in 1913, including 1,500 German and another 2,400 Europeans. 
Qingdao, by this time, had become one of the busiest ports, and one of the most flourishing 
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commercial centres in Asia (Tan, 2009). 
 
In 1914, the First World War began and in the Asian arena, the Japanese and Britain Alliance 
defeated the German army and ended Germany’s dominion in Qingdao. The Japanese took over 
Qingdao from German hands in 1914, and Qingdao entered a period as a Japanese colony and 
began a different development trajectory. 
 
4.3. Governing Chinese workers: divided spaces and policing techniques 
Japan’s textile industry rapidly developed in the 1870s and soon became the pillar of the country’s 
economy. Alongside the expansion in production, Japanese textiles faced a bottleneck in the early 
twentieth century, due to a lack of cheap labour, cotton and other raw materials within the 
country. Japanese politicians and entrepreneurs saw Qingdao as an ideal backyard industrial site 
to relocate the Japanese textile factories, which was not only geographically close to Japanese 
territory, but also had a substantial population, large-scale cotton farming and abundant coal 
mines to support textile production. This political agenda, to make Qingdao the industrial site for 
Japanese textile factories, provided a prime motivation for Japanese colonisation of Qingdao in 
1914, and prescribed Japanese planning and governing strategies there. 
 
In 1914, the Japanese planners drafted the Qingdao Area Master Plan. The suburban area to the 
north of Qingdao’s urban district was planned as a new industrial zone to accommodate the 
Japanese textile industry. The industrial zone not only provided cheap land for Japanese factories, 
but also guaranteed easy access to the cotton farms located in the north and the large labour 
force accommodated in the urban area. The Japanese government invested generously to develop 
transportation in the industrial zone. In 1916, a road network, as well as rail tracks were 
developed in the industrial zone. In 1917, the industrial area witnessed the first Japanese textile 
factory being set up, namely Qingdao Domestic and Foreign Cotton Mill. The textile factory was 
large, taking up 17 acres of land and equipped with 27,000 spindles. Its manufacture, Silver Moon 
Cotton Yarn, soon monopolized the local market and generated substantial profits. In 1918, the 
101 
 
company reinvested in another two workshops, expanding to 90,000 spindles and remained the 
largest textile manufacturer in Qingdao for the following fifty years. Encouraged by the success of 
the Domestic and Foreign, another eight large scale textile factories settled in Qingdao’s suburban 
area after 1919and became successful and profitable (Qingdao Island News Archive).  
 
In contrast to the German colonisers who softened the conflicts with local residents and made 
many compromises during the urban development process, in the period of Japanese rule, the 
relationship between the colonisers and the local people was highly confrontational. This was 
partly due to the fact that the two countries, China and Japan, had a history of war and conflict 
against each other along with a culture of national hostility. In addition, local residents’ 
resentment and resistance activities in Qingdao towards the Japanese colonisers were further 
intensified because of the policies being pursued – such as the exploitation of Chinese labour by 
forcing the local farmers to be port coolies on poor salaries, and the revanchist policies which 
punished the Chinese for misdemeanours such as spitting and stealing. Because of the serious 
confrontations between Japanese rule and the local people, strengthening the urban police 
functions became central in Japanese urban planning and governance of Qingdao. 
 
Along with rapid industrial development, the Chinese working population in Qingdao grew fast. A 
racial segregation policy was established by the Japanese government in 1915, as a new technique 
for policing the large number of Chinese factory workers. As part of this policy, Qingdao’s urban 
area was divided in two: the old urban district, built by the Germans and with well developed 
roads and facilities such as a sewer system, was demarcated as the Japanese living zone; on its 
south east, a shanty town that was established after 1900 was to be the place for Chinese 
workers. 
 
According to Njoh (2009), racial segregation policies in colonial cities always allocate the physically 
better places to the colonisers, as a manifestation of their superior position, power and 
domination over the colonised groups. Besides racial domination and oppression, colonial 
segregation policy also forms a social control strategy which seeks to impose supervision and 
police order through divided spaces (Njoh, 2009; Dossal, 1989; Foucault, 1977; Dikec, 2005). More 
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specifically, racial segregation policy creates (different) homogeneous spaces, and through this 
intensifies visibility and facilitates state surveillance. In Qingdao’s case, what the Japanese 
colonisers aimed to achieve through enacting a segregation policy was that both the Chinese and 
the Japanese could be well governed, by separating them and avoiding the chaos of mixing them 
together. The segregated spaces created in Qingdao enabled the enactment of different policies in 
governing the two social groups. In the Japanese zone, high sanitary and policing standards were 
applied: streets were required to remain clean; people were asked to dress properly in public 
spaces; patrol teams were established to police local security. While the Japanese zone continued 
to represent the landscape of a modern city, and a place with order, the Chinese zone, in contrast, 
showed signs of lack of government and disorder, such as a poorly developed road network, 
insanitary conditions, shanty dwellings, and high crime rates. Chinese writer Wang (1935) 
described the vision of the Chinese zone as representing the “bitterest urban life”,  
 
“(It is) the home of poor factory workers and vendors. … The overwhelming sight in this place is 
dilapidated, … with small groceries, cheerless hucksters, …modernized visions are so scarce in this 
place. … People wandering on the street, they are males with tattered jackets and cloth shoes, 
females in old fashioned clothing and wearing hair clasps in their blowzy hair. Children without 
pants fight each other on the street.” (Wang, 1935: no page) 
 
Qingdao’s segregation policy was also accompanied with techniques to police the segregation 
order itself. Chinese workers were restricted to the Chinese zone and not allowed to live in the 
Japanese zone; police patrol teams in the Japanese area would search for individuals resembling 
Chinese workers, such as those improperly dressed, questioning them and expelling them; night 
curfews were imposed in the Japanese zone to prevent entry by Chinese workers. These policing 
techniques rendered the Chinese zone a space of confinement, within which Chinese workers, and 
others who might endanger the order in the Japanese zone, such as the poor and criminals, as 
well as insanitary conditions and disease, were locked in.  
 
In 1918, Qingdao’s population grew to approximately 80,000, and almost half of them were 
Chinese workers employed by the Japanese factories. New government techniques were invented, 
and new spaces were created in Qingdao, in order to govern the substantial Chinese workforce. 
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New workers’ accommodation was built by the Japanese factories in the suburban industrial park. 
This housing was crampt in small blocks, living conditions were unpleasant, with small cubicles, 
low ceilings, narrow windows and poorly designed ventilation and lighting systems. Electricity and 
water supplies were available in prescribed time schedules. Room inspections were frequently 
conducted, by people sent from the factories, normally in the name of sanitary maintenance and 
security checks. For their poor living conditions and strict surveillance, the accommodation blocks 
constructed during this time were termed by Chinese writer Yu as “workers’ prisons” (2013, no 
page). This accommodation displaced Chinese workers from Qingdao’s urban area and (re)placed 
them at close surveillance of the factories (Qingdao Island News Archive).  
 
After 1918, the year the First World War ended, China’s central state, in the name of a victorious 
nation, started to conduct political canvassing in a series of post war international meetings, to 
close down colonies and settlements in China’s coastal areas. Facing mounting political pressure 
by China, at the Washington Conference held in 1922, Japan agreed to end its dominion in 
Qingdao. While the Japanese army and police force were evicted from Qingdao, and the 
segregation policy was abolished, Japanese entrepreneurs still controlled the massive textile 
factories and retained their influence over Qingdao’s economy. However, because of a series of 
military conflicts among the Chinese warlords after 1922 which caused political instability in 
Qingdao, many Japanese factories had to shut down and the city’s urban development stagnated. 
In 1938, just before the start of the Second World War, the Japanese army invaded Qingdao and 
colonized the city for a second time. However, in contrast to the rapid economic expansion and 
fast urban development that Japan realised during its first period of rule in Qingdao, and although 
an ambitious development plan was made to revitalize Qingdao’s textile industries and upgrade 
the city’s physical environment, implementation was seriously hindered by the local people due to 
mounting xenophobia and resistance activities during the war. China reclaimed sovereignty over 
Qingdao in 1945 when the Japanese army was defeated in the Second World War and evicted 
from Chinese territory. During China’s civil war period from 1945 to 1949, Qingdao as well as many 
other Chinese cities was stagnant in terms of development. It was since 1949, when the civil war 
ended and the new People’s Republic of China was established, that Qingdao finally witnessed 
another round of rapid development, after almost thirty years of war time, economic recession 
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and political instability. 
 
4.4. “Urban development serves industrial development”: Socialist urban planning and spatial 
practice 
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union’s planning culture, characterised by centralized 
economic planning and development controls, was transplanted into other socialist countries, 
such as Cuba, Vietnam and China, where the socialist regime was established in 1949 (Sanyal, 
2005; Bray, 2005). In 1953, the first central planning scheme, the First Five-Year National 
Development Plan, was published by China’s central government. The plan announced that the 
nation’s primary mission should be to promote fast industrial development, and envisioned rapid 
and large-scale industrialization as the way to resuscitate China’s economy, realise fast wealth 
accumulation and restore the country’s social and political order. This industrialization centred 
development strategy was also enshrined in successive National Development Plans that were 
published by China’s central state from 1958 to 1975.  
 
At the local level, Chinese cities strictly followed the central state’s diktat and started their own 
industrialization-centred planning and development. In Qingdao’s case, the city saw its primary 
mission as revitalizing local industries and ambitiously hoped to expand industrial production to 
be among the top ten cities in the country within ten years. From the 1950s to the 1980s, 
Qingdao’s urban planning and development were designed and recast to support local industrial 
development. “Urban development services industrial development”, a well-known development 
slogan in Qingdao at that time, was invented by Qingdao’s municipal government around 1950, 
and epitomized Qingdao’s development policies during the following four decades. 
 
In the 1950s, Qingdao’s municipal government sponsored a “socialist transformation” movement, 
the expropriation into public ownership of urban land, enterprise and real-estate from private 
owners. What was expropriated included, firstly, the massive industries established during the 
German and Japanese colonial periods, such as the German brew house and the massive Japanese 
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textile factories; and the large amount of residential housing in Qingdao, including the German 
designed hotels, coastal villas, and residential buildings (see section 4.3), and the textile workers’ 
dormitories that were constructed by Japanese entrepreneurs during the 1910s and 1920s (see 
section 4.4). This housing was then allocated by Qingdao municipal government to the workers 
employed by the local state-owned factories. It was through the “socialist transformation” 
movement that the initial wealth accumulation process for Qingdao’s socialist economy was 
completed. After the expropriations, Qingdao claimed it had transformed to a socialist city, where 
private ownership was extinguished, and socialist public ownership had been established. Based 
upon this transformation, Qingdao’s local government authorities declared that in the city’s future 
development, social segregation, deprivation and oppression, which were predominant in the city 
in previous decades, would be erased.  
 
The ideas and visions of building a socialist city, where certain utopian principles such as pure 
public ownership and egalitarianism would be enacted, confronted resistance, primarily from the 
entrepreneurs and private owners whose properties were expropriated by the state. But the 
expropriation was forcefully conducted, supported by the state machinery including police and 
military. Feeling powerless to confront the state machine, many private owners tried to resist in 
different ways, by hiding their properties from the state, or bribing local officials in order to keep 
their properties, but failed in most cases.  
 
In 1960, Qingdao’s first master plan in the post war period was published, and the city entered a 
phase of planned development. In drafting this plan, Qingdao’s local planners were heavily 
influenced by a Soviet planning expert, Stanishev, who was invited to Qingdao in 1957. The zoning 
scheme adopted in the master plan was based upon Stanishev’s advice that the city should be 
zoned and the plan should respect and accommodate the city’s historical past and existing texture. 
According to this advice, Qingdao’s 1960 master plan demarcated the city into six zones: the old 
urban area which was built by the German colonisers, and which had plenty of residential housing, 
a well developed road network and living facilities such as sewer systems, was allocated as 
residential; to its north, the areas where the original German and Japanese owned factories were 
located were zoned as Tai Dong Small Industrial Land, and Si Fang Mechanism and Textile District; 
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and to the north of these, on the urban margin and rural fringe, three new heavy industrial parks 
were planned, namely Clear Water (Shui Qinggou) Compositive Zone, CangKou Cotton and Rubber 
Park, and Lou Hill Rear (Lou Shanhou) Heavy Industrial Park. In the 1960 master plan, 
approximately sixty percent of urban land was planned for industrial land usage, with the hope 
that the extensive industrial zone would support the city’s industrial development and expansion 
in the future (Qingdao Island News Archive).  
 
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Qingdao’s municipal government injected massive funding 
into the industrial zones and brought about rapid development in these areas. In Tai Dong and Si 
Fang industrial districts, new production lines and new workshops were added to the old factories, 
such as the locomotive factory that was established by German entrepreneurs during the 1910s, 
and the textile factories founded by the Japanese in the 1920s. In the other three industrial parks, 
many new industries, which were primarily heavy and polluting, such as rubber, print works and 
iron, were established by Qingdao’s municipal government. During the 1960s and the 1970s, 
Qingdao’s industrial zones also witnessed an upgrade in transportation. Many main arteries were 
constructed during this period, including Si Liu South Road in Si Fang district, which was Qingdao’s 
earliest four-lane road. In the 1980s, Qingdao’s industrial zones continued their rapid 
development, with more factories being established and new roads and residential compounds 
being completed.  
 
A point worth mentioning is the function of barrack buildings, which formed the dominant 
architecture in Qingdao from the 1950s to 1980s. Along with Qingdao’s industrial development 
and population explosion, a large number of barrack buildings were constructed around the city as 
workers’ dormitories. These buildings normally had four or five stories, and contained standard 
single rooms, providing compact living spaces, shared kitchens and toilets (see Figure 4.3). While 
the city of Qingdao claimed to have transformed itself into a socialist city and erased private 
ownership, class conflict and exploitation, other conflicts and contradictions were still deeply 
embedded in its socialist urbanism, including those between genders, production and 
reproduction processes, as well as between domains of private and public life. It is within the 
barrack housing that these contradictions were concentrated and dealt with.  
107 
 
Figure 4.3. Qingdao’s barrack styled housing 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
Constructed as the factory workers’ dormitories, each barrack building normally accommodated 
the workers from the same factory, and this enabled the factory to impose centralized control 
upon the residents. Usually, in this barrack housing, strict time schedules were imposed upon 
workers’ daily lives for the purpose of ensuring good performance at work. As one retired textile 
factory worker recalls at interview, his life in the factory’s dormitory in the 1960s was “strictly 
controlled by the alarms which rang three times a day, … one in the early morning reminding the 
housewives to get up and prepare breakfast for the husband, … one ring later rushes the man to 
go to work, … (and) the last one happens at 10.30 pm warning people of black-out time and 
rushing people to go to bed, … (these alarms make sure) no one will be late for work and everyone 
must get a good rest in the night and be energetic the next working day.” For the people who lived 
in barrack housing, the boundaries of the work place and private life were blurred. 
 
Another characteristic of barrack housing was that it guaranteed no privacy for family life. While 
each family occupied a single room, the walls were flimsy and the neighbours had to share 
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kitchens and toilets located in the public corridors. Gossip disseminated rapidly among the 
neighbours, and as one interviewee commented, “living in the barrack housing means there is no 
secret about your private life, you fart during the night and the next day every neighbour will 
know about it and through them the factory will know in the end.” The barrack housing in Qingdao 
resembled the panoptic space where individuals were subject to the factory’s surveillance. If the 
factory detected anything that posed a threat to workers’ good performance at work, such as the 
sick elderly who required workers’ time and energy to take care of, or quarrels among couples that 
could cause demoralization during work time, the factory would try to interfere and solve these 
troubles, by providing healthcare for the elderly and sending representatives to mediate domestic 
conflicts. In Qingdao’s barrack housing, the state-owned factories played parental, philanthropic 
and pastoral roles. Besides the familiar arguments that such factories contributed to enhancing 
workers’ well-being and sense of happiness, indeed so, the stories in Qingdao’s barrack housing 
also signify how eager the factories were in reducing the troubles of daily life and creating a 
productive labour force. 
 
A primary urban crisis in Qingdao at the time was embodied in the underdeveloped urban physical 
environment, the lack of entertainment for hardworking people, and the poor housing conditions 
for the working class. To deal with these, the austere urban lifestyle in the barrack housing was 
beautified and promoted by Qingdao’s local state. The lifestyle in the “Happy Building”, the first 
barrack housing built in Qingdao, was promoted around the city through local newspapers. The 
shared usage of kitchens and toilets, though inconvenient, was promoted as nurturing a 
“family-feeling” among neighbours, and even more, consolidating “brother-and-sister” bonding 
among the working class through the intimacy of these public spaces. The name of the building 
was deliberately picked to respond to this discourse- the “Happy Building”- signifying the happy 
life of the workers’ families within such housing. The result of this is, as one worker who used to 
live in this building recalls, was a blind adoration of the lifestyle of barrack housing, “people 
normally believe living in the barrack housing is a fashion and something that everyone should 




Barrack housing also formed the sites where male domination was reproduced. In each barrack 
building, the factories established a neighbourhood self-learning panel, which comprised factory 
representatives and several active residents. A primary mission of the panel was to educate 
women to be “docile housewives” to serve their husband, the male worker. According to one 
mechanical factory worker, the panel in his housing used to reconcile the quarrels between 
himself and his wife, by criticising his wife’s wrongness in “fighting with husband”, and educating 
his wife to be “a model housewife… (who can) help husband with his career instead of pulling him 
down.” Besides being docile wives, the female residents were also expected to play another role 
as a mother, whose primary responsibility was to give birth and rear children and through this, 
ensure a substantial labour force for the city’s development. Before population control policy was 
imposed by the central state in the 1970s, Qingdao’s local state encouraged housewives to 
accomplish this role and propagandised this as the woman’s primary obligation. 
 
Qingdao’s barrack housing formed “spaces of discipline” (Rabinow, 1989; Foucault, 1975; Home, 
1996). It signified the “new socio-spatial arrangements” designed by the socialist state, where 
“the process of everyday life” of the working class became the focus of the government (Bray, 
2005: 85). In these spaces, workers’ lifestyles were remodelled for the purpose of enhancing 
productivity. Barrack housing, therefore, formed one kind of factory machine–not producing 
goods, but a new form of urbanism, worker subjectivities, and “the communal body of the 
working class”(Todorov, 1995: 10). 
 
4.5. Building a modern city: Discourses and techniques for conducting large-scale urban 
demolition and relocation 
In 1978, China’s central state initiated market reform, inducing the privatization of urban housing 
and land, as well as a political decentralization process through which the autonomous localities 
were (re)shaped (see chapter 1 for more detailed discussion). Market reform changed and 
redirected the development trajectories of Chinese cities, in the sense that it led to the resetting 
of urban agendas by entrepreneurial urban governments and their competition spirit. In Qingdao’s 
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context, since the late 1980s, the discourse of modernity started to inform the local planning and 
decision making process. Qingdao’s local officials and planning professionals combined in their 
urgency to engender significant transformation and the rapid modernisation of Qingdao, which 
were seen as crucial steps in enhancing the city’s attractiveness for investment. In the following 
decades, the meanings of urban modernization and modernity are sought, materialised and 
contested, through the processes of urban planning and spatial (re)production in Qingdao (Bell, 
2008; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2000; Taylor, 2002; Hubbard, 2004; Zhang, 2006).   
 
In 1992, Yu Zhensheng was appointed as Qingdao’s new mayor and the city’s chief secretary of the 
party. He proposed a new urban agenda for Qingdao, and that the city needed to adopt modern 
urban functions. More specifically, Yu wanted to change Qingdao’s industrial economy and instead, 
restructure the city to be a financial centre, a tourist destination, and where a CBD, shopping 
streets, and high-technology industrial parks were located. Yu claimed that this transformation 
was essential for Qingdao to capture the development opportunities in the twenty-first century. In 
other words, Yu believed that Qingdao needed to restructure its urban functions, in order to be 
more attractive for investment and talent, and to grab the chance of rapid development in an era 
of globalization and intense global competition. Yu promoted his idea to Qingdao’s local officials 
through a series of government meetings held in 1992 and 1993. Also, during these meetings, 
oppositional voices, such as those claiming that Qingdao should continue to develop its textile and 
other traditional industries, were denied and suppressed. 
 
The materialisation of mayor Yu’s ambition started with the development of a suburban area, East 
Zone, located on the eastern side of Qingdao’s urban area. In 1992, Qingdao’s municipal 
government published, The Decision to Accelerate East Zone’s Development. The document 
announced an ambitious development plan to remodel East Zone, containing approximately 7,783 
acres of land, as the city’s new business, entertainment, and administrative centre. The document 
also emphasised that East Zone should undergo elaborate planning and designs, and permitting 
only headquarter-type functions to locate there, with the hope of assembling world-class 
companies in East Zone and reshaping the place as a window to show Qingdao’s modernization to 
the outside world. 
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As the previous section has shown, before the 1980s, Qingdao enacted the socialist regime, 
building its economy upon public ownership, and the city was hostile to private capital and closed 
to foreign investment. It was through East Zone’s (EZ) development in the 1990s that Qingdao’s 
local government showcased its own changes and modernization agenda, embodied in its 
pro-development, investment friendly attitude. Qingdao’s municipal government announced that 
EZ welcomed private investors, domestic and overseas, and published a series of priority policies, 
such as tax reductions and exemptions for large-scale investment over 30 million RMB, and 
providing cheap or free land for developers. In 1994, Qingdao’s municipal government decided to 
sell its offices in the city centre and move to the newly developed EZ. This was a high-profile step 
to announce Qingdao’s opening up and pro-development agenda. Recounting this point, one 
municipal official commented at interview that,  
 
“The municipal government funded 0.17 billion by selling the old office buildings, and this money 
was used to pay for relocating approximately 50,000 residents in the East Zone.… The relocation 
was also to tell people that the municipal government was determined to develop the East Zone, … 
(by) moving to that place and making itself an interested-party in East Zone’s 
development. …Meanwhile, I think selling the government office also has a politically symbolic 
meaning. This was to tell people that if the government’s building, the symbol of local political 
power, can be sold, then there’s nothing that cannot be privatised, nothing cannot be sacrificed for 
supporting development. It is an important signal to announce the city’s transition from socialism 
to market economy.” 
 
East Zone witnessed rapid development in the following decade. By 1998, Qingdao’s EZ attracted 
12.3 billion RMB investment and more than one hundred development projects were completed. 
A modern landscape emerged rapidly, with farmland and farm houses replaced by high-rise office 
buildings, classic shopping malls, smart restaurants and night clubs. Companies and businesses 
have flooded in since 1996, including global luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton, Gucci and Bentley 
Motors. A well-known and prosperous CBD was established in EZ, called Hong Kong Road CBD, 
where HSBC, Wal-Mart and Hyundai-Motors, and many other top international companies located 
their branches. Many well designed tourist destinations were also constructed in EZ, including a 
famous sculpture square, Wusi Square, as well as beaches, and what is claimed to be the world’s 




EZ’s development stimulated Qingdao’s local real-estate market. Since the mid 1990s, Qingdao’s 
inner city has witnessed rocketing property prices and becoming increasingly more attractive for 
investment. This propelled the planning of several rounds of inner city redevelopment schemes, 
through which the social, economic and physical structures in Qingdao’s inner city area, a place 
accommodating many historical buildings, working class families and poor residents, were 
significantly remodelled. Qingdao’s inner city became the new battlefield of investment, value 
extraction and accumulation. The first inner city remodelling plan in Qingdao was announced by 
the municipal government in 1993, through the publication of a governmental document, Decision 
to Accelerate the Remodelling of Inner City Slum Housing. The Decision sought to demolish and 
rebuild forty parcels of inner city shanty housing by 2000, which involved relocating approximately 
46,000 households. Following this, in 2003, Qingdao’s municipal government initiated another 
ambitious inner city development plan, called “Old and Dilapidated Housing Remodelling 
Programme”, aiming to demolish, within ten years, the masses of barrack housing that were 
constructed during the 1950s to the 1970s. However, Qingdao’s local authorities released scant 
official data to show the public how large-scale the demolition and relocation were to be in the 
city through the 2000s. The reason for the concealment, as are tired planning official in Qingdao 
pointed out at interview, is due to the fear that the informed public will criticise and resist the 
development scheme. Nonetheless, we can still gain a picture of how large-scale the second round 
of demolitions in Qingdao were, from the fragmented data presented in various documents, such 
as newspapers, government internal meeting records, and government work reports. These 
accessible data shows us the scale of demolition and displacement at Qingdao’s sub-municipal 
level: from 2003 to 2007, more than 30,000 households in Qingdao Shi Nan district were displaced 
during the barrack housing remodelling projects; from 2007 to 2012, in Qingdao Shi Bei district, 
thirty one barrack housing communities were demolished, affecting 35,000 households; from 
2008 to 2010, approximately three hundred and fifty five barrack buildings in Si Fang district were 
demolished and 14,000 households were displaced; and, in Li Cang district, from 2005 to 2008, 
community development projects displaced nearly 16,000 households. 
 
Qingdao’s inner city remodelling plan, in terms of its large-scale character, resembles the inner city 
slum clearance movement in US cities in the 1950s; as well as the shanty town demolition 
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schemes in Istanbul, Bombay, and many other developing countries’ cities, which were conducted 
since the 1990s, and caused millions of families to be displaced. In Qingdao as well as other cities, 
demolitions are preceded by efforts to problematise the targeted places and residents. In other 
words, it is usually through stigmatising certain places that the government manufactures 
legitimacy for conducting demolition (Weber, 2002; Ramanathan, 2005; Goffman, 2009). In US 
cities for example, in the 1950s, the state bulldozer was operated in the name of clearing away 
urban slums, the so-called problematic places which contained unhygienic and sub-standard living 
conditions and where the poor and crime were concentrated (Anderson, 1964). In Qingdao’s 
context, since the early 1990s, through local public media, such as Qingdao’s local newspapers and 
TV news programmes, stereotypes about inner city neighbourhoods were produced and 
propagandised as places that lacked modern living facilities such as sewer and heating systems, 
and which were dangerous to live in because they lacked proper fire precaution measures. A 
recent discourse in problematising and stigmatising Qingdao’s inner city places is from the new 
mayor Zhang, who was in office in 2012. In 2013, speaking at an international forum, Bo Ao Forum 
for Asia, the Mayor declared, to the audience who were politicians and businessmen from Asian as 
well as European countries, that Qingdao must accelerate remodelling the inner city 
neighbourhoods to solve a serious urban problem that “200,000 Qingdao residents are still living 
in poor condition housing that resembles India’s urban slums”. 
 
Simultaneously, Qingdao’s planning professionals rationalised the conduct of large-scale 
demolition in Qingdao as an imperative for development. According to one senior planning official 
interviewed from Qingdao’s municipal planning bureaucracy, large-scale demolition and physical 
urban renewal form a necessary phase in city development, and Qingdao must go through this 
phase before turning towards other development and regeneration approaches. She illustrates 
this point as,  
 
“We have visited London, Liverpool, Manhattan and many other modern western cities. These 
places have their own moments of large-scale demolition and physical development. Now they 
have already finished that phase and have well developed urban physical environments. Instead, 
these cities are now turning towards comprehensive and culture-led regeneration, such as 
waterfront regeneration and the remodelling of deserted industrial areas into cultural centres and 
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tourist destinations.… Qingdao is fifty or sixty years behind those western cities, and it has just 
entered the phase of large-scale demolition and physical development. …We must firstly demolish 
the old and build the new, and then we can probably consider comprehensive regeneration, 
attending to the social and cultural textures of the city and making Qingdao a better place.” 
 
This quotation also implies that Qingdao’s local planning professionals see Qingdao as inferior to 
western cities, in the sense that Qingdao is less modernized and is part of western cities’ past. 
Qingdao’s planning professionals engage in activities that “rank and hierarchise cities” (Robinson, 
2008: 74), and they position Qingdao in a disadvantaged place. It is based upon this 
self-positioning that Qingdao’s planners rationalise the process of large-scale demolition and 
physical renewal, as a valuable urban experience and phase that the city must go through as 
evidenced by western cities. 
 
Qingdao’s development and modernization process is accompanied by many contradictions. One 
of these is the contradiction between modernization enthusiasts and proponents of conservation. 
In the former group, many of Qingdao’s local officials, planning professionals, and architects, seek 
to build a modernized landscape in Qingdao, and, in their opinions, a prime embodiment of 
modernity is widespread high-rise building and skyscrapers. Yet building skyscrapers is a 
value-laden activity, premised upon certain predominant cultural values, economic rationalities 
and political interests. More specifically, skyscrapers represent American modernity which is what 
Qingdao wants to transplant to its own land; and, as Castells (1983) points out, skyscrapers not 
only function as the headquarters of, and places which, “concentrate the paperwork of giant 
corporations”, or simply form “major real estate investments in a space that has become a 
commodity in itself”, but also “symbolize the power of money over the city through technology 
and self-confidence and are the cathedrals of the period of rising corporate capitalism” (Castells, 
1983: 303; see also, King, 2004). On the other side, many of Qingdao’s local architects and scholars 
wish to conserve Qingdao’s traditional landscape and historical buildings, especially those 





Eventually, it was the former group, who enthusiastically pursued modernisation, that have 
shaped Qingdao’s development agenda. Since the early 1990s, high-rise residential and office 
buildings have been erected, replacing the old, low-rise buildings in Qingdao. East Zone has 
assembled a large number of skyscrapers, including China Rail Road Qingdao Centre, at 237 
meters, the second highest building in Asia. During Qingdao’s large-scale demolition and 
reconstruction process in the past two decades, what has been erased is not only the old 
neighbourhoods and traditional landscape, but also the social networks and lifestyles that were 
contained in the demolished residential buildings, such as the working-class communal life in the 
barrack housing (see section 4.5). Qingdao’s development and modernization, therefore, informs 
how, in an era of globalization, global capital functions as a neo-colonial power which flattens local 
traditions and diverse cultures through a global urbanization process (Leisch, 2002; Harvey, 2005; 
Robinson, 2006, 2011; He and Wu, 2007; Pow and Kong, 2007; Liang, 2008; Arkaraprasertkul, 2009; 
Pow, 2009; Almatarneh and Mansour, 2013). 
 
Some compromise was made, through the more conservative development of Zhong Shan Road, a 
place including a large number of European style buildings which were constructed by German 
colonisers during the 1910s. In 2000, Qingdao’s municipal government listed many buildings on 
Zhong Shan Road as the city’s cultural heritage and conservation architecture. But compared to 
conserving valuable historical architecture, the protection of these buildings is motivated more by 
commercial reasons. Since 2000, the German buildings on Zhong Shan Road have been 
refurbished and remodelled as museums, restaurants or clubs, and opened to tourism. Zhong 
Shan Road has been rebranded as the city’s famous “exotic cultural street”, providing a different 










Figure 4.4. Zhong Shan Road, Qingdao 
 
Dates: 2012, October 
Source: photos taken by the author 
 
Besides conservation proponents, Qingdao’s modernization has also confronted resistance from 
ordinary urban residents, who feel dispossessed during the urban development process. Since the 
early 1990s, Qingdao’s municipal government initiated a government guided compensation 
standard, requiring the developers to compensate the residents by no less than this standard. 
However, the compensation standard is mismatched with the properties’ market prices; or, in 
other words, it does not reflect the housing’s exchange values on the local property market. From 
1995 to 2005, over a ten year period that Qingdao witnessed its most rapid increase in property 
prices, the government guided compensation standard changed little. In 2005, the standard was 
around 4,000 RMB per square meter. However, Qingdao’s property prices in 2005 reached 10,000 
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RMB per square meter, almost five times more than in 1995. Large scale urban renewal and 
regenerations has induced resentment in the residents, especially the poor. Catchwords spread 
among Qingdao’s residents, satirising urban development as a process of “government 
freebooting people” and “more government sponsored demolition, more poor are created”. 
Economic dispossession, displacement and gentrification are at the core of Qingdao’s urban 
contestations. 
 
A large number of residents’ protests have occurred in Qingdao since the early 1990s, claiming 
higher compensation levels and the right to stay in the city centre. Residents’ protests are 
frequent, and, as one official from Qingdao’s urban land resource bureaucracy commented at 
interview, “I never see one single redevelopment project which is without inharmonious voices 
and people”. Many of these protests take the form of blocking actions, which, as I point out in 
chapter 2, involve residents physically occupying the properties and refusing to move out, with the 
aim of slowing down the progress of the construction work and through this, forcing the 
developers to compromise and offer higher compensation. In order to accelerate development, 
the Qingdao government authorities usually adopt a forced demolition approach, which involves 
both government-led forced land expropriation, and illegal behaviour such as cutting off the water 
and electricity supplies, and threatening and harrying of residents by developer-hired thugs. The 
forced demolition approach has been used in the East Zone development project. In clearing the 
site for the new municipal government building, Qingdao government used police force, and 
managed to demolish a factory, a plant nursery, and forcibly relocated approximately thirty 
households within only twenty five days. Some of these residents tried to present a petition to the 
central government accusing Qingdao local authorities of illegal and violent behaviour during the 
process of forced demolition. But they were blocked by Qingdao’s officials and police and detained. 
One of the most well known blocking actions during Qingdao’s inner city remodelling projects was 
by a male resident named Wang Guodong in 2010. Claiming that his property deserved higher 
compensation according to its market price, Wang refused to move out and took action. Wang 
published his experiences via his personal blog, including being harried by thugs, verbal exchanges 
with local officials, and physical clashes with police officers, and he received intense public 




While forced demolition is the primary reason for exacerbated social conflict and has made urban 
development a highly confrontational process in Qingdao, many local officials believe using forced 
demolition is important and necessary in accelerating urban development and is in the public 
interest. Further illustrating this point, one senior municipal level official pointed out at interview 
that,  
 
“Accelerating urban development and speeding up the urban modernization process fit with every 
Qingdao citizen’s interests and benefits, … (by) giving everyone a better physical environment, 
better living conditions, and a prosperous economy. …But some individuals just cannot see this, 
they are obsessed with pursuing their own small economic gains. … It is the government’s 
responsibility to deal with this, … (because) in the current phase of development, government still 
plays the role of leader, decision maker, and supervisor, in short, an omnipotent role that takes 
responsibility for everything. …Forced demolition is not glorious, but it is essential to how we do 
things, … to overcome individuals’ short-sighted and selfish pursuit and to bring about rapid urban 
development and enhance public interest.” 
 
This discourse is typical among Qingdao’s officials. It indicates how Qingdao’s local officials 
legitimise using a forced demolition approach during the urban development process. As this 
quotation shows, this legitimization not only draws upon discourses of urban modernity and its 
relation to enhanced public interest, but it also draws upon the rationality of “omnipotent 
government”. More specifically, Qingdao’s local officials claim that it is the government’s 
responsibility and right to intervene in every domain of society, including accelerating urban 
development, enhancing the, so-called, public interest, and policing residents who object. In other 
words, it is based upon a “big government, small society” formula that Qingdao’s officials claim in 
adopting forced demolition as both the government’s responsibility and right. But these 
assumptions about government’s role and about civic society, as well as their interrelationship, 
has changed and been rescaled in Qingdao subsequently. As I will evidence in the following 
chapters, in a new round of inner city development projects that have commenced since 2012, a 
forced demolition approach is no longer key to the development agenda. Instead, Qingdao’s local 
government wants to explore new government-society relationships, and to test a new 





In this chapter, I have examined Qingdao’s development and urbanization in the last century, as 
related to urban planning, contestation, and social change. The chapter shows that Qingdao’s 
urbanization is a process that is accompanied by contestation. In the last section of this chapter, I 
examined the emergence of residents’ protests against large-scale urban demolition, displacement 
and low compensation levels, since the early 1990s. I also illustrated how Qingdao’s local officials 
have rationalised and legitimized the use of forced demolition approaches in urban development 
and how these relate to discourses of urban modernity, the public interest, and government 
responsibilities. 
 
In 2012, Qingdao’s municipal government sponsored a new round of ambitious inner city 
remodelling projects, which involved relocating approximately 50,000 households within five years. 
It was through these redevelopment projects that Qingdao’s local authorities experimented with 
new government initiatives, characterised by remodelling Residents’ Committees (RCs), the 
community-based, non-government organizations, to be the vanguard in policing residents’ 
oppositional voices and resistance activities. In the following chapters, I will turn to examine local 
RCs’ roles in urban governance and community regeneration projects in Qingdao, with a focus on 












Chapter 5   The community trail: Nan Shan Residents’ Committee as a vanguard in urban 
governance and community regeneration 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examines Qingdao’s urban planning and development in the last century. It 
shows that Qingdao’s urbanization has been accompanied by contestations, which took different 
forms in different historical periods, prescribed by, and embedded in, the social, economic and 
political specificities at the time. Since the early 1990s, along with market reform and the 
predominance of property-led urban development in Qingdao, the city witnessed the emergence 
of residents’ protests and resistance against the government’s forced demolition activities, and 
development policies which offered residents low compensation levels and displaced them from 
the city centre. Since the early 1990s, pacifying residents’ resistance and restoring social stability 
have been the focus of local government reforms. In 2012, a new trend in policy reform in 
Qingdao was embodied in local Residents Committees (RCs), community-based, 
non-governmental organizations, taking a vanguard role in delivering community development 
projects. In this chapter, I will examine RCs’ roles in urban regeneration, and urban governance 
more generally, by focusing on one particular RC in Qingdao, Nan Shan Road Residents’ Committee 
(NSRC). 
 
NSRC was established by Qingdao’s municipal government in 2000, operating in a neighbourhood 
comprised of approximately 20,000 residents. In the following years, NSRC increasingly took on 
more government functions, including, for example, neighbourhood security, birth control, and 
taking care of the elderly, which were devolved by the government authorities, to be implemented 
at community level. A series of techniques have been applied in governing NSRC, including 
performance evaluations, salary incentives, competitive funding, and personnel controls, through 
which Qingdao’s government authorities regulate NSRC staff behaviour, and motivate their work. 
There is much research focusing on China’s RCs, seeing these organizations as the basic 
government units in Chinese cities, where decentralised government functions are carried out, 
and through which urban populations are incorporated into urban governance systems (see for 
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example, Mok, 1988; Read, 2000; Bray, 2006, 2008; Sigley, 2006; Shieh and Friedmann, 2008). This 
chapter adds to these writers’ efforts in understanding RCs’ roles in urban governance, with a 
special focus given to RCs’ relationships to local government and its restructuring process. 
Exemplified through NSRC, I argue that RCs signify sites of government beyond the state, whose 
abilities of governance are cultivated by local government authorities, under the auspices of 
rolling out and rolling back the state which require RCs to take on more government functions and 
responsibilities. 
 
In terms of urban renewal and regeneration, policy reforms in Qingdao signify the local state’s 
rolling-out agenda. Qingdao’s government authorities see it as RCs’ responsibilities to deliver 
policies in the community, including developing residents’ support and consent for community 
development plans, compensation policies, and relocation schemes. Government’s prime task is 
to cultivate local RCs’ abilities in fulfilling these roles. NSRC is the first committee in Qingdao to 
take on the role of policy delivery, during the development of one residential compound in its 
neighbourhood, No.19 Fushun Road, in 2012. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into 5 sections. Section 5.2 examines China’s community 
building project, which was sponsored by the Chinese central state in 2000, with the aims of 
shaping urban residential community as a new space of governance, and cultivating residents’ 
committees’ abilities in community governance. Section 5.3 continues to explore RCs’ roles in 
urban governance, by focusing on NSRC in Qingdao, whose government functions and 
responsibilities have expanded in the past ten years, due local state decentralization. A recent 
responsibility, devolved to NSRC in 2012, is to participate in community regeneration. Sections 5.4 
and 5.5 explore measures and techniques applied by the municipal government, in governing 
NSRC. These include, as section 5.4 shows, performance evaluation systems and a competitive 
funding regime, which have been efficient in activating good staff performance at work; and 
personnel controls, which, as section 5.5 shows, are embodied in Qingdao’s government control 
over the selection of NSRC leaders and recruitment of its staff, so that NSRC becomes a model of 
professionalism in community governance and urban regeneration. Section 5.6 summarises the 
arguments and findings in this chapter, in terms of RC roles in urban governance, the restructuring 
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of state-society relationships in China, and how these are relevant in understanding their recently 
devolved functions and responsibilities in community development and regeneration. 
 
5.2. The community trail in China 
According to Rose (1999), in advanced liberal societies, “community becomes a valorized political 
zone” (1999: 189); or, in other words, in many western democratic countries, community is 
rediscovered, (re)invented, and asserted as the means of exerting political actions, and solving 
social problems and achieving certain government goals. In the UK, for example, various kinds of 
communities, through political identities, personal interests, or geographical locations, were 
recognised, visualised, and programmed into various government projects. The discovery of 
community by the state informs a liberal government technique that is referred to by Rose as 
“government through community” (1999: 176; see also, Giddens, 1998, 2000; Levitas, 2000; Shaw 
and Martin, 2000; Amin, 2005; Craig, 2007). 
 
At the core of this “government through community”, is the imagination of community, as a third 
sector, which lies beyond the public and business sectors, and contains special resources that can 
be manoeuvred for government purposes. Therefore we witness the emergence of discourses 
about community, which is said to contribute to enhanced participation and social democracy; 
strengthening social cohesion; providing opportunities for inclusion; and is efficient in fighting 
demoralization, which has been haunting modern society, by invoking people’s sense of 
responsibility and needing their services as volunteers.  
 
Government through community reflects a fundamental (neo)liberal rationality. Drawing upon the 
community’s (partnership) role in government processes minimises state intervention, as well as 
reclaiming and reorganising it, in a stage of rolling-out neoliberalsim which requires a more 
aggressive form of regulation in the social domain and a “more formidable and robust pattern of 
proactive statecraft and pervasive meta regulation” (Peck, 2001: 384). It is through community, a 
new operational plane, that “governmental interventions have been licensed within the (broadly 
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defined) neoliberal project” (Peck, 2001: 389). In doing this, community “disguises the continued 
operation of the coercive functions of the state under a softened rhetoric” (Levitas, 2000, 194); or, 
as Burchell (1991) comments, a third sector is consolidated in community as “a fertile ground for 
experimentation in the development of political technologies of government” and governed in the 
name of the public good (1991: 141).In the UK, state re-regulation and re-intervention in society 
are embodied in community; where community “became the central collective abstraction for 
New Labour” (Levitas, 2000: 191), paving a third way “between the state-centred welfarism of ‘old 
Labour’ and the radical free-market individualism of Thatcher’s Conservatives” (Bray, 2006: 532). 
New Labour, by resorting to community participation and responsibility, asserts “‘etho-political’ 
(Rose, 1999) forms of social governance” (Larner and Craig, 2005: 405) which could provide a 
solution to the Gordian knottied between two forms of failed regulations and controls, “the 
authority of the state, (and) the free and amoral exchange of the market and the liberty of the 
autonomous, right-bearing individual subject” (Rose, 1999: 167; see also, Keil, 2002; Peck and 
Tickell, 2002; Larner and Craig, 2005). 
 
While many writings address issues of community building, governance and neoliberalization 
processes, few acknowledge the pertinence of these theoretical discussions beyond advanced 
liberal societies. In China’s context, community is also a key approach of state (re)regulation and 
restructuring in the post-reform period, and what becomes the plane of government in China is 
the residential community. In 2000, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs published the governmental 
document, Advice on Promoting Urban Community Building in the Country. It defines community 
as, “the commune of social life of people assembled within a certain geographical boundary”; and 
community building as “a process of following Party and government’s leadership, relying on 
community forces and strengths, mobilising community resources, intensifying community 
functions, solving community problems, coordinating the development of community politics, 
economy, culture and environment, enhancing community members’ living standards and life 
quality” (2000, no page).  
 
This document also announces the imperative and urgency in building and developing community 
in China. Community building, as it asserts, is essential for cultivating a new social agency which 
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could take over the welfare functions that were squeezed from SOEs during the process of market 
reform. The document further illustrates this point: 
 
“Along with the deepening of reforms in state owned enterprises and the changes of their 
operation mechanisms, as well as the government institutional reform and government function 
transformations, the urban community is required to take over the social functions that are peeled 
off from enterprises, as well as the public services functions transferred out from the government. 
Urban community is also essential for the building of independent social security systems and 
social service networks beyond and outside the business and government sectors.” (2000: no page) 
 
Indeed, as Read (2000) points out, in the post-reform period, China’s urban residential community 
started to function in the vacuum left by the shrinking welfare state. Also, as the above quotation 
shows, residential community is recognised as a third sector beyond the public and business 
sectors, and where, as the document goes on to specify, provides valuable “social capital, … 
community resources, … potential for mobilizing and cultivating active residents in … enhancing 
their own civility, … participating in urban affairs, … building their own beautiful home” (2000: no 
page). These conceptualizations about community, as a sphere where political action and 
government management can be founded upon exploiting special community resources, are 
analogous to those developed in advanced liberal societies. 
 
In 2009, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs published another document, Advice on Further Promoting 
the Work of Building Harmonious Community. In this document, urban residential community is 
envisioned as space where “multiple interests converged and various social contradictions 
congregated”; and therefore it is a place where these problems should be tackled and where “the 
foundations of urban management and social cohesion should be built upon”. According to the 
document, the problems that Chinese community contains and should deal with include, “social 
security and governance; the management, surveillance and education of drug addicts, released 
prisoners, homeless children, underage offspring of sentenced criminals and children of migrant 
workers”, as well as “caring for the elderly, … educating the young, … helping the jobless and 
disabled people” (2009: no page). These discourses imply that in terms of urban governance, 
China’s central state envisioned and sponsored a process of restructuring the relationships 
between the state and civil society. More specifically, China’s central state has started to withdraw 
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its interventions from the social domain, and transferred many government responsibilities to the 
community, which is restructured as a partnership in the urban governance process.  
 
The document also points out how “urban problems” should be dealt with through community, by 
accentuating approaches of participation and voluntary services. It further illustrates this point as, 
“to build harmonious community, … (we) should inspire people’s enthusiasm, initiatives, and 
creativeness in social cohesion and economic development” (2009: no page). Meanwhile, the 
document encourages voluntary services and the cultivation of a sentiment of “I should help 
others and the others will help me in return”. Cultivating this new (active) citizenship and 
(volunteer) urban management mechanism are, as the document points out, essential for 
fostering social cohesion, people’s sense of belonging, and enhancing social stability. While the 
functions of community are imagined, designed and articulated along with the specific social 
problems in Chinese society, these resemble those in advanced liberal societies in several 
dimensions. At the heart of China’s community building initiatives, there lies what is called by Rose, 
“a double movement of autonomization and responsibilization” (1999: 174). By underscoring 
people’s responsibilities in community development and the importance of voluntary services, 
China’s state resorts to an ethico-politics, which is also at the vanguard of community building 
initiatives in Western democratic societies. 
 
But what distinguishes China’s community building process from the initiatives in Western 
countries is, in Bray’s (2006) words, “the degree to which the idea of ‘community’ itself has been 
institutionalized” through state policies and initiatives (2006: 545). Residents’ Committees (RCs), 
the community based, non-governmental organizations, play leading roles in China’s urban 
governance and community building. RCs were established by China’s socialist state in cities 
during the 1950s. One RC normally comprised seven to seventeen members and operated in a 
neighbourhood with six hundreds households. The primary job of RCs at that time was policing 
the people who were not included in the work unit system. In the post reform period, RCs 
experienced change in terms of staff cuts, and an expanding domain. Now China’s RCs normally 
have five to seven staff and govern in a larger neighbourhood comprising seven hundred to one 
thousand four hundred households. RCs have also been endowed with new responsibilities since 
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the late 1980s, including delivering welfare services in the community, such as distributing 
pensions to the elderly and disabled and providing training for the jobless; enacting government 
policies, such as birth control, in neighbourhoods; as well as organizing a series of cultural events 
in the neighbourhood, such as singing competitions or quiz nights, for the purpose of cultivating 
people’s sense of belonging and enhancing social cohesion. In addition, as stated in the Advice 
published in 2000, RCs are also expected to coordinate with various other organizations in 
delivering services and governing the community. These organizations include various local 
governmental departments, ranging from civil affairs, education, to transportations, as well as 
local enterprises and businesses, and various NGOs, such as the Property Owners’ Committee, the 
grassroots organization that representing property owners’ interests, and other voluntary 
organizations, workers’ unions, women’s federations, and the union of disabled people. RCs are 
supposed to draw “social forces and support” from all these organizations, and shape “synergy 
and cooperation in promoting community building” (2000: no page).  
 
By 2010, there were approximately 80,000 RCs around Chinese cities. RC neighbourhoods, or their 
domains, have clearly delineated boundaries, which are normally the streets and alleys. It is 
through RCs that Chinese urban spaces are re-territorialised into “a matrix of contiguous 
(residential) communities” and China’s urban society is remodelled into seamless government 
units (Bray, 2008: 398). In the following section, by focusing on one particular RC, Nan Shan Road 
Residents’ Community in Qingdao, I will further examine RCs and their roles in community building 
and urban governance. I will also examine how NSRC moved into the domain of community 
regeneration and was endowed with new responsibilities of policing residents’ oppositional voices 
and resistance activities. 
 
5.3. Nan Shan Residents’ Committee: “Prime minister in the alley” and laboratory of new 
government initiatives 
In 2001, China’s Ministry of Civil Affaire published the document, Guidance for Conducting Urban 
Community Building Demonstrations. It announced a plan of selecting some RCs around the 
127 
 
country as “demonstration units”, through which bold government initiatives would be explored 
and experimented around community building and urban governance. In detail, the document 
points out the expected functions and roles played by these “demonstration units”: 
 
“The demonstration units should insist on liberating thoughts, renewing mindsets, adopting spirits 
of reform and initiatives, exploring and practising in a bold way. … (The demonstration units) 
should enable the transformation of government functions,… further developing community 
organizations, … improving community management and services. … The demonstration units’ 
experience (in community building and governance) should be spread, they should be the model 
and vanguard who will lead, guide and radiate (other local communities’ construction and 
development).” (2001: no page) 
 
Following this document, the Ministry selected approximately eighty RCs around the country as 
the “demonstration units”, including Nan Shan Road Community (NSRC) in Qingdao (see Figure 
5.1and Figure 5.2). NSRC had been established by Qingdao’s municipal government in 2000, 
combining four small RCs that were founded by different work units from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
NSRC is operated by eight staff, including one head, two assistant heads, and another five 
employees. NSRC’s neighbourhood covers 1.3 km2 of land, comprising approximately 20,000 
residents and fifty properties. The neighbourhood is located in the domain of Fuxin Road Street 
Office (FRSO), which is governed by a sub-municipal level of government, Qingdao Si Fang district 
government. Approximately one third of NSRC’s residents are workers in a state-owned factory, 
and many were laid-off in the city’s large-scale redundancies in the early 2000s (Nan Shan 
Residents’ Committee online blog). The neighbourhood has also witnessed the influx of 
substantial numbers of low-income tenants in the last decade. The demographic structure of NSRC, 
as one staff member commented at interview, is “basically the elderly, low-educated, and 









Figure 5.1. Location of Nanshan Residents’ Committee 
 
















Figure 5.2. Front Gate of Nanshan Residents’ Committee 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
















An important reason why NSRC was selected as a national demonstration unit is because of its 
location in a poor neighbourhood, which made it a laboratory for experimental policies and 
initiatives in delivering welfare services to the poor. As a laboratory of government initiatives and 
public policies, NSRC not only has to carry out a series of routine work that any RC in Qingdao has 
to engage with, but also needs to spend considerable energy and time in designing and testing 
new ideas and measures about community governance. Next I will illustrate what comprises 
NSRC’s routine work and its role and responsibilities as a government laboratory. 
 
NSRC’s routine work comprises two parts. The first involves a series of government and public 
sector functions that have been devolved. These cover several domains, including, as NSRC’s head 
summarised at interview, “birth control, sanitary, education, local security, conflict mediation, 
women’s rights, welfare services, local development, … last but not least, political mobilization of 
party members”. Within these domains, the tasks being handed down to NSRC have continued to 
increase in the past ten years, along with Qingdao government authorities’ decentralization 
reforms. Commenting on this, NSRC’s expanding responsibilities in community governance, one 
NSRC staff member points out that the committee is like “a basket, …the upper government 
throws to us everything they are incapable of doing or unwilling to do” (interview). NSRC’s head 
further illustrates this point as, 
 
“While government slims down by handing a lot of jobs to us, I think residents’ committees are 
overburdened. … For example, in terms of welfare services, we usually only deal with the jobless 
and the poor, by handing pensions to them each month. But about five years ago the government 
also requires residents’ committees to take care of the disabled people in the community, which 
used to be the responsibility of the disabled people’s federation. … More ridiculous is that the 
government wants residents’ committees to attract investment to the neighbourhood. This is 
definitely government’s responsibility but not NGOs like us.” (interview) 
 
This viewpoint, that NSRC has been overburdened during the decentralization process, and has 
taken over many responsibilities that should not be undertaken by NGOs, is recognised by other 
NSRC members. However, the tendency has continued, with increasingly more jobs devolved in 
the past few years to NSRC, and other Qingdao’s RCs, including, for example, fire prevention, and 
inspecting unlicensed vendors. Besides these decentralised government functions, NSRC also has 
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to deal with massive paperwork each day, or, as one staff calls it, “being a stamp machine”. This 
agenda involves the committee in reviewing, scrutinising, and then stamping substantial 
documents on a daily basis. These documents are mainly related to proving residents’ identities, 
such as the statement of an individual’s low-income status that is required in applying for 
government benefits; or drafting letters for proving people’s un-married status that enables 
people to get marriage certification. It is through this paper work that NSRC is incorporated in, and 
plays an important role in, administrative procedures. And, NSRC’s head claims that in “proving 
people’s identities”, the committee acts out the government role of categorising people, based 
upon its knowledge about the local population. She further illustrates this point as, 
 
“Government’s administrative process is based upon categorising people. … Government has to 
identify who are the low-income, the disabled, who are law abiding people and who have a 
criminal history, and whether one is single or married, so that different policies can be applied to 
them. …But the government has to rely on residents’ committees to do the job, because we are 
familiar with people’s family situation and what is going on in their life.” (interview) 
 
NSRC staff will normally spend a great deal of time stamping documents, and they feel this makes 
the committee “partly function like a government bureau, engaged in boring, mechanical, and 
administrative work”. Also, as NSRC’s head claims, taking over a wide range of government 
functions, the committee plays an important role in local governance, as “every single government 
policy has to go through the committee in order to be enacted in the community” (interview). It is 
in these senses, NSRC’s importance, busy workload, and partly bureaucratic characteristics, that 
NSRC’s staff term the committee like a “Prime Minister in the alley”. 
 
Besides the routine work, NSRC also has to fulfil its laboratory roles. When new ideas about 
community governance are conceptualised by Qingdao’s municipal government, NSRC will need to 
put them into practice by designing and enacting new initiatives and measures. For example, in 
2007, Qingdao’s municipal government, responding to the central state’s newly agenda of 
enhancing social cohesion, required NSRC and another four RCs in Qingdao to test new 
approaches and new measures in increase people’s sense of belonging and friendship among their 
neighbours. NSRC staff held a large-scale banquet, the “neighbours and friends’ festival party”, 
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which welcomed every resident living in the neighbourhood and provided a social occasion. The 
idea of holding a banquet was applauded by the municipal government, was later introduced to 
other Qingdao’s residents’ committees and became a widespread, annually held, neighbourhood 
social event in the city. 
 
As a “demonstration unit” appointed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, NSRC also has to test the 
Ministry’s ideas about community construction and became a window for the Ministry to observe 
the results of its experimentation. As mentioned in section 5.3, developing voluntary services is a 
key agenda in the Ministry’s community construction programme, and NSRC has been a vanguard 
in carrying out this idea. In 2009, NSRC established the first neighbourhood patrol team in 
Qingdao, enrolling approximately twenty local residents, to police burglary, graffiti and illegal 
advertisements appearing in the community. In 2010, NSRC opened up a charity canteen, which 
provided cheap lunches to unaccompanied children and elders in the neighbourhood. The canteen 
provided approximately ten paid job positions for unemployed residents in the community, and 
enrolled more than twenty residents as volunteers. Also in this year, four residents who were 
retired junior high school teachers opened a summer vacation training programme, providing free 
chess, literature and calligraphy classes to children and young people from the community. These 
initiatives, designed and enacted by NSRC, were acknowledged and praised by an investigation 
panel sent by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2012, and were later, via the panel who visit many 
other RCs around the country, introduced to other cities. 
 
In 2012, Qingdao’s municipal government faced new challenges in terms of promoting inner city 
regeneration projects. On the one hand, the municipal government announced an ambitious inner 
city remodelling plan, aiming to demolish 1.7 million m² housing and relocating 50,000 households 
in five years. On the other hand, the municipal government was faced with the central state’s ban 
on using a forced demolition approach in the land clearance process (see chapter 2), and 
therefore, had to explore new measures to bring about rapid development without using forced 
demolition, planning profitable and attractive development projects while avoiding acute social 




“the city’s development and the process of enhancing residents’ living standards should 
continue, … but there are stronger political pressures (from the central state) forcing the localities 
to adopt new approaches. …The localities have to follow the central state’s will, because it 
concerns local officials’ political rightness and their career future, as well as whether local 
development can access funding support from the central state, … (such as) from China’s 
Development Bank.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation implies, China’s central state has manufactured imperatives for conducting 
reforms at the local level. The reason for this, besides controlling funding resources, lies in the 
central state’s strict controls over local officials’ promotions and the future of their career, which, 
as I have discussed in chapter 1, are essential approaches to retaining the central state’s influence 
over local development agendas. Faced with political pressures to reform, Qingdao’s municipal 
government cast its gaze towards local RCs.  
 
In 2012, organised by mayor Zhang, Qingdao’s municipal government held a series of government 
meetings, discussing reforms and new initiatives for conducting urban renewal and regeneration 
projects. The meetings involved officials from street offices, the lowest level of government and 
which have most contact with RCs; as well as officials from land resources, urban planning, and 
property management, as the departments that play key roles in planning, decision making and 
surveillance during the urban development process. At these meetings, consensus was shaped 
among the officials that RCs should take a more central role during urban renewal projects. More 
specifically, RCs should fulfil a double mission in community redevelopment projects, that is, 
accelerating the speed of development, as well as reducing the chances of the emergence of 
residents’ oppositional voices and resistance activities. According to one street official who 
participated in these meetings, Qingdao’s officials believe RCs are capable of doing all this 
because,  
 
“People are familiar with their residents’ committees and know about the staff, so they trust the 
committees members and this gives the committee huge advantages in propagandising policies. … 
Residents’ committees are familiar with local residents and their family situations, so they are 
good at dealing with the people. … Committees can mobilize community resources and are good at 
exploiting local social networks in solving problems. … In contrast, government departments are 
not good at these. … Government should retreat to its own domain,… (which) it is good at and 
signifies its real responsibilities, …planning and decision making. … Policy enacting and issues of 
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dealing with residents should be handed to the RCs and be solved within the communities. …It is 
time to change big government thinking.” (interview) 
 
This quotation shows that among Qingdao’s officials, the thinking on residents’ community 
responds to that announced in a series of central state documents, which, as discussed in section 
5.2, see community as a third sector with valuable resources that can be exploited for government 
purposes. In addition, the above quotation also implies the changing views on government’s roles 
and responsibilities in urban regeneration, no longer as a big government that should cater to 
both decision making and policy delivery, but only focusing on the former; as well as new 
conceptualizations of the relationships between government and civil society, embodied in an 
intention to shape community and RCs partnerships in urban regeneration and the urban 
governance process. 
 
NSRC, as the laboratory for Qingdao municipal government’s new ideas and policies, becomes, 
once again, the place where this new thinking is experimented and tested. After the decision was 
made through a series of government meetings, to draw upon the RC as a partner in urban 
renewal projects, a leadership panel was established, comprising the deputy mayor, and senior 
officials from urban planning and land resources departments. The panel held several meetings to 
discuss and design details concerning NSRC’s involvement in community redevelopment projects. 
NSRC was expected to facilitate resident participation, mobilise community activity, and cultivate a 
sense of responsibility amongst residents. Through this, the panel believed that NSRC could 
leverage residents’ understanding and support for the redevelopment projects, and reduce the 
chances of resistance. If this could be done, as the officials from the panel claimed, then NSRC 
would carve out a new approach for conducting urban regeneration in Qingdao, which would be 
less confrontational, more consensus based, and signify an alternative to the forced demolition 
approach. In chapter 6 and chapter 7, I will examine the initiatives adopted by NSRC to fulfil these 
expectations.  
 
In addition, to let NSRC function as a laboratory for this thinking, the panel decided that No. 19 
Fushun Road, a residential compound located within NSRC’s neighbourhood, would be the first to 
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be redeveloped in the new round of the inner city remodelling programme that began in 2012. 
The idea about involving RCs in community regeneration would be tested during No. 19’s 
redevelopment project, through NSRC, and, if proved to be successful, would be applied to other 
regeneration projects that follow. In the next chapter, I will provide more detail on No. 19 and 
other reasons for selecting it as the first regeneration project. 
 
A key issue for Qingdao’s government authorities is how to make sure NSRC is acting according to 
government wishes. More specifically, a primary concern is how to mobilize and monitor NSRC 
staff to play the role exactly as envisaged and expected. This is important, as one street official 
pointed out at interview, “so that the committee will be a helping hand instead of an issue in 
itself”. In the following two sections, I will examine the measures taken in governing local RCs, 
exploring how they form intensified and restructured centralised controls, and whether, and in 
what sense, these measures are effective controls of decentralised government units. I will 
exemplify this through the case of NSRC. 
 
5.4. “We are government’s arm in the community”: Centralized control and NSRC’s top-down 
agenda 
In the previous sections, I discussed the state project of (re)discovering the third sector as a 
partner in governance, examining this in Qingdao’s context, and exploring its relevance to the 
emergence of residents’ committees in the urban governance process. This state project signifies 
the adjustment of state-society relationships, and it is also accompanied by the invention of new 
regulation techniques and the restructuring of the state power regime. 
 
Along with the state’s neoliberal project of empowering and responsiblising the community, 
substantial NGOs emerge, which, along with private sector organizations, take over the devolved 
functions of government. The role of the state is restructured, no longer as the centre from where 
to “know, plan, calculate and steer”, or “required to answer all society’s needs for order, security, 
health and productivity” (Rose, 1999: 174); but being “the facilitating state, the enabling state or 
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the state as animators” (Rose, 1999: 174), which could coordinate, from a distance, the operations 
of a diversity of agents, ranging from “commercial enterprises, trusts, voluntary organisations, 
primary carers and so on” (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 29). The state is effectively rolling out to the 
domain of organising and regulating social provision (Jessop, 1994; Desai and Imrie, 1998; Imrie 
and Raco, 1999). Commenting on the changes in state functions, as well as the relationships 
between state and civil society this informs, Desai and Imrie argue that local government is being 
“transformed into local governance structures, characterised by a shift in policy development and 
implementation from elected agencies and/or institutions of the state, to non-elected, 
quasi-governmental organisations” (Desai and Imrie, 1998: 638). 
 
Against the decentralization and dispersal of state functions, new government techniques are 
invented and applied to restore state controls and (re)centralise its powers of coordination. 
Responding to this point, Clarke and Newman (1997) comment that, “while the state has 
withdrawn in some ways, its powers and apparatuses have been extended in others – transferring 
‘responsibilities’ but simultaneously creating the capabilities of surveillance and enforcement to 
ensure that such responsibilities are being fulfilled” (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 29). At the heart 
of this (re)centralisation process is the emergence of performance evaluation systems and 
competitive funding regimes, the technologies of New Public Management, which, draws upon 
organizations’ “self-discipline through the internalisation of financial and performance targets”, 
manufactures a regulated autonomy for NGO operations and state supervision (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997: 29; see also, Hoggett, 1996; Rose, 1999). In Qingdao, performance evaluation and 
a competitive funding regime also form key strategies for implementing the local state’s 
centralised controls over local RCs. 
 
In 2000, when NSRC was established based upon the merger of four smaller RCs, it also inherited 
their properties. These included several print shops and restaurants, a low-rise office building, and 
several residential flats in NSRC’s neighbourhood, which generated substantive incomes and 
enabled NSRC to be financially independent. In 2002, Qingdao’s municipal government sponsored 
reforms to regulate the funding regime of local RCs. NSRC was required to sell its properties, 
except for several residential flats that brought the committee approximately 24,000 RMB per year, 
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and which was used for staff bonuses. Public funding became NSRC’s primary resource, and was 
allocated by three governmental departments, including Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureaucracy, Si Fang 
district government, as well as Fuxin Street Office. The public money covered NSRC’s major 
expenditure, ranging from the salaries of its eight staff, payments on office facilities, and bursaries 
for holding small-scale social and cultural events in the neighbourhood. In the early 2000s, NSRC 
and other Qingdao local RCs received a fixed funding allocation, operating in an environment that 
lacked incentives, resulting in inaction and producing relatively poor performance.  
 
In 2005, to stimulate the activities of local RCs, Qingdao’s municipal government implemented 
performance evaluations, and introduced salary incentives and a competitive funding regime. The 
evaluation system comprised two parts. The first part aimed to evaluate and monitor RC 
behaviour in conducting routine work, including, for example, local security, welfare service 
provision, and enhancing social stability. RCs’ behaviour in these domains was evaluated and 
scored according to detailed criteria. Using NSRC staff descriptions, I have drawn up a table that 
outlines some of these evaluation criteria (see Table 5.1). The second part of the evaluation 
system contained standards and criteria to evaluate RCs’ performance in the flexible and 
temporary jobs allocated by government authorities. For example, in 2007, the municipal 
government required local RCs to investigate and report illegal buildings in the community, and 
one criterion in evaluating RCs’ performance was how fast they completed the job. This second 
evaluation system will change each year, reflecting different temporary missions that the 
government wants RCs to accomplish. By enacting this two-part evaluation system, Qingdao 
government authorities not only aim to monitor and enhance RCs’ everyday performance, but 










Table 5.1. Evaluation criteria for Qingdao’s RCs (selected criteria) 
Categories Criteria Total scores  
Welfare services 
 
Community health centre construction 
Community convenience shop construction 
Job seeking/training/consultancy centre 
Housing for disabled people 
20 
Local security Community police station construction 
Community patrol team development 
Fire prevention seminars 
10 
Social stability Policy propaganda seminars 
Residents’ petition management  
Media relationship management  
25 
 
Under the evaluation system, performance is scored against criteria, made comparable through 
league tables, and rendered open to state surveillance and gaze (Shore and Wright, 2004). Based 
upon what scores they have achieved, Qingdao’s RCs can be compared to each other, and be 
labelled as good or poor performers. The reward and punishment mechanism for RC performance 
was enacted in 2006, as salary incentive and a competitive funding regime. 
 
Qingdao’s municipal government decided to introduce two parts to RC staff salaries, including 
basic salary, which is paid monthly as a fixed amount; and incentive payments, which require the 
committee to exceed certain scores under the evaluation system. The incentive payments take the 
form of an end of year bonus, the exact value of which is unclear. According to an ex-NSRC staff 
member the amount equalled one third of his annual income, and was attractive enough for 
inducing certain activities. While Qingdao’s RCs receive a fixed amount of funding from local 
government authorities, the top ten percent of RCs which have the highest scores will be allocated 
an extra amount of funding for supporting their activities. This brought Qingdao’s RCs into acute 
inter-organizational competition to achieve high scores. According to NSRC’s head, in the past 
decade, the committee has been achieving high scores under the evaluation system, and because 
of this, it receives extra funding of approximately 270,000 RMB per year. She believes this to be 
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evidence that “NSRC is one of the most outstanding residents’ committees in Qingdao, … (because) 
it is capable of producing good performance, satisfying the government, … meeting the criteria, … 
and wining substantial funding support for good performance and staff hard work.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation shows, NSRC’s head believes that meeting government’s evaluation criteria and 
generating good performance under the evaluation system are evidence of the committee’s 
outstanding status. This viewpoint is reinforced by other NSRC staff, who go further to suggest that 
a high score under the evaluation system is “the target of each (NSRC) member”, and that 
“receiving government admiration and (financial) rewards are the committee’s engines of 
self-improvement” (interview). These reflect, firstly, as in Shore’s (2008) words, NSRC staff 
“interpolate …as auditees” who “measure themselves and their personal qualities against the 
external benchmarks (and) performance indicators” (Shore, 2008: 281). In addition, under the 
operation of this system, NSRC displaces its accountability away from local residents and towards 
government. Criticising this, Desai and Imrie (1998) point out that “the purported advantages of 
the NGOs have been worn away by their focus on procedural targets, increased funding, 
professionalisation, bureaucracy and the shifting of objectives from social mobilisation towards 
service delivery” (1998: 639). Recounting this point, and in more esoteric words, an ex-NSRC staff 
member who is now able to criticise the viewpoint of the committee, points out that in terms of 
NSRC and other Qingdao RCs, “we are government’s arm in the community, … following 
government orders and have very limited self-determination.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, Qingdao’s government authorities wanted to involve RCs in community 
regeneration and planned to explore this through NSRC in 2012. For this purpose, a new 
evaluation and scoring system was designed, jointly by the municipal government and Si Fang 
sub-municipal government, which was applied exclusively to NSRC, in order to mobilise its 
activities and direct its performance in the regeneration project. The evaluation criteria were 
designed to ensure that NSRC accomplished a double mission, which, as mentioned earlier, was to 
facilitate rapid development, while policing residents’ oppositional voices and resistance activities. 
These criteria, as shown in Table 5.2, focus on evaluating the committee’s performance in 





Table 5.2. Evaluation criteria for NSRC’s performance in community redevelopment project 
Category Criteria and scores + Criteria and scores - 
Rapid 
development 
+20 for vacating the buildings 
within three months 
+15 for vacating more than seventy 
percent of residents from the 
building within three months 
-15 for more than half of the 
residents remaining in the building 
over three months 
-10 for causing serious delay in the 
construction project 
Social stability +20 for non petition activities 
accrued 
+15 for recognising and preventing 
residents’ group petitions 
+10 for recognising and preventing  
residents’ individual petitions 
+5 for successfully persuading a 
nail household to move out 
-10 for not properly responding to a 
petition in twenty four hours 
-5 for the petition activities being 
delivered to higher government 
institutions (municipal, provincial 
and central level) 
-5 for residents petitions/forced 
demolition events being exposed by 
the media 
 
Participating in community regeneration is considered by Qingdao government authorities as, a 
very important, but temporary agenda allocated to NSRC. The newly designed evaluation system 
for monitoring NSRC performance in community regeneration signifies another, but somewhat 
different, control mechanism for regulating the committee’s behaviour in temporary and flexible 
agendas beyond its routine work. The municipal government decided that in 2012, NSRC would be 
exempt from evaluations of its routine work, but that evaluations would be exclusively based upon 
its performance in the regeneration project. In other words, as NSRC’s head explained, this means 
that “only if we can generate good performance in the regeneration project, the committee is 
considered (by the government) as has accomplished its job well”. (interview) 
 
NSRC staff feel a lot of pressure from this new arrangement, as they are forced to devote their 
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efforts into community regeneration, a domain that they are not familiar with. Although they 
complain, NSRC staff are dedicated and passionate about doing a good job, given the incentive 
mechanisms. Hearing about the new evaluation system for NSRC, the head held a meeting to 
inform the staff and encourage them to prepare for the challenge. Recalling her speech during the 
meetings, the head believes she accentuated the following points, 
 
“I tell them that the committee will need to turn on its full engines, that everyone should do their 
best and make sure the committee meets government requirements. … This (regeneration project) 
is both an opportunity and a risk, either we prove our ability to accept and fulfil the challenges, or 
we will fail the government’s expectations. … We need to generate good performance, … achieve 
high scores to prove ourselves as one of the best committees in Qingdao, … (by) making sure the 
demolition and relocation process is very smooth, quick and harmonious.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation implies, NSRC’s head sees the committee’s priority in the community 
regeneration project is to meet government requirements, receive government approbation, and 
achieve good performance and high scores under the evaluation system. However, nothing has 
been mentioned about the committee’s responsibilities with the local residents, and this may 
imply that NSRC is switching its accountability from the local people. This will be evidenced in 
chapters 6 and 7, which examine the detailed initiatives and activities employed by NSRC in 
shaping consensus and suppressing oppositional voices during No.19 Fushun Road’s regeneration 
in 2012. As these chapters will show, representing residents’ interests and voices is less of a 
concern to NSRC, and, sometimes, in order to accelerate the progress of the development project, 
NSRC even resort to measures that actually signify oppression and domination of the local 
residents. 
 
5.5. Personnel management and centralized control in NSRC 
Besides performance evaluation and the competitive funding regime, personnel control forms 
another key approach adopted by Qingdao’s local government in regulating RC behaviour. Using 
NSRC as an example, this section examines how Qingdao’s government authorities manage, and 
intervene in, RCs’ personnel arrangements; in what sense, and to what extent, government 
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management and control of personnel shape NSRC’s professionalism in the domain of urban 
renewal and regeneration. 
 
As mentioned earlier, NSRC is operated by a panel which comprises eight positions, including the 
head, who is primary leader of the committee; two assistant heads; and another five members 
that follow the head and the assistant heads’ orders. The hierarchical structure of NSRC is shown is 
Figure 5.3. According to Urban Residents’ Committee Organizational Law, a legal document 
published by China’s central state in 1989, RC heads and assistant heads should be elected by local 
residents. Yet, except in a few RCs, such as those under Shanghai Jiading Street Office, which have 
been experimenting with the democratic election approach, the majority of RCs around the 
country have their head and assistant heads selected and appointed by local government 
authorities. In Qingdao’s case, street offices will normally nominate candidates for RCs within their 
own areas, and the nominations will be submitted to the Civil Affairs Bureaucracy at the municipal 
level for sanction. After the decision is made, a selection meeting will also be held in the 
neighbourhood, which normally involves ten to fifty local residents, but which only functions as a 
“rubber stamp” to legitimise the government’s appointments. 
 
Figure 5.3. Hierarchical structure of NSRC 
 
 
The power to appoint is reserved by Qingdao’s government as a means of control. Through 
selecting and appointing local RC heads and assistant heads, government authorities make sure 
only those with desirable qualities, and who have the potential to produce good performance, 
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enter RCs and become leaders of these organizations. In 2000, Fuxin Street Office nominated the 
head of NSRC, who has been in post since then and until 2012. She was appointed as the head 
because, as one official from the street office claimed at interview, “she is diligent, passionate, … 
considerate for residents’ difficulties, more importantly, she is efficient in her work and good at 
enacting government orders”. As this quotation implies, compared to other qualities, whether one 
is willing to follow government orders is a more important standard in selecting the head. This 
viewpoint is reinforced by another official from the street office, who points out, in a more direct 
way, “we want someone docile” (interview). These discourses reflect an important, but less 
overtly expressed, agenda concerning governing local RCs, that is, Qingdao government 
authorities want to establish strong control over RCs, ensuring these organizations follow 
government’s orders, enacting the government’s will, and appointing docile leaders for RCs is seen 
as a key approach in realising these.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Qingdao’s government authorities wanted NSRC to be involved in 
community regeneration in 2012, and hoped that the committee would play an important role in 
accelerating development and policing residents’ oppositional voices. In this year, Fuxin Street 
Office nominated a new leadership panel for NSRC to replace the previous one. The new panel 
were considered by the street office as more capable of fulfilling the above expectations. These 
candidates have work experience in assisting government officials in community regeneration, 
such as promoting policies in the neighbourhood, persuading residents to accept their 
compensation offer, and pacifying angry residents who planned to sponsor petitions and law suits. 
These elements of work experience were important because, as one official from Fuxin Street 
Office pointed out at interview,  
 
“They (the new head and assistant heads) are veterans in the domain of demolition and 
relocation, …so we can expect they have good performance in the forthcoming development 
project. … They can foresee potential dangers for causing conflicts, and have a better 
judgement(than the officials) in gauging what might be good strategies in pacifying the 
conflicts. …They have valuable skills in this domain (which) the officials should respect, … and 
should manage to use their skills wisely.” (interview) 
 
The new leaders of NSRC are also people who are skilful in communication with residents, and 
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good at developing personal networks in the community. These qualities, as one municipal level 
official perceives, are very helpful for NSRC’s leaders to build trust and authority among local 
residents, and develop their own information network in the community. In the forthcoming 
regeneration project, these, in turn, will enable NSRC’s heads and assistant heads to be good 
mediators for residents’ petition activities as those “whose words the residents will buy”. 
 
Family life was also brought under government surveillance when selecting NSRC’s head. The head, 
a woman in her mid-fifteens, was deemed to have an ideal family situation for her to take on a 
committee leadership position. The head has two family members, a son in his mid thirties who 
has his own successful business, and the husband who has retired, both of whom do not need the 
head to pay much time to attend to their daily life. Because of this, as one official from Fu Xin 
Street Office felt at interview, the head could invest all her time and energy in the community job, 
and, could be expected to “work around the clock” during the community development project. 
This responds to Maravelia’s (2003) argument that increasingly, professional and non-professional 
domains have been submitted under the gaze of power, through which individuals are further 
enslaved as being remodelled to fill the expectations of instrumental role-playing.  
 
The remaining five staff members of NSRC are selected by Qingdao’s local state through 
examinations. In 2011, Qingdao’s municipal government held an examination to enrol staff for 
NSRC and several other local RCs. The examination was open to every citizen in Qingdao, and 
more than one hundred applicants sought positions in NSRC. The examination included two 
rounds of tests, the first was a written test held by Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureaucracy. This was 
followed by an interview, at which a board of examiners, consisting of officials from Fuxin Street 
Office, Shi Bei sub-municipal government, and Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureaucracy, was in charge. 
Through these examinations five people, who are young and have a university education, were 
appointed to NSRC. An important reason for selecting these people is because they are considered 
to have the qualities and skills that the head and assistant heads do not have. Among these an 
important one is internet skills. In recent years, along with the popularity of the internet and PCs 
around the country, online blogs, forums and public chat rooms have emerged as primary sites for 
the residents to disseminate discussion and access information, and therefore deemed as targets 
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for surveillance and policing. The responsibilities of policing discussion published online is 
allocated to RCs and, during the community regeneration project, NSRC staff are expected to 
watch over residents’ online discussion, detect the risk of a petition and adopt appropriate 
strategies, such as locating the residents who publish such a discourse, and persuading them to 
drop their petition activities. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examines NSRC’s agenda and functions, showing that along with the local state’s 
slimming down in the last two decades, the committee is decentralised taking on more 
government functions, and, is required to play a vanguard role in urban renewal and regeneration, 
in terms of delivering development policy in the community. I also examine a series of techniques 
adopted by Qingdao’s local government authorities in governing NSRC, including performance 
evaluation, salary incentives, competitive funding, and personnel controls, through which the local 
state mobilises the NSRC staff enthusiasm at work, redirecting their behaviour, and governing at a 
distance. I argue that in Qingdao, the local state is turning towards an enabling role, rolling out its 
agenda towards coordination, instead of direct service provision. By focusing on the Qingdao 
context, and through the NSRC case, this chapter aims to draw a bigger picture of RCs’ roles in 
urban governance, their relationships with China’s local state, as well as an understanding of the 
restructuring of local state functions and how this process relates to RCs. 
 
I accentuate the efficiency of the government techniques applied in governing NSRC. They have 
restructured NSRC’s relationships with local government. More specifically, it is through these 
government techniques that the local state has implemented a top-down agenda in NSRC. The 
committee faces a common problem that also shadows NGOs in advanced liberal societies, that is, 
the lack of real bottom-up engagement. In urban renewal and regeneration, NSRC carries out 
agendas and seeks to meet targets that are prescribed by the local government authorities. These 
are, to assist the government in vacating the community, and policing residents’ oppositional 
voices and resistance to redevelopment. In the following chapters, I will focus on the development 
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project at No.19 Fushun Road, a residential compound in NSRC’s neighbourhood, and examine the 






























Chapter 6   Community participation at No. 19 Fushun Road: empowerment or government 
control? 
6.1. Introduction 
Community involvement and the related rhetoric of empowerment and democratic control have 
been in vogue in urban policy in advanced liberal societies since the early 1970s. In the Chinese 
context, these are relatively new policy reform initiatives, addressed by urban policy makers, such 
as those in Qingdao, only in the last decade. In 2012, No.19 Fushun Road, a residential compound 
in NSRC’s neighbourhood, was included in the city’s inner city development plan. The municipal 
government announced that the(re) development of No.19 was open to resident participation, so 
signifying, apparently, community involvement in, and democratic control, over the future of the 
area, and what appeared to be a new approach in delivering community development in the city. 
However, I argue that in the case of No.19, participation signifies, instead of empowerment of 
local residents, an instrument to legitimise government policy. 
 
NSRC plays a key role in facilitating this instrumentalised participation process. While claiming to 
draw in residents’ participation, Qingdao’s government authorities prescribe the parameters of 
No.19’s redevelopment, including planning, compensation levels, and relocation sites. It is through 
NSRC that local participation is created as a process to suppress oppositional voices, 
manufacturing consent, stifling local debate and creating consensus.  
 
As resident participation in urban renewal and regeneration in China is a relatively new policy 
initiative which has captured scant attention (Shin, 2008), less has been developed about this 
topic in current literature. This chapter addresses this knowledge gap, by unpacking the 
procedures and power relationships relating to residents’ participation in community 
redevelopment projects in China’s context. I find that the issues that shadow participation in 
Western countries, including residents’ exclusion from agenda setting and the community’s 
powerlessness in controlling its own fate, are also applicable in understanding community 
participation in the Chinese context. In particular, I argue that in Qingdao, it is through NSRC, 
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which reinvents participation as a rubber-stamp for government decisions, that local residents’ 
participation signifies an exertion of government control, because, to quote Labonte, 
“participating … (in the form of) being organized towards someone else’s ideas, was not 
empowering; it was a system of control” (1999: 432). 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.2 reviews the literature on 
community participation in urban regeneration. Section 6.3 examines the decision-making process 
concerning No.19’s development, pointing out that local participation, which is conducted under 
prescribed agendas and policy parameters, signifies limited community empowerment, and is an 
instrument for legitimising government policy. Section 6.4 unpacks how consultation, the primary 
form of resident participation used in No.19, is reinvented by NSRC as a process of suppressing 
residents’ oppositional voices towards off-site relocation schemes. In section 6.5, I explore 
debates among residents concerning compensation levels and relocation sites, showing that NSRC 
plays a vanguard role in suppressing these controversies and shaping consensus to show local 
residents’ support and consent. Section 6.6 concludes with the findings of this chapter, and draws 
out broader issues of community involvement, empowerment, and change of government 
rationality in China. 
 
6.2. Participation, community and urban governance 
In advanced liberal societies, local residents’ participation in regeneration projects has a long 
history and is widely discussed. In the UK, for example, people’s participation in urban 
regeneration has developed particularly since the early 1990s, addressed in flagship programmes 
such as City Challenge, the Single Regeneration Budget, and, the more recent New Deal for 
Communities (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Lawless, 1996; Foley and Martin, 2000; Raco, 2000; Ball, 
2004). Residents’ participation in urban regeneration, and, in urban policy more generally, is 
assumed, primarily by government authorities, to have many benefits, social, economic and 
political, such as that it could “tackle paternalism” by empowering communities and shaping a 
bottom-up policy approach (Mayo, 1997: 8); or it could “promote ownership of regeneration 
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activity within local communities” and through this, enhance a project’s efficiency and 
sustainability (Raco, 2000: 596; see also Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jones, 2003; Ball, 2004). With all 
these assumed benefits of a participation approach, it is welcomed by, and practised in, many 
localities around the world; and is offered to society as a panacea to a series of social problems. 
Participation is claimed, by politicians and policy makers alike, to be a sign of political progress and 
achievement of reform. Indeed, as Jones (2003) comments, resident and community participation 
in urban governance and urban development “appears to reach its very zenith” in the twenty first 
century (2003: 581). 
 
However, as Shin (2008) points out, less has been written about residents’ participation in urban 
renewal and regeneration in China’s context. The primary reason for this is that in China, 
participation in urban redevelopment projects is a new policy initiative, tested in a few Chinese 
cities, such as Qingdao, but has not yet captured much research attention. From the late 1980s, 
when property-led urban development emerged in Chinese cities, planning and decision-making 
in terms of urban renewal and regeneration were dominated by government authorities and 
closed to participation by the people affected (Shin, 2008). Analogous to the UK’s urban 
regeneration in the 1980s, China’s urban development projects implemented a top-down agenda 
and focused on property renewal, while seldom addressing issues of participation and local 
democratic control.  
 
Community involvement and residents’ participation in urban regeneration are haunted by the 
problem that has also confronted democratic politics, that is, whether communities can really be 
empowered during the process. As Raco (2000) warns, in community regeneration and urban 
policy, “the issue of political legitimacy”, instead of considerations of empowering residents and 
communities, signifies “the primary motivation for coopting community groups” (2000: 575). In 
Qingdao, in a new round of inner city redevelopment planning that started in 2012, a new policy 
reform initiative includes residents’ participation in the decision-making process. To what extent 




6.3. Redeveloping No. 19 Fushun Road: participation under a prescribed agenda 
As Foley and Martin (2000) point out, in urban renewal and regeneration, community signifies a 
powerless entity which “lacked the resources and the power and influence enjoyed by businesses, 
local authorities and other public agencies” (2000: 481). Because it is powerless, the local 
community usually lacks control of its own future, in terms of whether there is a need for 
redevelopment, when the development happens, and how the local residents should be 
compensated and where they should be relocated. This was also true for No.19 Fushun Road, a 
residential compound in NSRC’s neighbourhood, where local residents had been fighting for 
redevelopment of the community for more than ten years but with minor political effect. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, No. 19 consists of two multi-storey buildings which were constructed 
in 1969, by Qingdao Third Print works, a state-owned factory, as the accommodation for the 
workers (see Figure 6.1). No.19 currently accommodates one hundred and nineteen households, 
who are ex-/workers and their family members of the print works. Before the late 1980s, No. 19 
witnessed its golden years. It was, at the time, one of the highest buildings in the neighbourhood, 
with a state-of-the-art architectural design, and, in comparison with other housing that was 
pervasive in the city at the time, provided much better living conditions. No.19’s residents 
believed that the outstanding building signified the factory’s wealth and power. As one male 
resident put it, 
 
“Constructing these houses cost one third of the factory’s annual income, which was a large 
amount of money, only those big size and profitable factories like the Third Print Works could 
afford. … Also constructing workers’ dormitories back at the time means you must have strong 
personal connections with the municipal leaders, so that you can be allocated with a parcel of 









Figure 6.1. No.19 Fushun Road 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
The first batch of residents moved into No.19 in 1969, as “outstanding” individuals of the Print 
Works, who beat their colleagues in the competition for allocating accommodation. These 
included the factory’s leaders, the chief technicians, and the factory’s “model workers” who had a 
good performance record at work. One resident, who had been living in No.19 since 1969, 
comments that the residential compound used to be “a first-class residential place for first-class 
workers” (interview). Also, another resident points out that before market reform, state-owned 
factory workers were a privileged social class, who enjoyed high income and good welfare benefits 
such as living in good-quality housing in No.19. Responding to, and further illustrating this 
viewpoint, one female resident puts it as, 
 
“You have to be a worker of a really wealthy and large state-owned factory to be able to live in a 
community such as No.19. I mean, you know, the multi-storied buildings are rare resources in 
Qingdao at the time, and living within one thus really means something. I’ll say, it is a privilege you 
enjoy for being members of a privileged club, … not possible for people who are not workers in 
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large size state owned factories.” (interview) 
 
The fate of No. 19 was overturned in the 1990s alongside market reform. In the early 1990s, 
Qingdao’s municipal government imposed several rounds of market reforms on local state-owned 
factories, reducing public funding support, and, exposing them to market competition. Many 
Qingdao factories experienced a financial crisis, and had to go through redundancies, mergers and 
bankruptcy. From 1992, the Third Print Works started to experience serious financial shortages, 
and cut down its expenditure on maintaining the housing and facilities at No.19, which, then 
became physically rundown, with “cracked outer walls”, “leaking roofs” and an “aging electric 
circuit” which caused frequent power failures. A memorable incident, which was repeatedly cited 
by local residents as proof of the community’s physical deterioration, was the blocked public 
toilets during the winter of 1994. This caused, as one elderly female recalls, “flooding filthy water”, 
which was even worse when “iced over on the buildings’ corridors and stairs, (which) were 
dangerous because people would slip and fall down” (interview). 
 
In the 1990s, No.19’s neighbourhood experienced rapid development and acquired a more 
modern landscape. Many new buildings were constructed around the area of No.19, including 
smart office complexes, classic restaurants and hotels, as well as high-rise residential housing 
comprising modern flats (see Figure 6.2). No.19’s buildings, remained in the architectural style of 
the 1960s, and, in sharp contrast with the new buildings in the neighbourhood, gave local 
residents a sense that the place was left behind in the city’s rapid development and, physically, out 
of date. One female resident of No. 19 recounts this point as, “the other part of the 
neighbourhood becoming better since the early 1990s, this made us feel our buildings were 









Figure 6.2. Classic restaurant by No.19 Fushun Road 
 
Dates: 2012, October 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
The Third Print Works conducted a redundancy programme in 1998, after which many residents in 
No.19 became jobless. The factory finally shut down in 2004, and all remaining workers were laid 
off and were living on municipal government benefits. Although No.19’s residents were suffering, 
however, Qingdao’s economy experienced rapid development throughout the 1990s and the 
2000s, and the average income level increased rapidly. No. 19 Fushun Road became a place which 
accommodated the jobless and poor. 
 
From the early 2000s, the desire for redevelopment became pervasive and increasingly stronger 
among the residents in No.19. This was because No.19’s residents, who were poor and could not 
afford to purchase real-estate, considered redevelopment as their only chance of moving to new 




“I think community redevelopment is an approach that the government reallocates the wealth that 
accumulates through economic development, … (because) redevelopment projects give poor 
people a chance to move to better housing. … Many friends of mine have enjoyed new houses 
because of community redevelopment projects. … I think we (No.19’s residents) should enjoy this 
right too.” (interview) 
 
This discourse is typical among No.19’s residents, who think community redevelopment is their 
right. Since 2000, the residents have submitted several petitions, signed by every resident in the 
compound, to the municipal government, demanding that the municipal government draft plans 
and raise money to support redevelopment of the community. Despite the residents’ strong 
wishes for redevelopment and their petitions, however, little political influence was exerted. While 
Qingdao’s inner city area witnessed large-scaled demolition from the late 1990s, No.19 was 
excluded from this process, until 2012, when a private developer, Yi Zhong Real Estate (YZRE), 
decided to invest. 
 
In Qingdao planning officials’ opinions, No.19 Fushun Road was difficult to plan for renewal and 
regeneration. More specifically, as one planning official points out, it is a challenge to plan a 
profitable and attractive redevelopment for No.19, because the site is on a very small parcel of 
land, 3,440 m² in total; yet it has a very high residential ratio, accommodating one hundred and 
nineteen households, which means the cost for compensation and relocation of residents will be 
high. Besides the problem of profitability, an issue in redeveloping No.19 also lies in how to use 
the land better. One senior planning official further illustrates this point as,  
 
“You can see how Fushun community is in discordance with the neighbourhood. It is old-style 
residential housing that is surrounded by much newer constructions built in the 1990s and 2000s. 
It looks like a wedge that is inserted in the neighbourhood, unfit and problematic…It is very 
difficult to recycle the land (of No.19) because it is not easy to re-plan, on this small site, for better 
land usage to make it coherent with other land functions in the neighbourhood, to make the 
development (of No.19) sustainable, that we could, say after thirty years, still see it as a good 
development plan.” (interview) 
 
It is because of these “difficulties with planning”, as Qingdao’s planning officials claim, that in the 
past decade, No.19’s redevelopment has been long-delayed, despite the strong wishes of local 
residents. Claiming themselves to have been engaged in planning for No.19’s redevelopment and, 
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finally coming up with a scheme in 2012, Qingdao’s planning officials see this new plan as 
innovative and adopting a long-term perspective. More specifically, the new plan combined 
No.19’s redevelopment as a profitable project, with the construction of an office building in 
Qingdao’s CBD, with high investment returns, as one larger project, to generate profits of 
approximately 1.1 billion RMB. No.19’s redevelopment plan also involved the transformation of 
land use, from residential to commercial. According to the plan, the residential compound would 
be demolished, replaced by a five-storey office building, and the residents would be relocated 
off-site. The plan attracted investment from YZRE in 2012. 
 
By consulting, and negotiating with YZRE, details on compensation levels and relocation schemes 
for No.19 were settled: relocation of residents would be around the coastal area in Shi Bei urban 
district where property prices were not expensive, and compensation levels would not exceed 
11,000 RMB per square metre. However, later on, Qingdao’s municipal government contradicted 
this in an announcement, on the city’s TV news reports, saying that No.19’s redevelopment would 
open up to a process of residents’ participation. More specifically, it was said that in No.19, both 
the relocation scheme, and the compensation levels, which were, as one planning official 
commented, “residents’ greatest concerns”, would be open to consultation. Residents’ opinions 
would be fully consulted, and taken into consideration by the government, and, as one planning 
official claimed at interview, “residents will have a say in the community’s development”.  
 
Will the input of local residents have an influence on the prescribed agenda for the 
redevelopment? More specifically, will residents’ opinions, on compensation levels and where 
they would like to be relocated, change the set agenda and policy parameters? This seems unlikely, 
given the evidence provided by the head of NSRC at interview. According to her, after the 
announcement about community participation was made, NSRC staff were required to attend a 
series of meetings and seminars held by the municipal government, during which, not only were 
detailed plans for No.19 shared, including information about the developer, the government’s 
investment plans, and the future land use of No.19; but also, they were given explicit orders to 
police opposition arising from the residents. The head further illustrated this point as, “(in these 
meetings) the government officials tell us we should channel the participation process properly, to 
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persuade the residents who do not support the off-site relocation plan and are dissatisfied with 
compensation … until they fully understand and support the government decisions.” Also, NSRC’s 
head claimed that she has been called to meet many “big officials”, including the head of Fu Xin 
Street Office, planning officials, and the deputy mayor, who lectured, persuaded, and dictated to 
her, to make sure the committee would play its expected role properly. NSRC’s job descriptions 
and targets were prescribed, so as to suppress oppositional voices which challenged the settled 
agenda and policy framework. 
 
Drawing upon the rhetoric of empowerment and participation were seen by Qingdao’s local 
officials as important strategies for conducting reform. Illustrating this point, one Qingdao official 
pointed out, bluntly, that feeding people with a feeling that their opinions were respected and 
that they could influence the policy making process, was crucial to produce consent for policies, 
and reduce the chance of conflict and resistance. He recounted this point as, 
 
“A primary reason why residents are dissatisfied and complain about community development 
policies is because they feel excluded, … they want their voices to be respected. … Therefore we 
introduce reforms, to provide a channel that local people can voice their opinions and feel they are 
being heard. … This is an important strategy for a better governance process.” 
 
Participation in No.19 was therefore, from the outset, denied any chance of bottom-up political 
influence, but was manufactured as an instrument to draw in people’s support, consent and to 
enhance the government’s political legitimacy. Indeed, as Foley and Martin (2000) comment, 
participation is usually passive, embodied in the fact that the extent to which community sectors 
can exert influence is usually decided by the extent to which the other partners are willing “to 
cede power and control of resources, decision making and implementation processes to 
communities” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 486). In No.19, limited powers and controls were intended 
to be ceded to No.19’s residents. How was such an instrumentalised participation process 





6.4. Issues with consultation 
As Ball points out, “there are varying degrees of community involvement” (2004: 124), ranging 
from the lowest level of consultation to real empowerment of the community, “where community 
and neighbourhood groups take their own decisions and control resources, for example, through 
development trusts or community-based housing associations” (Carley et al, 2000, quoted in Ball, 
2004: 124). To what extent does consultation signify the empowerment of community, and, how 
far will the consultation process include or exclude local residents from the decision making 
process? 
 
In August 2012, NSRC held a consultation meeting in the neighbourhood, inviting every resident of 
No.19 to attend. At the consultation meeting, more than two thirds of residents proposed that 
they wanted on-site relocation, because, as one resident recalls, “many people shout out that they 
do not want to leave this neighbourhood with its central location and that we are familiar with 
and where we have many memories” (interview). But, instead of responding to these voices, NSRC 
suppressed them. NSRC told the residents that their only option was to accept the off-site 
relocation scheme, otherwise the developer would withdraw investment and the government 
would cancel the development plan. Indeed, as discussed in section 6.3, off-site relocation is a key 
part of the government’s planning for No. 19, but the claim that refusing off-site relocation would 
lead to the suspension of the development project is NSRC’s own understanding and 
(mis)interpretation. Yet this (mis)interpretation proved to work well in pacifying residents’ 
opposition. 
 
While many residents at first refused to be relocated off-site, after NSRC staff told them this would 
cause them to lose the opportunity for redevelopment, which No.19’s residents had been seeking 
for more than ten years (see section 6.3), they decided to submit and accept off-site relocation. 
One elderly resident commented that disseminating such discourse, “you either agree or lose the 
opportunity of development”, was a clever strategy adopted by NSRC, and it signified the 





“NSRC has participated in our petitions for development in the last ten years, and it knows how 
badly we desire community (re)development. … It knows threatening people that they will lose the 
development opportunity is the best way to make them give up, … the committee knows where 
people’s soft rib is and how to hit it.” (interview) 
 
Indeed, as this quotation implies, NSRC knows about local people, about their wishes, their past, 
and, it can even predict their future actions. This “knowledge” about local people, and the ability 
to control, as I have discussed in chapter 5, is exactly the reason why Qingdao’s government 
authorities want RCs to play a key role in regeneration and especially, in policing residents’ 
oppositional voices. This viewpoint is applauded by the head of NSRC, who, in commenting on the 
reason why government is devolving the responsibilities for policing community opposition, points 
out that, 
 
“There are somethings that only the (Residents’) Committee are capable of doing, such as 
pacifying residents’ dissatisfaction and persuading them to accept government policies. … This is 
because we know our people too well, we know what they care about, and how to let them change 
their minds. … Government is incapable of doing this.” 
 
After the consultation meeting, many residents tried to seek further information on the 
government’s plan for No.19, and they asked difficult questions on why off-site relocation was the 
only option for residents. But NSRC staff chose to elude these questions, by telling people that 
No.19 cannot include on-site relocation due to issues concerning the government’s funding 
balance. Many residents were dissatisfied with this ambiguous response, but, in defending 
themselves, NSRC staff claimed that they gave this simple answer because residents could not 
process further information. The head of NSRC made this point as, 
 
“It took a very long time for our staff to study government policies and to finally figure them 
out. …We have studied the planning bureaucracy’s plan for No.19, and it involves much 
professional knowledge, such as architectural design, land use planning, and you have to go 
through a lot of numbers to figure out the government’s funding plan for the development 
project. … The residents obviously cannot understand these policies, even if you show these to their 
face.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation implies, NSRC’s head sees residents as people who lack sufficient knowledge and 
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ability to understand government policies, and this opinion is widely shared among NSRC staff. 
The quotation also reveals that the head of NSRC feels that the committee’s staff are superior to 
residents and, perhaps more covertly, indicates discrimination towards them. These attitudes 
towards residents are problematic when considering the fact that NSRC is a community 
organization which is supposed to represent residents’ voices and to benefit them. 
 
Ten days after the meeting, every resident in No.19 signed a document drafted by NSRC staff, 
“Agreement to Off-site Relocation Scheme”, formally agreeing to the off-site relocation plan. 
No.19’s residents reached a consensus on off-site relocation, but, indeed, as Jones (2003) 
comments, too much controversy, dissatisfaction, as well as manipulation and control, have been 
concealed under the superficial consensus. Following the consultation meeting, another well 
orchestrated participation drama played out at No.19, concerning compensation levels. 
 
In Qingdao, compensation is usually set through negotiations between government authorities 
and developers, a process which excludes residents’ participation. As mentioned earlier, this was 
also how No.19’s compensation levels were settled, and, in order to enhance developer profits, it 
had already been decided that compensation levels would be lower than 11,000 RMB per square 
meter. But Qingdao government authorities claimed the opposite –that compensation levels for 
No.19 would be decided by real-estate evaluation companies (REECs), the private, professional, 
third party organizations, based upon their evaluation of property market values, without any 
control and influence from the government and developer. It was also said that No.19’s residents 
would have a say in deciding the compensation levels, because they could decide which evaluation 
company they wanted to use. 
 
But residents’ freedom of choice was constrained to a list which consisted of three evaluation 
companies, selected by the municipal government, from more than thirty local evaluation 
companies. On 12th August, 2012, NSRC hung out an information board in the courtyard of No.19, 
which outlined information about the three evaluation companies, and told the residents they 
should choose one of these companies to evaluate their properties. But, as one resident 
complained, the information NSRC disclosed told people too little, “just about the names, year of 
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establishment, and the company’s registered capital, none of these are useful in helping us to 
make decisions and choice” (interview). This viewpoint is held by many other residents, who 
claimed they could not make a wise and deliberate choice because of lack of information. Among 
these people, one man’s discourse is typical, 
 
“It is like you can find information on these companies from nowhere, you cannot find their 
information on Google, and I think the committee knows more (information) but it just does not 
want to share. …We want to know useful information like whether the company is receiving 
government funding support, … which means the company will not be on the residents’ side, … or 
information like the evaluation prices the company gave in other communities. … Without these, 
we have to make a choice blindly, like gambling.” (interview) 
 
No.19’s residents believed that the three evaluation companies were in the pocket of the 
government authorities, and they claimed a primary proof of this was that only these companies 
were selected by the government from so many local evaluation companies. As one resident put 
it,  
 
“They must be government puppets, otherwise they will not be chosen by the government. … This 
letting people select evaluation companies is just a show directed by the government. In the end, 
no matter which (evaluation company) wins, the government’s puppet wins and the government 
wins.” (interview) 
 
Residents’ doubts were not totally unreasonable, and, in fact, their suspicions have been 
supported by staff from an evaluation company, Qingdao Jian Ke Yuan Real Estate Evaluation 
Company, which was one of the three on the list. According to one senior manager from the 
company, in evaluating the property prices, they have to take into consideration both the “market 
mechanism” and the “government’s guidance”. She further illustrates this point as,  
 
“In this business, you take jobs directly from the government’s hand. Sometimes we will look for 
jobs from the market, but the real big and profitable projects come from the local government. 
This means you have to keep close relationships with the government, … building personal 
connections with the officials, … and showing your loyalty by accepting government guidance and 
following its orders.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation implies, Qingdao’s local real-estate evaluation companies experience 
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government intervention and control over their evaluation activities and decisions. There is no 
reason to expect that in No.19’s case there will be an exception. As will be proved later, the 
evaluation prices for No.19’s properties followed the government’s prescription; they were around 
10,300 RMB per square meter, under 11,000 RMB per square meter, just as the government 
expected. 
 
Frustrated by the lack of information, and the feeling that their choice would make no real 
difference to the final decisions, residents were indifferent about participating in the process of 
selecting evaluation companies. One week after NSRC had published the information on the 
evaluation companies and invited residents to vote, less than ten percent of households in No.19 
submitted their voting tickets to NSRC. However, the government authorities required NSRC to 
make sure every household in the community submitted their tickets, so that the process of 
selecting the evaluation company could be said to signify participation and a democratic decision. 
To fulfil this mission, NSRC staff visited each household in No.19, persuading them to fill in the 
voting slip. The discourse of “voting is your right and responsibility”, was intensively used and 
exploited by NSRC staff during this process. As one male resident recalls, to make him vote, NSRC 
staff spoke to him in the following way, 
 
“They tell me I should submit my ticket, and I should help them in persuading my neighbours to 
submit their tickets as well. … I tell them people do not want to vote because we feel our votes are 
useless, will have no influence on the government’s decisions. … But they (NSRC staff) say we must 
vote because this is our duty … to play along with the rules, … to evidence our enthusiasm and not 
being indifferent. … So in the end, everyone voted, … but I bet most of them, just like me, voting 
involuntarily.” (interview) 
 
NSRC therefore played a key role in shaping active citizens, by forcing everyone in the community 
to participate, and through this, enacting their rights and responsibilities. However, forcing people 
to participate signifies the violation of another kind of right which, as one female resident points 
out, is embodied in “showing government our complaints and dissatisfaction by not voting and 
not participating” (interview). NSRC denied this kind of right, and pacified residents’ resistance 
through “showing indifference”. Finally, after another week, every household submitted their 
ticket. Among the three candidates, Qingdao Jian Ke Yuan Real Estate Evaluation Company gained 
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the highest number of tickets and became the evaluation company for No.19. 
 
6.5. Participation and consensus shaping: Marginalising oppositional voices 
Community, as Colenutt and Cutten (1994) argue, in itself contains diverse and contradictory 
voices and viewpoints, among different social groups, such as between the rich and poor, 
residents and local small businesses (see also, Harvey, 1993; Ball, 2004). However, as Raco (2000) 
warns, the participation process could work towards suppressing controversy and debate and 
shaping a uniform community voice, through recognising, defining, and excluding, certain voices 
as “irresponsible”, “irrelevant” and “unworthy”. In the case of No.19, it is through NSRC that such 
a consensus shaping process was facilitated. 
 
On the 2nd September, 2012, details about the relocation scheme and compensation policies for 
No.19, in which the residents supposedly participated in the decision-making process, were 
formally published by Qingdao municipal government. Large, colourful information boards were 
erected in front of No.19’s buildings, showing the policies to local residents (see Figure 6.3). The 
compensation levels for the properties ranged from 10,191 to 10,436 RMB per square meter, 
varying among properties on different floors. As mentioned earlier, properties in No.19 are small 
in size, ranging from 15m² to 30 m². Depending on the size of the properties, the compensation 












Figure 6.3. Information Boards 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
In principle, residents are responsible for purchasing housing and relocating themselves by using 
the compensation money. They can either purchase from the market or from the relocation 
communities provided by the developer, where property prices are much cheaper than the market 
due to government subsidies. Over eighty percent of residents in No.19 chose to purchase 
properties in the three relocation communities, including Coastal Garden Community (Hai Wan 
Hua Yuan), Zhong Ye British County (Zhong Ye Ying Jun), and Coastal Beautiful City (Hai An Jin 
Cheng), which are all located in the city centre and not very far from No.19 Fushun Road. Property 
prices in these communities are around 8,900 RMB per square meter, and property sizes range 
from 70 m² to 120 m². Even to buy the smallest size property in the relocation communities will 
cost approximately 600,000 RMB. This means those who receive the lowest compensation, of 
200,000 RMB, will need to pay at least an extra 400,000 RMB to buy relocation housing; and those 
who receive the highest level of compensation, 400,000 RMB, will need to spend at least another 
200,000 RMB to buy in the relocation communities. Demolition and relocation place a heavy 
economic burden on No.19’s residents. Further illustrating this point, one male resident pointed 
out that, “200,000 RMB may not be a big thing for other families, but for us who are jobless and 
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poor, it is our lifetime’s saving.” 
 
Residents of No.19residents hold distinct viewpoints on the compensation policies and relocation 
scheme, which divides them into two camps. On the one side, ninety four households, out of the 
one hundred and nineteen households in No.19, claim they are willing to be relocated based upon 
current compensation offers. For these people, the redevelopment is a valuable opportunity for 
better housing conditions and a better life, which should not be missed no matter what. 
Recounting this point, one male resident comments, 
 
“For the people who have been expecting the community’s redevelopment for a whole decade, 
when the opportunity finally comes, you should just grab it tightly and never let it go. … Personally, 
it is my dream to move to modern residential communities, … I want to live in modern flats where I 
can finally have my private toilet and not to share with neighbours.” (interview) 
 
For this resident and his neighbours who hold similar views, while the compensation is not high 
enough to fully cover the costs of purchasing relocation housing, it is good enough, especially 
when compared to other communities’ development projects, which have offered much lower 
compensation levels than in No.19’s case. Further illustrating this point, one female puts it as,  
 
“Five years ago, when Yun Nan Road community was demolished, the local residents only got fifty 
thousands (RMB) compensation for their flats. … And two years ago, Liao Ning Road community’s 
development project only offered five thousands RMB per square meter compensate onto the 
residents. … Now we are offered more than ten thousand per square meter compensation level, … I 
think we should just be satisfied and grateful with what we are offered.” (interview) 
 
This discourse is typical among the residents in the first camp, and, it speaks to a broad theory of 
relative happiness or relative satisfaction. More specifically, as Li (2014) illustrates, in China’s 
context, where development and change are rapid, and disparities among social groups and 
geographical regions are huge, a primary standard and source of residents’ satisfaction and 
happiness is their superior status in comparison with other social/geographical groups. While 
some residents in No.19 are happy about the fact that their compensation level is much higher 
than other communities, this signifies their “relative satisfaction”, which conceals, rather than 




In addition, many residents say that they are willing to pay extra money to purchase relocation 
housing, although this means a huge economic burden for them, because, as they claim, it is their 
responsibility to relocate themselves. Recounting this point, one elderly male resident puts it as,  
 
“The community’s (re)development is about enhancing people’s living conditions, so residents 
themselves should share the responsibilities with government, … you cannot expect the 
government to do everything. By this I mean, the government have done its part by attracting a 
developer to invest, and providing cheap relocation housing, it is just right and natural that 
residents take out their savings and pay for moving to a new community and new housing, isn’t 
it? … I will say, it is residents’ responsibility to pay and to invest in enhancing their housing 
conditions and living environment.” 
 
So far, as we can see from the accounts of the residents who are satisfied with the compensation 
offers, these people see themselves as practical, who can be satisfied with obviously good 
compensation levels, and responsible in taking their part in the responsibilities involved in the 
community’s development project. As we will see, these discourses and self-judgement put these 
people in a convenient position, in attacking those residents in the other camp, who hold opposite 
opinions. In this latter camp, there are approximately twenty five households, who think the 
compensation level is too low and the relocation communities are not in good locations. It is 
worth noting that these are the poorest residents in No.19, including many disadvantaged, such as 
disabled people, and those who are former prisoners.  
 
Among these twenty five households there is one couple, who claim to be the poorest household 
in No.19, and they cannot afford the costs induced by the relocation process. They explain this 
point further in the following way, 
 
“You may not believe that we only have 800 RMB income per month, other No.19 residents 
normally have 2,000 RMB per month, and Qingdao’s average household monthly income is 5,000 
RMB. … So you can see why we cannot afford moving to the relocation communities. … Our total 
savings are less than 10,000 RMB, how can we afford 20,000 RMB to purchase the relocation 
properties? … In addition, you have to spend a lot of money in decorating the new flats, and I 
heard that the new communities have very expensive property management fees. … We cannot 




Similar to this couple, other residents also claim they cannot afford to move under the current 
compensation offers, and, unless the developer offers them more compensation, they will refuse 
to vacate their properties in No.19 and refuse to move to the relocation communities. In addition, 
some residents are also dissatisfied about the location of the relocation communities, which, 
although in the city centre, are not as good as No.19. One man claims that he has “special family 
circumstances”, which means he cannot leave the neighbourhood of No.19. He further explains in 
the following words, 
 
“My wife has been seriously sick for over five years. We must live in a neighbourhood which is close 
to a hospital, in case there is an emergency (with my wife). … No.19 is perfect, you can see there is 
a medium size hospital just around the corner of the street, … and fifteen minutes of walking there 
is another hospital, which is one of the biggest hospitals in Qingdao.… Unfortunately the relocation 
communities have no hospitals in their neighbourhoods, so we just cannot live there.” (interview) 
 
This family’s situation is not unique, but shared by another three households, who also have sick 
family members and claim they must live in neighbourhoods which have good medical resources. 
These households’ stories reflect that hospital facilities can be a key factor in deciding people’s 
attachment to a place. But in Qingdao, as well as in other Chinese cities, hospital resources are 
unevenly distributed around urban spaces, normally lacking in newly developed communities, 
such as the neighbourhoods of the three relocation communities for No.19’s residents. This 
reflects, perhaps just as one No.19’s resident claims, that “the officials and planners seem not to 
realise or do not care about people’s need for a hospital” (interview) 
 
Among the residents who do not want to accept their compensation offer, there is a household 
who, as the neighbours comment, propose “weird” reasons and requirements. This household 
comprises one couple in their fifties, and their son, thirty years old, who is recently released from 
prison. This family claims that the monetary compensation is not what they really want, but, as 
the mother points out, “a new job opportunity and chance of starting a new life for my son” 




“We do not really care about the money. … What my family needs is that the redevelopment 
project can give my son a new chance for starting his life. … I hope the government can provide a 
job opportunity for my son, because, you know, he cannot find a job by himself (as a former 
prisoner). … For example, the government can let him open a convenience shop in the new 
community, or let him be a security guard in the new community. … Other families want money 
and new houses from the community’s development, but we want job opportunities. Why should 
we not?” (interview) 
 
In the UK context, community renewal and regeneration policies focused on property in the 1980s, 
but, since the early 1990s, started to address social problems such as deprivation, joblessness, 
social and spatial segregation. As the above quotation shows, this family in No.19, see that 
regeneration of the community should not just be about giving people better housing and higher 
compensation, but should also provide “opportunities” for the residents, indicating a need for a 
more socially focused regeneration approach. But this family’s requirement is faced with intensive 
attacks from the neighbours, and is denounced as “nonsense”. One male resident criticised it in 
the following ways,  
 
“Under this market economy you should think along with market principles. …The community’s 
(re)development is about negotiating compensation, it is market behaviour. … Where does this 
weird requirement come from, asking government to solve their son’s jobless problem? … These 
kinds of problems are not on the agenda (of the community’s regeneration), they should not be 
talked about during the community’s (re)development process. … I say, let us get back to real 
business, let us talk about money, compensation, and housing.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation shows, the man thinks community development should only concern properties 
and compensation, which, in his opinion are the focus of regeneration under a market economy. 
This viewpoint and rationale is also held by many other residents in No.19, who insist on the 
property focus of community development policies, and denounce their neighbours’ “job 
opportunity” requirement as irrelevant. 
 
Besides this particular family, other residents who are not satisfied with the compensation offers 
and relocation schemes are also criticised by their neighbours. These residents’ requirements and 
expectations about the community’s redevelopment, such as that they need higher compensation 
levels to cover their relocation expenditure, and they need hospital resources in the new 
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communities, are denounced as unworthy voices. Among such critiques, one female’s comments 
are typical, that those residents who are not satisfied with the compensation offers are greedy, 
irresponsible, and short sighted,  
 
“The compensation offer is good enough, and those who are not satisfied with it and want more 
are just too greedy. … They also insist they have this and that kind of family issues and difficulties, 
and they want the government to solve these for them during the community’s (re)development. … 
But solving these (family issues) are their own responsibility, they cannot throw these to 
government. … They claim the new (relocation) communities do not have hospitals, schools, big 
supermarkets, are lacking this and that, but they are too short sighted. I believe five years later 
those neighbourhoods (of the relocation communities) will be just as well developed as No.19’s. 
They should not be so short-sighted.” (interview) 
 
In No.19, debates between the two camps have become increasingly more acute. NSRC allies itself 
with residents who support the government’s compensation policies, and, join their critiques of 
the residents on the other side. According to the head of NSRC, the committee will not support 
those residents who are not satisfied with their compensation offers and who have “other 
requirements” about the community’s development, because these are “selfish requirements” 
that are unworthy of support. The head further illustrates this point as, 
 
“We acknowledge that there are some inharmonious voices in the community. … But we know that 
the majority of the residents support the compensation policies. ... The majority of residents’ 
voices always reflect the true voice of the community. …Some residents promote selfish 
requirements, they want the government to give them more than the policies have given to their 
neighbours. … Community(re)development is about giving everyone equal compensation, giving 
them equal opportunity to enhance their housing conditions, but some residents want the 
(development) project to be an opportunity to harvest personal gains.” (interview) 
 
As this quotation shows, NSRC’s head claims the reason why the committee do not support some 
residents’ needs is due to the consideration of equality. However, accentuating equality, which, as 
in the head’s opinion, signifies that every resident should receive the same compensation and 
treatment in there development, could mean inequality for the poor who confront the most 
serious deprivation. The attitudes of NSRC should also arouse concerns about its accountability, 
because, as one resident comments, as a community organization which is supposed to care about 
local people, especially the poor and disadvantaged, the committee seems, “indifferent to 
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people’s suffering and family difficulties” (interview with resident seeking higher compensation). 
 
According to Ball, it is usually through “some process of revelation and representation”, such as 
through selecting representatives who claim to represent the community’s voice, that the uniform 
community view is manufactured (2004: 121). Also as Mayo (1997) warns, the identification and 
selection of community representatives can be manipulated as a process of bypassing trouble 
makers, providing “short-cuts to consultation”, and, pacifying oppositional voices and shaping 
consensus (1997: 13). In No.19, it is also through representative selection that oppositional voices 
are marginalised in the consultation process. One week after the compensation policies and 
relocation schemes for No.19 were published, the municipal government decided to hold a 
consultation meeting, to hear local residents’ opinions and feedback. The government authorities 
required NSRC to select twenty representatives from local residents to attend the meeting. As a 
result of NSRC’s selection, the twenty representatives comprised only those residents who were 
satisfied with the compensation policies and agreed to be relocated under current compensation 
offers. At the consultation meeting, No.19’s representatives shouted out in their own voices: “we 
support the compensation policies”, “we are willing to be relocated under the current 
compensation offers”; but these were treated as the voice of the community. Those oppositional 
voices from residents in the other camp were marginalised, and never allowed to become part of 
the consultation process. After the consultation meeting, Qingdao’s government authorities 
announced that the residents of No.19 supported current compensation policies, and that 
redevelopment of the community would start immediately.  
 
Manufacturing a uniform community viewpoint through the selection of representatives, and 
precluding the emergence of oppositional voices through controlled community participation, 
signifies a consensus shaping process that current urban regeneration programmes and urban 
policy are inclined to take. This consensual politics, as Mouffe (2005) warns, signifies a dangerous 
post-political attitude, which denies the antagonistic nature of democratic politics and seeks to 
suture up the space of proper political debate. This consensus politics underpins the participation 





This chapter examines residents’ participation in the redevelopment of No.19, with a focus on 
NSRC’s role in the process. It finds that local residents’ participation takes the form of consultation, 
which, according to Ball (2004), signifies the lowest level of community empowerment. Ball 
advocates that community participation should move from mere consultation to a higher level, 
including partnership shaping, and, more than this, real empowerment of the community which 
means they have actual control over resources and agenda setting (see also, Carley et al, 2000; 
Foley and Martin, 2000). But in Qingdao, as evidenced in the case of No.19, as well as in other 
Chinese cities, where the local state resorts to community participation as an approach to 
conducting policy reform, consultation is how participation is addressed (Shin, 2008). The 
community’s powerlessness and its exclusion from agenda setting signify, as this chapter shows, 
prime issues that face the use of community participation in both the Chinese context and in 
advanced liberal societies. 
 
This chapter also shows that NSRC plays a key role in the participation process. It deals with local 
residents’ indifference to participation, activating them to vote, to speak their opinions, and to 
participate in the municipal government’s consultation meetings. NSRC also pacifies and 
marginalises oppositional voices from local residents, by identifying and addressing these voices 
as unworthy and irrelevant. The result of this, as this chapter shows, is that debates are 
suppressed and a uniform community voice is generated, to demonstrate local residents’ support 
for compensation levels and the relocation schemes decided by government authorities. In urban 
renewal and regeneration, Qingdao’s local decision-making process is still closed to community 
voices, and, as I argue, community participation, a high profile agenda of policy reforms in 
Qingdao, signifies, if anything, only a strategy for providing political legitimacy to government. In 
responding to Jones (2003), this chapter argues that community participation in Qingdao is “a 
‘means’ for project delivery”, rather than “apolitical ‘end’ or ‘right’ in itself” (2003: 583); and, 
following Labonte (1999), I argue that participation is not always a means of empowerment, but 




Drawing upon the role played by NSRC in the community participation process, this chapter also 
reflects on issues relating to NSRC’s accountability. It shows that the committee, as a 
community-based NGO, however, is less concerned about representing local residents’ interests, 
and is indifferent to the suffering and difficulties confronted by certain local residents. Instead, 
NSRC sees its priority is to abide by government officials’ orders and accomplish the mission 
prescribed by the government, that is, to suppress local residents’ oppositional voices. 
 
In Qingdao, community participation in the urban regeneration process, given all the 
above-mentioned issues, however, reflects a changing government rationality. Qingdao’s local 
state sees community participation as an orientation of reform and a source of government 
political legitimacy, although the extent to which the community is empowered needs to be 
questioned. The traditional rationality in China, which characterised local development policies 
and agendas before market reform, and which saw political legitimacy coming from the efficiency 
of government policies and interventions, dissolves in the face of this new approach. Deep down, 
the state-society relationship is restructured, characterised by the dissolving of big government, 
and small society rationality, and is becoming dominated by new government calculations and 
















Chapter 7   Social capital and community activists: governing the nail households 
 
“There is ‘something’ going on ‘out there’ in people’s day-to-day relationships that is an important 
determinant of the quality of their lives. ... Bouncing somewhere between the economic 
individualism of the market and the regulatory communitarianism of the state, conditioned and 
constrained by both, it is the ‘gluey stuff’ that binds individuals to groups, groups to organizations, 
citizens to societies. What exactly this ‘something’ is remains moot, but few doubt that it is 
palpable. ... It is also the very ‘stuff’ that community development sets its sights on improving.” 
(Labonte, 1999: 430) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that amongst No.19’s residents, opinions on levels of 
compensation and relocation sites divided people into two camps. While the majority of residents 
agreed to be relocated to the designated communities with compensation decided by the 
government, there were twenty-five households refusing to accept the offer. They are called ‘the 
nail households’ by local residents and NSRC staff and officials. The NSRC mobilised a group of 
local residents, known as community activists, to persuade the nail households to change their 
minds and vacate their properties. To understand local residents’ persuasion activities and tactics, 
this chapter draws upon social capital theory. Social capital, according to Field (2003), suggests 
that the nature and quality of inter-personal relationships, including trust, reciprocity, and sense 
of obligation, can be cultivated by government as part of a process of governance. In developing 
this understanding, I argue that the deployment of persuasion activities in No.19 was part of a 
tactic in which the cultivation of social capital was conceived as a basis for resolving the problem 
of the nail households. Following Wakefield and Poland (2005), this chapter contributes to an 
understanding of the sense in which social capital has “been alternately lauded as a way of … 
(insinuating a) neoliberalist approach to social relations” (2005:2820). In other words, this chapter 
notes that the attempt to discipline and shape the attitudes of the nail households by cultivating 
different attributes of social capital, signifies no less than the responsibilisation of community in 
self-government.  
 
The experience of the nail households in community redevelopment projects has been given little 
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attention by academics. This chapter addresses this knowledge gap, by representing and 
evaluating the experiences and voices of the twenty five nail households in No.19. It depicts the 
complex and difficult situations that confronted the nail households, and that can be characterised, 
in part, as the oppression of their views and values, and undermining of their lifestyles and modes 
of habitation. Insights into the values and lives of the nail households enables the chapter to 
explore the dark side of social capital, that is, the ways in which the operation of social capital can 
also lead to negative effects in terms of social injustice, marginalization, exclusion and oppression 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Edwards and Foley, 1997; Portes and Landholt, 1998; Field, 2003; Wakefield and 
Poland, 2005) 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. Section 7.2 reviews literature on social 
capital. Section 7.3 examines inter-personal relationships among No.19’s residents, as well as 
between NSRC and local people, which signify the pre-existing social capital of the place. Section 
7.4 examines Qingdao officials’ discourses on governing nail households, exploring in what sense 
social capital, individual responsibility and community self-government, are inter-related concepts 
and rationalities held by Qingdao officials. Section 7.5 examines community activists’ persuasion 
activities against nail households in No.19, and discusses how we should understand the 
oppression confronting the latter. Section 7.6 concludes with the findings and discusses the 
relationships between social capital and the governance process. 
 
7.2. Social capital as a government instrument 
Social capital, as defined by Putnam (1996), involves “features of social life – networks, norms and 
trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” 
(Putnam, 1996: 56). More specifically, social capital is embodied in particular forms of 
inter-personal relationships and networks which may enhance cooperation and reinforce mutual 
influence among people, such as shared values, common norms, collective interests based upon 
membership, or emotional bonds, trust, sense of obligation to each other because of kinship, 
friendships, and shared experience and history, such as neighbours. Social capital is, as in 
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Coleman’s (1988) words, something “inherent in the structure of relations between actors and 
among actors” (1988: 98). At the core of social capital theory is the idea that, as Field points out, 
“relationships matter” (2003: 1), or as Putnam puts it, “social networks have value … social 
contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups” (2000: 18-9). Further illustrating 
Putnam’s viewpoint, Field argues that interpersonal relationships and social networks “constitute 
a resource” (2003: 1), “a valuable asset” (2003: 12), a form of capital, which, as Coleman argues, is 
productive “like other forms of (physical and human) capital, … making possible the achievement 
of certain ends  that  in  its  absence  would  not  be possible” (1988: 98). Responding to 
these arguments, DeFilippis (2001) suggests that social capital has a facilitating role, which will 
contribute to enhanced productive cooperation, overcoming individuals’ selfish pursuits, and 
revitalising a communitarianism spirit in society, as well as adding to economic development, 
personal welfare, and public goodness. 
 
In the current literature, the value of social capital for government purposes is examined and 
discussed. For many, social capital signifies a special resource inherent in civil society, which can 
be exploited as part of governance processes, working to solve problems that “might otherwise 
appear as classic market failures or state failures” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002: 422).According to 
Maloney et al (2000), social capital works to amend state and market failures in the following ways. 
Firstly, social capital constructs “the context of obligations, expectations and trustworthiness in 
which actors operate” (Maloney et al, 2000: 802), and under which market transactions and 
economic behaviour can be efficient. In addition, social capital also signifies information channels 
among people, which can facilitate cooperation and enhance collective interests. In their study of 
Japanese fishermen, Bowles and Gintis (2002) note that they share information, techniques and 
skills about fishing, and this enables the fishermen to work in cooperation and share the risks in 
the business. Last but not least, social capital signifies the “availability of norms and effective 
sanctions to discipline relationships” (Maloney et al, 2000: 802). This dimension of social capital is 
embodied in, foremost, as in Coleman’s words, “the interest, even the intrusiveness, of one adult 
in the activities of someone else’s child” (1988: 334), such as “neighbours and kin (acting)to 
reinforce teachers and parents in dissuading young people from playing truant or skipping their 
homework” (Field, 2003: 25).  
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In governance processes, an emphasis on social capital signifies the responsibilisation of 
community and civil society in conducting self-governance, as well as accentuating the 
government’s rolling-out agenda by exploiting social capital and cultivating community self 
government abilities. Further illustrating this point, Wakefield and Poland (2005) argue that social 
capital “provides an avenue for expressing concerns about the need for investment in the social 
fabric without adopting an overtly redistributionary stance, while at the same time giving 
neo-liberals a means of expressing their concerns about state intervention in community life” 
(2005: 2829; see also, Portes and Landholt, 1996; Woolcock, 1998; Labonte, 1999; Poland, 2000; 
Purdue, 2001). Echoing this point, Labonte argues that “social capital doesn’t exist. It is being 
constructed by our choice of ‘things’ with which to fill it” (1999: 430); and, when combined with 
neoliberal ideology, “it is social capital as the shutting down of hard fought for well/fair state 
entitlements to civil society obligations” (1999: 430). 
 
In many policy areas, such as health and poverty alleviation, the usage of social capital is 
examined, but less is talked about how social capital is manoeuvred, or deployed, in urban 
renewal and regeneration. An exception is Purdue’s (2001) research, which finds that the “internal 
communal and external collaborative social capital” held by community leaders, built upon the 
“mutual trust or goodwill” in relation to “a wide range of community groups … (and) private and 
(crucially) the public sectors” (2001: 2221), are key for the “effectiveness of neighbourhood 
regeneration partnerships” (2001: 2211). Still less is known about whether, and in what ways, 
social capital can also be manoeuvred, towards governing oppositional voices and resistance, 
instead of facilitating cooperation, in community regeneration projects. In addition, in the current 
literature, less has been said about whether, and in what senses, in the Chinese context, social 
capital could signify a neoliberal government strategy that values community self-government. I 
will address these knowledge gaps in the remainder of this chapter, by exploring how Qingdao’s 






7.3. Inner city neighbourhood, sense of place and social capital 
Social capital, as Fukuyama (2001) comments, is “a by-product of religion, tradition, shared 
historical experience and other types of cultural norms” (2001: 7). For Dean (2002), social capital 
signifies “the forms of regulation” that already exist in civil society, which the (liberal) government 
will seek to obtain and operate through (2002: 39). In No.19, the embedded social ties that reflect 
many years of developing sociality, people’s shared past, and familial relationships, signify such 
pre-existing social capital which, later on, is discovered and manoeuvred by Qingdao’s local state 
for solving the problem of nail households. 
 
As NSRC’s head commented at interview, residents in No.19 have close inter-personal connections 
and strong emotional bonds, “many families have known each other for three generations and 
they are close friends that are willing to help each other”. Some of them have kinship relations, 
they are parents or offspring, siblings, and whose children get married. No.19’s residents share 
common memories and history. They are colleagues who used to work together in a state-owned 
factory, the Third Print Works. While the factory went bankrupt in the 1990s, as one elderly male 
resident pointed out, “we still talk about those old days in the factory, sharing gossip about old 
colleagues, …it is enjoyable to have someone to chat with about old memories in your young time” 
(interview). Another popular topic among local residents is change in the neighbourhood. As one 
female resident said, “we talked a lot about how fast the neighbourhood has changed, … we 
sometimes bemoan those small open markets and groceries that disappeared along with 
development” (interview). Before market reform, Chinese people called each other comrade, or 
Tong Zhi, the companions and allies in the building of a communitarian society. While the 
inter-personal relationships built upon this comradely sensitivity was fading away alongside 
China’s market reforms, in No.19, it seems that this old comrade relationship signifies an 
important component of local people’s common past. One male resident recounted this point: 
 
“When we still worked in the factory in those old days, we shared a common belief. … We just 
wanted to contribute our young blood and passions to President Mao, the communist party and 
contribute to the development of the new China. … People in this community used to be Tong 
Zhi, … sharing one dream (of fighting for communitarianism). …That is a very valuable memory, 




As many residents point out, chatting with neighbours is an important part of local people’s life, 
and indicates the strength in their connections and sense of belonging to the community. Further 
illustrating this point, one female resident put it as, 
 
“Myself and my neighbours do not know how to use computers or other high-tech gadgets, we do 
not use the internet. … We still keep many older lifestyles that have disappeared from those newly 
developed communities, such as chatting with neighbours in the courtyard after dinner is still our 
primary way of entertainment. … Here everything looks more like a community, a home than other 
places, where neighbours do not even know each other.” (interview) 
 
NSRC is an inherent part of local social networks. Since NSRC was established in 2000, developing 
friendships and mutual trust relationships with local residents has been the committee’s primary 
agenda. As one ex-staff member of NSRC commented, the committee’s previous head, who had 
been in position from 2000 to 2011, was a highly respected character in the neighbourhood, who 
was seen by the local residents as a “close friend, … more like a family member, … even a life 
guider, …caring for local people like parents” (interview). This is because, as this ex-staff member 
explained at interview, the head “dedicated all her passions in serving the local people”, not only 
helping residents to solve domestic issues such as mediating quarrels between couples, 
disciplining children, but also assisting people in finding jobs and applying for government benefits. 
NSRC’s current head also claims that developing friendships with local people is important. She 
recounted this point as, “the first thing I do is to visit many residents’ homes, introducing myself to 
them, let them become familiar with me, winning their trust” (interview). In chapter 5, I outlined 
the social events that NSRC held in the neighbourhood, such as the “neighbours and friends’ 
festival party”. NSRC’s current head believes such social occasions help the committee to build 
connections with local residents, winning their trust and favour, because, as she put it, “(holding 
these social events) will let residents feel we are doing good things for the neighbourhood” 
(interview). 
 
The inter-personal networks that NSRC has managed to build with local residents are an essential 
resource for the committee in conducting its daily work. It is through local residents that the NSRC 
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gains information, knowing what is going on in the neighbourhood, and extending its purview. 
Recounting this point, NSRC’s head commented that, “residents are the committee’s ears and 
eyes, … providing first-hand and important information to us” (interview). According to one 
member of staff from the committee, information provided by residents is especially essential for 
the committee in undertaking its work relating to, for example “birth control, mobile population, 
and illegal building construction”, because, as he further illustrates, “first hand information from 
the residents enables the committee to acknowledge things as soon as it happens, and to catch 
the violator red handed” (interview). In chapter 5, I mentioned some volunteer services organized 
by NSRC and provided by local residents, such as a neighbourhood patrol team, which comprises 
approximately twenty local residents, and a charity canteen which enrolled more than twenty 
residents as volunteers. NSRC staff commonly believe the reason why residents cooperate is 
because of the friendships that exist between the committee and local people. The head further 
illustrated this point as, “the committee provide a lot of favours to local people, and they want to 
give back, … (this is why) when we ask them to attend the community meetings, they will come, 
and when we ask them to join the patrol team, they agree to help. … It is a totally inter-personal 
network” (interview). Indeed, as Gui (2007) comments, it is based upon a “reciprocity” 
relationship among RCs and local residents, that volunteer services are developed in Chinese 
communities (see also, Ikels, 1996; Pan, 2002; Read, 2003; Gui, 2008; Zhu, 2010).  
 
However, some of NSRC’s activities seem to breach the trust relationship between NSRC staff and 
residents. In the previous chapter, I have shown that NSRC was in charge of selecting community 
representatives for government consultation meetings, but excluded those residents who voiced 
opposition. This made some local residents feel, as one female pointed out, “(the committee’s 
staff) they want to please the government instead of really caring about people’s lives” (interview); 
or, as another resident put it, “the committee has close relationships with some residents but 
treat the others as worthless” (interview). Commenting on such viewpoints, NSRC staff point out 
that they were aware that residents’ complain but, as they believe, the closeness between the 
committee and the local residents remains because their reciprocity relationship, which is 
fundamental, is intact. Further illustrating this point, NSRC’s head put it as, “the committee is still 
very important in people’s lives, and we will continue to offer people our help and do our best to 
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serve them. … Frictions (between the committee and the local people) are inevitable, … but this 
will not mean when we need residents’ help, … (and) their cooperation, they will say no, … 
because they know help is mutual” (interview).This viewpoint responds to Gui’s (2007) argument 
that instead of loyalty to local people, the reciprocity relationship is what makes Chinese RCs 
influential and efficient in the community. This viewpoint is also consistent with my findings in the 
previous chapters, that NSRC actually dislocates its accountability from local residents, but, as I 
will show later in this chapter, it is still powerful in mobilising local residents and drawing their 
cooperation and help in delivering the government’s mission. 
 
7.4. Governing through social capital: rights and duties of self governance citizens 
Following Putnam’s work, Bowling Along, published in 2000, in which he depicts trustworthiness 
and civic participation as valuable social capital of a given society that will enhance cooperation, 
the idea of social capital captured the attention of policy makers. Social capital started to enter in 
to policy discourses, and was addressed by government officials and policy makers alike, as “a 
salve to many of the social ills of our time” (Gaynor, 2011: 27). For Kearn (1995), at the heart of 
social capital lies the idea of responsiblising civil society. Also as Gaynor (2009) comments, social 
capital signifies a consistent concern of the (liberal) government that is, to govern through shaping 
an active citizenship which can self-govern, but which is “enveloped in wholesomely positive 
values such as co-operation, cohesion, caring and neighbourliness, and evoking heart-warming 
ideals of belonging and solidarity” (2009: 27).  
 
The idea of governing through social capital, for Rose (2000), would signify an etho-politics in 
modern society. As Rose comments, in modern society, “human beings are now considered to be, 
at root, ethical creatures”, who are guided by “community-based ethics” such as “shame, guilt, 
responsibility, obligation, trust, honour, and duty” (2000: 1399). For Rose, based upon this 
conceptualization of people arises a series of new government calculations and techniques that 
we can call etho-politics, or “a new politics of behaviour” (2000: 1399). At the heart of 
etho-politics is etho-power that “works through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to 
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underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the management of one’s obligations 
to others” (Rose, 2000: 1399).  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, in Chinese cities, it is usually through forced eviction and demolition 
activities that the local state has ended the blocking strategies of nail households and accelerated 
the land clearance process. However, in Qingdao, at a series of meetings held by Qingdao’s 
municipal government and Shi Bei sub-municipal government, which discussed how to deal with 
the nail households in No.19, decisions were made, that no forced demolition activities would be 
used. A primary reason for making this decision was because of the central state’s orders 
forbidding the use of forced demolition. Recounting this point, one official from Shi Bei 
sub-municipal government pointed out that, “it is a sensitive time to continue using forced 
demolition because it will mean high political danger to be punished by the central state” 
(interview). In addition, according to one municipal government official, the reason lies in the fact 
that forced demolition signifies an instrument of an “inappropriate governance thought”. He 
illustrated this point as, 
 
“Someone might say forced demolition involves using violence and showing people a barbarian 
government, I agree. But I think we should not deny that under certain circumstances, forced 
demolition is necessary. For example, when a small number of nail households are slowing down 
the progress of a development project and, delaying the date the other residents can move back 
(in the newly developed communities), conducting forced demolition is how government protects 
the majority of residents’ benefits. … But a primary problem with forced demolition is that 
government assumes too many responsibilities, … (meeting these responsibilities) using 
inappropriate methods, …it forgets residents’ own responsibilities in it.” (interview) 
 
Question (author): “What do you mean by residents’ responsibility?” 
 
Answer (interviewee):“The community’s redevelopment is for the purpose of improving residents’ 
living conditions. If residents want this good thing to happen, they will do something to help the 
government.” 
 




Answer (interviewee): “Persuading their neighbours to drop other thoughts (on compensation 
levels and relocation sites), … solving the nail household problem. Residents are better at this than 
the government.” 
 
As the above quotations show, this official believes that forced demolition sometimes signifies the 
“good intention” of government, but its wrongness lies, primarily, in that the government intends 
to intervene too much. He also claims that residents should assume more responsibility in the 
regeneration of their community, especially in terms of dealing with nail households. In this 
official’s opinion, residents themselves should be part of the efforts of governing the nail 
households, because this relates to residents’ own welfare, and, perhaps more importantly, as he 
suggests, residents are better at doing the job than the government. Further illustrating the latter 
point, the official explained that, “residents are familiar with each other, and they can talk sense 
into the nail households as friends and old neighbours, … we have to admit sometimes the 
residents do not trust government but they will trust their neighbours” (interview). The argument 
above put forward by this official, signifies a rationality of responsibilising the community in 
conducting self-governance, as well as a conceputalization that inter-personal relationships are 
valuable resources for government purposes. 
 
This official’s viewpoint is reinforced by many other officials in Qingdao, who claimed, during 
interviews, that mobilising residents to “persuade the nail households” to drop their resistance 
activities and vacate their properties, should be the orientation of reforms in Qingdao. When 
talking about this idea, and trying to evidence its practicality and efficiency, many officials referred 
to community renewal projects under the planned economy and the work unity system. Before 
market reform, a resident’s panel, which comprised several local residents, played a key role in 
community redevelopment. The panel would visit each family in the community, inquiring their 
opinions on whether they welcomed the development, where they wanted to be relocated, and 
collecting information such as the size of the property, and how many family members were 
currently living together. This would be considered in deciding how many and what kinds of flats 
the family would access after redevelopment. In addition, when the majority of residents 
welcomed the development, and only a few did not, the panel would persuade and educate the 
latter to change their minds. The involvement of residents’ panels in community redevelopment 
182 
 
signifies, as many Qingdao officials believe, a high-level of self governance by residents, and was a 
characteristic political ethos of, as well as a good government technique under, the socialist 
planning regime. Putting forward this viewpoint more frankly, one official claimed that it was time 
to revive a “communitarian spirit in urban regeneration”. He further illustrated this point as, 
 
“Reviving a communitarian spirit is not a bad thing, the spirit that everyone sees themselves as 
master in the society and responsible for the fate of the community and the future of the 
country.…Many good traditions, good government experiences in the old era (of the planned 
economy) are lost and forgotten in the era of market reform, such as the massed line, to mobilise 
the people to govern themselves.” (interview) 
 
Using residents’ self-governing behaviour in the redevelopment of the community, especially in 
governing the nail households, and establishing a residents’ panel to do this, is a key idea which 
underpins reform in Qingdao. In the case of No.19, Qingdao government authorities required 
NSRC to establish a residents’ self-governance panel, enrolling several local residents, and to lead 
such a panel in persuading the nail households to accept their compensation offers. In the next 
section, I will examine how NSRC established, and mobilised a residents’ panel to persuade the 
nail households. I will also explore residents’ experiences of undertaking “persuasion” and being 
persuaded, with a focus on the latter.  
 
7.5. The dark side of social capital: nail households, persuasion and oppression 
“Sociability cuts both way.” (Portes, 1998: 18) 
 
As Field (2003) argues, “from most of the social capital literature, there shines out a warm glow, 
social capital’s ‘dark side’, by contrast, remains largely unknown terrain” (2003: 71). What if, as 
Field notes, the operation of social capital leads to some negative effects that have been neglected 
by current literature which over-accentuates the optimistic possibilities of social capital? And what 
if, as Bourdieu (1986) reminds us, using social capital in the governance process reproduces 
hierarchical power relationships and domination (see also Edwards and Foley, 1997; Wakefield and 
Poland, 2005)? In this section, I will join these writers’ efforts to explore the dark side of social 
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capital, by examining whether, and in what ways, in the case of No.19, using residents to persuade 
nail households, exploits local residents’ inter-personal relationships as a valuable (social) capital 
for government purposes, and leads to the oppression of the nail households.  
 
In exploring the negative effects of the operation of social capital, Field quotes Portes’ argument, 
that “sociability cuts both way” (Portes, 1998: 18; in Field, 2003: 72). Further illustrating this point, 
Field examines situations where social capital could work in a bad way, such as cooperation among 
criminals that will harm “victims of organised crime” (2003: 71), and “group identification can also 
involve stereotyping of outsiders”. Explaining the “perverse effects of social capital” in this way, 
Field (2003: 82) shows us that social connections among people can work against the outsiders, 
and that, as he puts it, “one possibility is that social capital may form part of a stable system of 
negative externalities” (Field, 2003: 84). But what if social capital also works against the insiders? 
In other words, will social capital, or the very friendships, reciprocal relationships and trust 
cultivated and developed between people, render them under situations that they have to submit 
to against their own wills? These situations are what No.19’s nail households found themselves in 
when facing their neighbours’ persuasion. 
 
As Gui (2007) notes, Chinese RCs’ daily work in the community is based upon the help of 
community activists, a group of local residents who are willing to, and are capable of, offering their 
help to the committee. According to the head of NSRC, there are nine such activists in No.19, who 
have been helping the committee with much of its work, such as dispatching birth control 
brochures to the residents, notifying people to attend community meetings held by the 
committee, and sharing gossip with NSRC staff, which is an important information source for the 
committee. As the committee’s staff comment, these nine activists are trusted and welcomed by 
local people. One of them is an elderly woman, who has been offering generous help to 
neighbours throughout her life, such as taking care of unattended children, taking sick ones to 
hospital and lending money to families who need it. Another is the factory’s old deputy head, who 
is highly respected by the residents. This is not only because he is the only person in No.19 who 
has a college education background, “a literate person” as many residents call him, but also, as 
one male resident commented, “he was a hero of the factory, … he used to make many wise 
184 
 
decisions and saved the factory from bankruptcy several times, and when he was a big leader he 
treated us not like subordinates but like brothers” (interview). 
 
For Putnam (1996), social capital can be seen as a resource possessed by people, the amount of 
which depends on the various kinds of relationships developed with others. Following this 
viewpoint, the activists in No.19 therefore are people who, in comparison with other residents, 
possess higher levels of social capital. Helping NSRC seems to be an important way that these 
activists accumulate their social capital, because, as one activist comments, “helping the 
committee doing some work lets me become more familiar with my neighbours and the 
committee’s staff, I even get to know many officials from Shi Bei (sub-municipal) government 
because of the work” (interview). For another female activist, helping the committee is more like 
an opportunity to collect “debt” from neighbours and NSRC staff. She illustrated this point as, “the 
(committee’s) head always says she owes me a big favour because I have spent much time helping 
the committee do various kinds of work, without payment. One time, one neighbour asked me to 
find a job for her son, so I asked a favour from the head and the thing is done. … The neighbours 
and the (committee’s) head are both very grateful to me” (interview). Indeed, as Bourdieu (1986) 
points out, social capital is something that will reproduce itself through use. 
 
When NSRC established a residents’ panel for the purpose of persuading nail households, it was 
these nine activists that were enrolled. For some activists, joining the panel was doing NSRC staff a 
favour, and, perhaps, another good chance for intensifying their connections with NSRC and 
further accumulating their own social capital. In addition, all of these nine activists felt that the 
compensation levels and relocation sites were good enough, and, as one male activist pointed out, 
the reason why he agreed to join the panel and persuade the nail households was because he 
wanted to do good things for his neighbours. He further illustrated this point as, “I think the 
compensation levels are really good. Some neighbours do not see it just because they do not 
really understand the policy. I will help them to understand why accepting the compensation is for 
their own good. I think this is doing a good thing for my neighbours” (interview). Perhaps it is true 
as Bowles and Gintis (2002) comment, “the motivations supporting individuals’ participation in 




In conducting their persuasion, a typical argument used by the activists is, to “do me a favour”. As 
mentioned earlier, the activists have offered their help to their neighbours, including the nail 
households, in their daily lives. For some activists, the nail households should be grateful to them, 
and the activists believe they can bank on such gratitude when persuading. In illustrating this 
viewpoint, one female activist’s discourse is typical, “I think if they (the nail households) are really 
grateful for what I have done in helping them throughout the years, they will listen to my 
advice, … sign the contracts, as a way to do me a favour… and pay me back, … otherwise I will be 
looked down on by the committee” (interview). When facing the activists argument of “doing me 
a favour”, some nail households feel it is difficult to challenge. One man from a nail household 
commented that, “she (a female activist) came to me and said, just sign the contract and see it as 
doing me a favour. I cannot say no because she once took my wife to hospital and really saved her 
life, … so I signed. I think I deserve better compensation, but I have to give up, otherwise I will be a 
bad person who does not know to be grateful for help.”Therefore reciprocal relationships can 
work against at least one side of people in this relationship. 
 
Symbolic power, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (2004), is embodied in a series of 
postulates, and axioms, that impose themselves as “self-evident, universal” (2004: 273), and are 
taken by people as such, because they fit with people’s “pre-reflexive assumptions about the 
world” (2004: 272). Bourdieu and Wacquant also note that political institutions will exert such 
symbolic power, on people’s conduct, and they call such a way of governing as “hidden persuasion” 
that works through, “quite simply, by the order of things” (2004: 272). Family signifies one site 
containing such symbolic power, embodied in the hierarchical order among different family roles, 
such as parents and children, husband and wife. In Chinese society, a patriarchal culture 
dominates, and it is usually taken for granted that son/daughter submit to the wills of father/male 
head of a family. This domination/submission relationship is called as “Xiao” by Chinese people. As 
Hamilton (1990) notes, in Chinese society, “Xiao” signifies an “eternal principle of the cosmos from 
which there is no escape between heaven and earth” (Ch’eng Hao, AD 1032-1085, no page; 




Activists in No.19 not only have close personal relationships with their neighbours, but also build 
close connections with their neighbours’ family members who do not live nearby. One female 
activist calls herself a friend of an elderly man, a veteran who lived far from No.19, and the father 
of a male in a nail household in No.19. When planning to persuade this family, who the activist 
called “very tough and will not easily change their mind”, this activist turned to persuade the 
father and drew on this elderly man’s consent to persuade his own son. In the face of the father’s 
persuasion, the male head of the nail household agreed to sign the contract because, as he put it, 
“I have to respect my father’s opinion” (interview). This simple answer, however, is very revealing 
of a symbolic power that makes the son believe it is natural to submit to his father’s will. 
 
Facing the activists’ persuasion activities, many nail households felt that their life was seriously 
disrupted. One female from a nail household illustrated this point as,  
 
“They knock on my door from morning to night, they come inside and want to have a chat with me 
regardless of whether I am engaged in other things. … Every dinner my family will be interrupted 
like more than three times.” (interview) 
 
While the activists were engaging in these persuasion activities, NSRC hung out a poster on the 
outer walls of No.19, which identified the families who had not signed the contract (see Figure 
7.1). This made the nail households feel guilty and uneasy. Recounting this point, one male said 
that the poster made him feel “exposed to the public with the purpose of humiliating me, making 
me feel like a man of sin that is judged by the public.” In addition, many residents from nail 
households pointed out that since the day the poster was published, their neighbours started to 
stop talking to them and intentionally ignored them. One elderly male indicated the ignorance 
makes him nervous, depressed, and feeling unsafe: 
 
“Everyone changed their attitudes towards me overnight (after the posters were hung out). … 
When I met the neighbours in the (community’s) courtyard, they will not say hello to me like the 
old days, actually, they will not even look at me. … Making me sad was this old buddy, we have 
more than thirty years’ friendship, but he chooses to ignore me like everyone else, … gives me that 
hurting dirty look when we meet. … I can feel that deep hostility, like ice cold air, it makes me feel 
unsafe and terrified. … My response is to lock myself and my family behind the door at dusk, it may 
sound stupid but I really fear some old neighbours will hurt me.” (interview) 
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Figure 7.1. The poster identifying Fushun community’s nail households 
 
Dates: 2012, September 
















Figure 7.2. No.19 Fushun Road is demolished 
 
Dates: 2012, November 
Source: photo taken by the author 
 
Activists’ persuasion activities, which created various kinds of pressures, including feeling guilty, 
unsafe, and depressed, as well as obligations to submit to a family member’s and a neighbour’s 
will, successfully drove the nail households out of the community. By the end of October, 2012, 
every resident had moved out of No.19, and the buildings were demolished (see Figure 7.2). 
Another, but just one among many, working class neighbourhood in Qingdao’s inner city 
disappeared, and was deemed to be a necessary contribution to Qingdao’s modernization. It is 
claimed, by Qingdao’s government authorities, that the nail household problem in No.19 was 
solved through persuasion instead of forced demolition, and has avoided the use of violence. But 
violence, as many writers have noted, can take different forms, such as marginalization and 
exclusion (see for example, Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Sibley, 1995), and includes all situations 
that render individuals powerless and make them face an oppressor, which is exactly what the nail 




This chapter examines how NSRC mobilised a group of local residents in conducting processes to 
change the attitudes and dispositions of the nail households. These persuasion activities signify 
that in Qingdao cultivating community self governance underpins local reforms. At the heart of 
this reform initiative is the development and deployment of social capital, in which cultivating 
trust, reciprocity and obligations between people is a valuable resource for government. In this 
chapter, I have explored how these dimensions of inter-personal relationships are manoeuvred in 
the governance process. 
 
NSRC is an embedded part of local social capital, and has built upon friendships and reciprocity 
relationships with residents. It is exactly because of the reciprocal relationships with local 
residents that NSRC is capable of drawing on people’s cooperation and mobilising them into 
conducting self-governance activities, such as persuading the nail households. It is through NSRC, 
that micro level inter-personal relationships and those “individual experiences and everyday 
activity”, are linked to, and contribute to realising, the macro-level governance process (Field, 
2003:7). 
 
Another contribution of this chapter is to explore and represent the nail households’ experience in 
urban renewal and regeneration. In No.19, the nail households ’experience signifies oppression, 
defined broadly as all situations of powerlessness. The operation of social capital indeed has a 
dark side, as this chapter has tried to evidence, in terms of the injustice, marginalization and 








Chapter 8 Conclusions: Towards an understanding of China’s neoliberal urban transition and 
Chinese governmentality 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has examined the Nan Shan Residents’ Committee (NSRC), a community-based, 
non-government organization, involved in an urban regeneration project in Qingdao in 2012. It has 
explored a series of governmental agendas and activities that the NSRC has been part of, including 
facilitating local residents’ participation in decision making, and mobilizing residents in particular 
forms of self governing, primarily as a means to persuade the community’s nail households to 
accept compensation terms and to vacate their dwellings and relocate. Here, the NSRC’s priority 
has been to marginalize oppositional voices and to suppress resistance to the broader 
regeneration agendas prescribed and implemented top-down by local government authorities. 
Through this case study, the research has sought to comment not only on the specificity of the 
Qingdao case, but its relevance to the understanding of recent reform initiatives in China 
concerning urban renewal and regeneration, and, on a deeper level, the changes of urban 
governance processes and the emergence of liberal governmentality in China’s society. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss how this thesis has addressed the research 
questions outlined in chapter 3, and how it has contributed to the understanding of community 
involvement in urban regeneration. In Section 8.2, I discuss the restructuring of state functions 
and powers in relation to RCs’ roles in the urban governance process. Section 8.3 considers the 
nature of China’s neoliberal transition by adopting Foucauldian accounts on governmentality, and I 
argue that the changes in government rationality, in relation to the government of cities, signifies 
an important moment, and dimension, of change in Chinese society. In Section 8.4, I examine in 
what senses the concept, accumulation by dispossession, characterises Chinese residents’ 
experience of urban renewal and regeneration, and I seek to speculate about what we might 
understand about the possibilities of an alternative urbanism and the propagation of an 




8.2. Residents’ committees and the restructuring of urban governance 
A primary aim of this research has been to understand the emergence, and rescaling, of 
governance functions and roles of Chinese RCs, and the diverse ways in which this is re-shaping 
the nature of governance of urban policy and process. Community building often signifies a 
flagship political project in liberal societies, where, as Rose (1999) comments, the state seeks to 
regroup its power through intervening into different spheres of community life. Community 
development is a primary technology of neoliberal government which, for Mowbray (2010), is 
characterised by shaping active citizenship and mobilising urban grassroots (self) governance. 
Lying at the centre of community development projects is what Rose refers to as the, “reframing 
of the society”, in which society is (re)asserted as both the object and subject of neoliberal 
government(ality) (2000: 1395). 
 
The community building project sponsored by China’s central state since 2000 has a central theme, 
that is, to cultivate urban residential communities’ capabilities to tackle a series of social problems 
arising along with China’s market reform, such as joblessness, social fragmentation, and 
hyper-mobile populations. As indicated in many documents published by China’s central state, 
such as Advice on Further Promoting the Work of Building Harmonious Community that was 
published in 2009, urban communities are imagined as spaces where “multiple interests 
converged and various social contradictions congregated” (2009, no page), which were to be 
tackled through building urban management and social cohesion and creating new, much 
improved, community governance processes. Rose’s arguments, that “community has become a 
new spatialization of government”, in terms of how social problems are captured, imagined, and 
how public policies are legitimised, is pertinent in interpreting community building projects in 
China’s context (1996:327). 
 
For Bray (2006), China’s community building adopts an institutional model: the establishment of 
urban residents’ committees as the agencies that will lead community building, mobilising 
residents’ self-governance activities, and drawing synergy and cooperation among government 
departments and community. For Read (2000), China’s RCs are organizations that are functioning 
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in the vacuum left by the shrinking welfare state. This research has found different aspects in 
NSRC’s agendas and functions that echo aspects of Read’s argument. The committee is captured 
by current agendas in the process of state decentralization, taking over welfare services, local 
security, birth control, sanitary services and many other functions that are squeezed out of a 
slimmed down central state. In addition, the NSRC has been in the vanguard of social mobilization 
and organising volunteer services, such as establishing a community patrol team and a charity 
canteen that are seen by Qingdao’s local state as good initiatives of community self-governance.  
 
Chinese RCs operate within clearly demarcated geographical boundaries, or the residential 
compounds that are marked out by streets and alleys. While many writers note that China’s 
residential communities and compounds signify basic government units, Bray’s (2008) argument, 
that RCs’ neighbourhoods are spaces of power where the state is watching, and disciplining, 
individuals’ behaviours and community life, is more pertinent to the findings of this research. As 
the NSRC’s case has shown, the committee plays omnipresent, parental, and pastoral roles at the 
grassroots level, intervening into people’s private lives, such as mediating domestic quarrels, and 
regulating individuals’ moral and political life – cultivating volunteerism in the community and 
encouraging people to participate in the decision-making process. A prominent character of RCs, 
as this research suggests, is policing various kind of urban deviance: the criminals, jobless, 
disabled, and urban grassroots protests and resistance, such as those against displacement and 
dislocation. 
 
For Bray (2006, 2008), RCs’ neighbourhood signifies new spatial arrangements in the Chinese 
post-reform society that has replaced work unit spaces. A series of urban dynamics underpin this 
spatial restructuring process. The first one is private reform and the emergence of property-led 
development, which have been restructuring Chinese urban spaces with residential housing 
estates, usually in gated forms. In addition, it is through residential compounds that an 
increasingly mobile population is anchored, and China’s fragmented society is given a manageable 
dimension by the state; social and economic fragmentation, as asserted by the state, can 
begoverned in smaller geographical spaces. Indeed, urban socio-spatial transformation of this kind, 
from work-unit led to residential compound based ones, signifies an important dimension of 
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Chinese society’s restructuring after market reform. 
 
There is the issue of accountability and how such arrangements work, and commentators observe 
a preponderance of community organizations with dislocated accountability for their actions, and 
the lack of bottom-up engagement in the broader urban agenda and politics (see Mowbray, 2010; 
Popple, 2008). For Mowbray, community development requires “a critique of the impact of 
neoliberalism” (2010: 133; see also, Popple, 2008; Mayer and Rankin, 2002), especially in terms of 
how local community development borrows corporate management ideas and techniques, and 
how community building adopts de-politicalised and instrumentalised forms that, as Mowbray 
indicates, while being ‘represented as inclusive and empowering community engagement is 
effectively about containment and control” (2010: 132). These debates about community 
development are also relevant to the Chinese RCs and community governance in China’s context. 
 
Localism and centralised control are also at the centre of current debates on community (self) 
governance. According to Clark and Newman (1997), along with a process of the dispersal of many 
government functions to NGOs and volunteer organizations, the state is simultaneously 
strengthening its capabilities of coordination and surveillance. It is through a series of government 
techniques, such as competitive funding and performance evaluations, that the state is capable of 
implementing top-down agendas to community organizations. These arguments also hold true, 
but partly, to China’s context. As NSRC’s case has shown, the committee is, on the one hand, 
operating under a competitive funding regime and system of performance evaluation, and 
governed under “regulated autonomy”. Here, the work of the RCs’ staff are subject to modes of 
self discipline, to meet evaluation criteria and measures of good performance at work (Clark and 
Newman, 1997); on the other hand, the RC is required to attend government meetings to receive 
orders, and study governmental documents to learn about government directions. During No.19’s 
development, such managerial and bureaucratic measures were evident and reflective of 
top-down agendas seeking to shape the committee’s behaviour, particularly in defining their 
priorities, which were policing residents’ oppositional voices, and getting them to vacate dwellings 




My contention is that Chinese RCs play an insignificant, if not negative, role, in facilitating a 
bottom-up process. The committees are relatively powerlessness, politically and economically, in 
controlling resources, personnel, and therefore their own agendas. Representing local residents’ 
voices is usually marginalised by RCs, as a secondary agenda to that of following central 
government’s orders and meeting government’s evaluation criteria. This is also the case in relation 
to No.19’s redevelopment project. Delivering up local residents’ voices was a secondary 
consideration by the NSRC, and there was often an agenda of ‘flattening’ debates, and seeking to 
generate consensus by manufacturing residents’ support and consent for public policies. The 
State’s controls remain powerful, effectively reshaping community agendas and pacifying urban 
grassroots protests. Because of their top-down agendas, the nature of Chinese RC’s are contested 
in the current literature, and there are those who argue that instead of conceiving of them as 
urban grassroots organizations, they are more akin to quasi-governmental organizations and the 
“’base-level’ administrative institutions” (Read, 2000: 806).  
 
The way of working for such quasi forms, in the Qingdao context, was often by cultivating social 
capital as a means to create a context for regeneration objectives, of government, to be met. 
Social capital, referring to the trust, friendships, and mutual help relationships among people, is 
assumed by planners and policy makers alike as a valuable resource of government. It is assumed 
that community organizations are good at cultivating and mobilising social capital in governance. 
Social capital, as Labonte (1999) indicates, signifies a newly conceived government idea that 
underpins community development project, feeing the later with theoretical supports and 
practical instruments.  The research found out that reciprocal relationships among RCs and local 
residents, one aspect of social capital, was a power source of RCs in conducting grassroots 
mobilization. Cultivating and tapping trust, friendship, and mutual help with residents are Chinese 
RCs’ fundamental strategies of governance (Gui, 2008; Zhu, 2010).  
 
As evidenced in the NSRC’s case, the committee offers help, develops friendships, and wins trust 
from local residents, and, drawing on these inter-personal relationships, seeks to cultivate 
residents’ cooperation and help with the committee’s daily work often by participating in many 
volunteer services to cater for the elderly, and community security. In conceptualising how to 
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solve the ‘problem’ of the nail households’ in No.19, it is these inter-personal connections that 
Qingdao’s government authorities have been seeking to utilise. The NSRC is required to mobilise 
one group of local residents, so called community activists, to persuade, discipline, and change the 
minds of the nail households to end their blocking actions. These observations in Qingdao speak 
to arguments which, casting a broader vision, highlight that social capital and active citizenship are 
conceptual instruments of urban policy makers in restructuring urban governance processes 
towards more participatory forms (Kearns, 1995; Gaynor, 2009). 
 
8.3. Understanding China’s neoliberal transition 
Shaping RC’s vanguard roles in urban governance processes reflects, but not only, the 
restructuring of economic, social and spatial orders in Chinese society, but also transformations at 
a deeper level, that is, the changes in the rationality and mentality of government. This research 
has shown that the changes on all of these aspects are relevant to understanding China’s 
neoliberal transition. Neoliberalism is criticized as a blunt theoretical idea, which can be applied to 
interpret a wide range of economic-political behaviours and therefore can be criticised as an 
omnipotent and omnipresent concept (see Larner, 2000). Debates arise on whether the concept 
can be moved from neoliberal centres, such as the UK and the USA, to interpret economic and 
social changes in other contexts, such as China. For instance, Nonini (2008) argues that 
neo-liberalization does not characterise Chinese society because of the relentless resistance and 
protests, which undermine the capacity of neoliberalism to be a dominant economic and political 
hegemony. 
 
Indeed, as Larner (2000) argues, in using neoliberalism as a concept, we need to further 
breakdown and clarify the meaning of the term. Neoliberalism is often used with different 
interpretations and meanings. It can signify privatization and de-regulation as a policy framework; 
it may refer to political ideology and hegemony as used by Nonini; or, it can embody an emerging 
art of government and rationality. The latter seeks to interpret neoliberalism through Foucauldian 
accounts on governmentality. A neoliberal transition can signify the emergence of new forms of 
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calculations and rules in governing the individuals and the population. While more efforts are 
invested in these “Foucauldian analyses” of neoliberal governmentality, knowledge is still 
underdeveloped, especially in terms of understanding China’s transition.  
 
One interpretation is that China’s community development, characterized by RCs’ vanguard roles 
in community governance, signifies, as in Nicholas Rose’s (1999) words, autonomising and 
responsibilising the community, or a particular rendition of neo-liberalism that seeks to operate 
through ‘government at a distance’. This can be illustration from my work in a number of ways. 
Foremost, I have demonstrated that in Qingdao’s urban policy, an omnipotent state rationality, 
claiming to know all and intending to intervene in every domain of social life, has been dissolved. 
The local state, instead, seeks to play an enabling role. The evidence is the cultivation of, through 
the implementation of performance evaluation system and the introduction of competitive 
mechanism, local RCs’ effectiveness in community governance and in tackling many social 
problems including joblessness, mobile populations, and community security.  
 
Qingdao’s local state is also enthusiastic in shaping NSRC’s expertise in community governance, 
through endless training sessions, government-led seminars and conferences. The NSRC’ staff are 
professionals who know about local residents’ dispositions, their past, family situations, and they 
have experience and wisdom on how to communicate with residents and mobilise residents’ 
activism and cooperation in the governance process; all of these staff ‘virtues’ are identified, 
cultivated, and utilised by the local state. Here, the expertise of professionals, such as that vested 
in the NSRC staff in community governance, is, as Rose suggests, “a new formula for the exercise 
of rule” of liberal government in shaping the governability of individuals and the society 
(1993:283). Quoting from Bray, community development and governance in Qingdao show that 
the “community has become a resource for enabling, facilitating and implementing efficient and 
cost-effective government” (2006: 533). 
 
A new (active) citizenship is emerging at the centre of local governance processes. While Chinese 
citizens, from the 1980s to the early 2000s, were part of a nationwide political culture of closed 
participation and bottom-up process, as Qingdao’s case has shown, now China’s citizens are 
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required to participate in urban policy, and are assumed as responsible to conduct 
self-government – such as participate in various kind of volunteer services to take care of the 
elderly, the disabled, the community’s security, and to solve the “nail households problem”. The 
latter, as this research has shown, is combined with government discourses claiming it is residents’ 
own responsibility to participate in policy delivery and make sure the community regeneration 
process is not blocked by the people who protest. Indeed, as Hindess (2001) reminds us, the claim 
of respecting individuals’ freedom is a central value and strategy of (neo) liberal government. 
 
Indeed, under closer investigations, the freedom, that seems to emerge in China’s society, appears 
to be, what Rose (1999) describes as, the ‘artefact freedom’. It is through RCs that individuals are 
submitted to closer surveillance and disciplinary power. As the NSRC’s case has shown, the 
committee watches, and intervenes into, people’s daily lives, consistently remodelling individuals 
to be what is expected by the state: the active citizens with a volunteer spirit, and, especially, 
responsible individuals who will act on themselves and others. Further illustrating the latter point, 
this research has shown how a group of residents in No.19, the so called community activists, are 
mobilised, by making it their responsible to act, to persuade the community’s nail households to 
conform and to accept the government’s regeneration agenda.  
 
To govern in the name of freedom, the liberal government conceives a civic domain outside of 
itself (Dean, 2002), and seeks to regroup the state’s surveillance and policing upon the forms of 
regulations already existing in civil society (Rose, 1999). Further illustrating this point, this 
research has presented how the RCs mobilise social capital – the trust, friendship, and reciprocal 
relationships among people in the community, in governing the nail households. No.19’s nail 
households no longer faced forced demolition and violence but, instead were confronted by peer 
pressures from neighbours, and signifying the state’s ability to regroup its disciplinary power. The 
individuals in the research witnessed no less, but only different forms of, governance. Many 
aspects of community life, which used to be outside of the purview of the state, such as 
inter-personal connections, are increasingly part of the state’s remit, through the RCs’ emerging 




The research also tells the story of how No.19’s nail households, facing neighbours’ persuasive 
techniques, were made to feel shame and guilt because they held different voices and opinions. 
These experiences, while not including physical violence, as signified by forced demolition 
activities, speak to the more complex and deeply embedded violence that relates to oppression, 
domination, exclusion, powerlessness and naturalised social and cultural norms which are part of 
rendering one’s submission (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Indeed, as Hindess indicates, 
“unfreedom” is always an inherent part of liberal government (ality). The liberal government 
claims, and legitimises, its use of police power, or in Dean’s (2002) term, an authoritarian 
approach, based upon categorising and labelling the population. There are always certain social 
groups, such as the poor, jobless, and, relevant to this research, the nail households or the people 
who challenge the social and political order, that are recognised, and labelled, by the government, 
as people who “deserve” the “treatment of unfreedom”. 
 
8.4. From residents’ experiences to an emancipatory urban politics 
The emergence of China’s centralized planning system in the 1950s has been radically transformed 
by the country’s insertion into the globalised economy. China’s embracing of global financial 
capital is one of the primary determinants in reshaping its urban spaces at a rapid pace. Indeed, as 
Harvey (2008) points out, China is now one of the epicentres of a global capital accumulation 
process that is realized through urbanization. Deeply intertwined into this “global” process, 
Chinese urbanism shows many characteristics that are similar to those in the other parts of the 
world. At the forefront of China’s neoliberal urbanism is what Harvey terms “creative destruction”, 
“the creation of a neoliberal system” based upon the destruction of prior economic regimes, 
policy frameworks, and social relations (2007:23); and accumulation by dispossession, an 
accumulation process that is “funded on the exploitation of the many by the few” (Harvey, 1976: 
314). This research has presented many aspects showing these two processes are inter-related, 
mutual-constitutive, and are parts of the broad cloth of China’s urbanization. 
 
To start with, the ethos of China’s urban policies has shifted from socialist urban policies 
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embracing “the institutions and narratives that promoted more egalitarian distributive measures” 
(Harvey, 2007:22), to urban agendas prioritising rapid development and modernization. 
Responding to this point, Zhang (2006) argues that a sense of lateness, through which the state 
articulates urgency for accelerating urban development and modernization, signifies a primary 
strategy of development in many Chinese cities. Pursuing urban modernity, or a fear of being late, 
facilitates a particular kind of socio-spatial restructuring process in Chinese society – large-scale 
demolition and the displacement of the poor to urban marginal areas. Alternative urban agendas, 
under this flagship of modernization, are marginalised. In Qingdao, the inner-city remodelling 
plans, which started in the early 1990s, have been legitimised by government discourses of 
modernization and pursuing urban modernity. Such discourses were proposed and supported by 
the city’s planners and officials.  
 
Urbanization has the capacity to produce and exacerbate social/political/spatial fragmentations 
and injustice around Chinese cities. Since the late 1980s, China’s rapid urban development has 
created gated communities standing alongside shanty towns. Spatial fragmentation, as Merrifield 
(2011) comments, is a feature of the urbanization process because of the inherent logic of capital 
accumulation. Capital’s endless search for cultivating profits out of land deals leads to a “’portfolio’ 
of property speculation”–(over) investment in some places and disinvestment in other, less 
profitable, locations; or, quoting from Merrifield, capital is searching for exchange value of urban 
land leading to the creation of “the two worlds—centre and periphery…side-by-side everywhere, 
cordoned off from one other, everywhere” (2011:474). In Qingdao, for instance, thirty years of 
property-led urban development has led to acute social and spatial differentiation. On the one 
hand, the profitable coastal areas witnessed abundant investment and rapid development to 
showcase the city’s achievement in modernization. The inner city communities, such as No.19 in 
Qingdao, on the other hand, have been, until recently, by-passed by capital because of the 
expected low investment returns there. 
 
Notably, what has happened in China’s urbanization is that people’s political rights have become 
spatialised, closely related to people’s rights to access urban central locations. In other words, 
accessing property citizenship is increasingly understood by many Chinese people as staying in 
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urban central locations that provide high quality education, healthcare and public transport. Since 
the late 1990s, through ambitious urban planning and inner city redevelopment schemes that 
were sponsored by China’s local state, urban central locations have been gentrificated to become 
privileged places for the rich. High property prices have been a primary market leverage working 
to exclude the disadvantaged to marginalised places.No.19’s development in 2012 embodies this 
gentrification process. The local residents were dislocated to less developed places while on the 
site of the community, an official building was planned which was part of the plan to develop a 
new urban CBD and regenerate the inner city. 
 
Chinese localities’ planning and governance processes have been reinvented to assist the capital 
accumulation process. For instance, in Qingdao, since the early 1990s, local planners started to 
see their priority as to plan profitable development projects that could attract investment. In 2012, 
Qingdao’s local planners celebrated the planning of No.19’s development as a big achievement 
because the planning is creatively making the community’s development to be highly attractive for 
investment. Crucial to this planning, however, were these initiatives: injecting public funds, 
displacing the residents to marginalised places, and cutting down compensation levels. Here, 
China’s local state, eager to invest and willing to absorb risks, but less concerned about social 
needs and distance from socialist egalitarian spirits, was embracing an entrepreneurial transition. 
 
In Qingdao, efforts have been make to generate good governance initiatives in tackling urban 
grassroots resistance against demolition and displacement, and to facilitate the capital 
accumulation process. Key to these initiatives is using local RCs’ vanguard roles in community 
governance, and to police and pacify residents’ oppositional voices in the community’s 
development projects. The strategy, as this research has found out, works very well, but signifies 
the deprivation of people’s political rights to articulate their voices. In No.19’s development, the 
NSRC reinvented participation as a process of rubber-stamping government’s decisions and 
implementing government’s controls. To do this the NSRC identified the oppositional voices as 
irrelevant and sponsored moral attacks on them – by calling residents who held different voices as 
‘selfish people’. China’s urban development and rapid capital accumulation therefore were built 




Arguments about power, spatiality and (in) justice, promoted by writers such as Lefebvre (1989) 
and Merrifield (2011), and based upon the observations of European cities’ policies, seem 
pertinent to the changing nature of China’s urbanization. The emergence of spatially unjust cities, 
and accumulation by dispossession, has been at the forefront of recent critiques from urban 
researchers(See for example, McCann, 2002; Purcell, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Harvey, 2003; Simone, 
2005; Mayer, 2009; Weinstein and Ren, 2009; Attoh, 2011). The discussions focus on what kind of 
urban planning, participation process, and urban grassroots movements should be developed in 
order to redefine urbanization agendas, to restructure urban spatiality, and to challenge a police 
order which, as Dikeç (2001, 2002) comments, produces urban otherness and urban problems to 
be tackled in urban policies (Castells, 1983; Ellin, 1999;Perrons and Skyers, 2003; Maginn,2007; 
Taylor, 2007; Holston, 2009). These writers can be allied under the flag of emancipatory urban 
politics – people who are seeking to challenge urban domination and surveillance by promoting 
alternative urban visions. Indeed, as Lees comments, an important task of urban studies is to offer 
“a stronger normative and utopian dimension to complement its (urban research’s) tradition of 
diagnostic critique” (2004: 4). 
 
Marxists have spearheaded the arguments of emancipatory urban politics. Following Lefebvre’s 
(1991) arguments on the right to the city, or empowering urban dwellers and claiming citizenship, 
Harvey further illustrates that the right to the city is a right to change the city “after our heart's 
desire” (2003:939). Enacting this right, urban residents ought to have control over the use of 
surplus and to fight against neoliberal urbanism and the accumulation by dispossession process. A 
prominent mission is, as Harvey suggests, fighting against the police order of neoliberal regimes– 
the common-sense values, narratives and practices of a market economy. As he suggests, “to live 
under capitalism is to accept or submit to that bundle of rights necessary for endless capital 
accumulation”, (Harvey, 2003: 940). The rights to private property have become inalienable under 
a market economy because, as Harvey comments, “our society is dominated by the accumulation 
of capital through market exchange” (2003: 940). Other rights, such as democratic participation, 
are, when compared to property rights, seriously marginalised. Indeed, the ordering of rights and 
social process are mutually constructive, and to challenge the police order of neoliberalism 
202 
 
requires one to redefine social and political rights, in a way suggested by Harvey (2007), that is, 
moving the currently marginalised rights, such as rights to participate, into the centre ground. 
 
In China’s context, the privatization of urban housing in the 1980s facilitated property-led 
urbanization. Private ownership of housing became an important dimension of China’s economic 
and political life. The privatization of housing opened up and accelerated accumulation by 
dispossession, by opening up “new fields for capital accumulation in domains formerly regarded 
off-limits to the calculus of profitability” (Harvey, 2007:35). It also led to the emergence of urban 
property rights activism in Chinese cities (Hsing, 2009; Shin, 2013) - the property owners who fight 
against graffiti, illegal renters and demolition to protect (the exchange value of) their private 
properties. 
 
Over the last three decades, China’s central and local state have been working to forge a 
hegemonic regime on private property rights, by articulating the interests of a wide range of social 
groups in the privatization and urbanization process. The rich are said to begaining a fortune from 
the uprising of property values, the working-class from newly acquired ownership over housing, 
and the urban poor from increased numbers of public owned affordable housing constructed by 
using surplus value. The property rights regime is consolidated in Chinese society, and proof 
comes from the fact that urban grassroots protests have been placated, in part, by higher 
compensation values and better relocation housing, and consequentially being absorbed into 
exchange value processes. Other, more political agendas, such as claiming democratic controls 
over urban development, and requiring community development responding to social needs such 
as better job opportunities, are seriously marginalised, if not extinguished. The emancipatory 
power of Chinese urban grassroots protests are further impaired, by the fact that these protests 
take individualised forms instead of shaping coalitions, seeking immediate goals of economic 
benefits instead of critiquing of broader urban processes of accumulation by dispossession. 
Dismantling the hegemonic and dominated position of property rights seems to be the key to 
developing an emancipatory urban politics in China’s context. 
 
There are many ways to do this, but a promising one is to shape the vanguard roles of community 
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organizations in leading grassroots protests. Ideally, the grassroots organizations need to develop 
social capital among local residents and local government, so that they can forge coalitions among 
people and effectively deliver up local voices to government bureaucracies; and these 
organizations should comprise staff who are elites, with a good educational background and 
power, so that these people can spearhead urban social activities. Residents’ committees, as this 
research has shown, have the potential of doing all of these things. But, given the fact that 
Chinese RCs are still underpinned and shaped by strict government controls, there is still a long 
way to go for them to wrest democratic power and be part of the vanguard of a grassroots 

























Appendix 1. List of Interviews 
Government authorities 
Department Date 
General office of municipal government 10 September 2012 
Urban planning bureaucracy 18 September 2012 
Urban planning bureaucracy 14 April 2013 
Urban planning bureaucracy 01 March 2012 
Urban land resources 13 September 2012 
Urban land resources 02 March 2013 
Urban housing management 06 April 2013 
Urban housing management 09 April 2013 
Si Bei sub-municipal government 19 September 2012 
Si Bei sub-municipal government 08 October 2012 
Si Bei sub-municipal government 25 March 2012 
Fuxin street office 04 September 2012 
Fuxin street office 26 November 2012 
Fuxin street office 09 December 2012 
NSRC 
Positions Date 
NSRC’s head 05 September 2012, 09 October 2012 
NSRC’s deputy head 23 September 2012 
NSRC’s deputy head 09 December 2012 
NSRC’s staff 12 November 2012 
NSRC’s staff 24 December 2012 
NSRC’ staff 27 October 2012 
NSRC’s staff 19 November 2012 
NSRC’s staff 04 December 2012 
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NSRC’s ex-staff 20 March 2013 
No.19 Fushun Road residents 
pseudonym Date 
Resident X1 06 September 2012 
Resident L1 15 September 2012 
Resident P 25 September 2012 
Resident M1 01 October 2012 
Resident X2 02 October 2012 
Resident X3 30 September 2012 
Resident Y 10 October 2012 
Resident L2 08 September 2012 
Resident W 20 September 2012 
Resident B 14 September 2012 
Resident H1 17 September 2012 
Resident L3 22 September 2012 
Resident M2 20 October 2012 
Resident C 28 October 2012 
Resident D 02 November 2012 
Resident H2 11 September 2012 
Private companies 
Name of company Position Date 
Yi Zhong Real Estate Senior manager 05 December 2012 
Qingdao Jiankeyuan Senior manager 22 December 2012 
Shi Bei Development Company Director 17 November 2012 
Xiatai Real Estate Evaluation Senior manager 09 April 2013 
Hengyuande Real Estate Evaluation Manager 28 April 2013 





Appendix 2. Interviews with Qingdao Governmental Officials 
Background information 
1. What are the responsibilities and priorities of your department? 
2. How many years have you been working in the department? 
3. Can you briefly outline what your job is about? 
 
Urban redevelopment, residents’ welfare and economic development 
4. What do you understand by the term urban regeneration? 
5. In particular, do you think urban regeneration can be equated with the terms demolition and 
relocation? 
6. Can you recall when Qingdao entered a phase of large scale demolition and relocation? 
7. In the past twenty years, Qingdao’s inner city shanty towns and old neighborhoods have been 
demolished and remodelled, do you think these projects have contributed to the city’s 
economic development? And to residents’ welfare? In what ways? 
8. In your opinion, what should be the priority of the community renewal projects? Residents’ 
welfare or economic development? Why? 
 
Forced demolition and policy reform 
9. In your opinion, what is the primary source of social conflicts in urban renewal and 
regeneration? 
10. Do you think offering residents higher compensation and keeping them in urban central 
locations will mediate these social conflicts? Why? 
11. Some people would say that nail households are people who protest for their legal rights, do 
you agree? Why? 
12. How would you comment on the government’s forced demolition activities? 
13. Do you think forced demolition activities violate residents’ legal rights? In what ways? 
14. Someone might say forced demolition activities are necessary for urban development, do you 
agree? Why? 
15. Are you aware of the central state’s reform initiatives on forbidding the use of forced 
demolition activities? How would you comment on these reform initiatives? 
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16. What changes have taken place in Qingdao’s community redevelopment process, following 
the central state’s reform initiatives? 
17. How would you comment on these changes in Qingdao? In particular, do you think they will 
work towards protecting residents’ benefits? And alleviating social conflicts? 
 
Residents Committee 
18. How important do you think RCs are in urban governance? Why? 
19. How would you comment on RCs relationships with government authorities? 
20. What are the standards and processes in appointing heads and assistant heads for local RCs? 
And the enrollment of other staff for RCs? 
21. Can you tell me about the sources, and amount, of Qingdao RCs’ funding? 
22. How would you define the nature of RCs? (NGO?) 
23. Someone might say RCs are more like a government department at the community level, 
because government controls their funding source and personnel arrangements. Do you agree, 
why? 
24. Do you think RCs should be more independent from government? Why? 
25. Where do you think RCs are accountable? Government or local residents? Why do you think 
so? 
26. Do you think RCs should be involved in urban renewal and regeneration? Why? And in what 
ways? 
27. Will RCs’ involvement make changes to the way in which community redevelopment is 
conducted in Qingdao? In what ways? 
28. In particular, will RCs’ involvement mean the improvement of residents’ benefits? 
 
Residents’ participation 
29. Do you agree with the opinion that community redevelopment should draw upon residents’ 
participation? Why? And in what ways? 
30. In particular, do you think residents’ participation will enhance residents’ welfare, in what 
ways? 
31. And will participation mediate social conflicts?  
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Appendix 3. Interviews with NSRC staff 
Background information 
1. Can you briefly introduce the background of NSRC?(Year of establishment, number of staff, 
etc.) 
2. How many years have you been working in the committee? 
3. What does your job entail? 
4. What are NSRC’s primary roles and responsibilities? 
5. How efficient would you say that NSRC is at its work? 
 
NSRC’s relationships with government authorities 
6. How important do you think RCs are in urban governance? Why? 
7. In the past decade, the local government authorities have passed down many tasks to RCs. Do 
you feel this is right? 
8. How do you see RCs’ relationships with government authorities? 
9. What are the standards and processes in appointing heads and assistant heads for local RCs? 
And the enrolment of other staff for RCs? 
10. Can you tell me about the sources, and amount, of Qingdao RCs’ funding? 
11. How do you define the nature of RCs? (NGO?) 
12. Someone might say RCs are more like a government department at the community level, 
because government controls their funding source and personnel arrangements. Do you agree, 
why? 
13. Do you think RCs should be more independent from government? Why? 
14. Where do you think RCs are accountable? Government or local residents? Why do you think 
so? 
 
NSRC’s relationships with local residents 
15. How close would you describe the committee’s relationships with local residents? 
16. Which initiatives have the committee sponsored, that you would say have contributed to 
enhance local residents’ welfare? 
17. Among local residents, who are the people that have close relationships with NSRC? 
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18. How have these people helped NSRC with its work? 
 
Community redevelopment and residents’ participation 
19. Do you think RCs should be involved in urban renewal and regeneration? Why?  
20. Will RCs’ involvement make changes to the ways in which community redevelopment is 
conducted in Qingdao? In what ways? 
21. In particular, will RCs’ involvement mean the improvement of residents’ benefits? 
22. In 2012, No.19 was enlisted in the city’s old development plan. Do you think this community 
redevelopment will enhance local residents’ welfare? Why? 
23. Are you aware that in the past decade, local people have submitted several petition letters to 
the municipal government, demanding the (re)development of the community? Was the 
committee part of this? 
24. No.19’s residents can choose which real-estate evaluation companies they want to use. Do 
you feel this is a good initiative? Why? 
25. No.19’s residents are consulted on their opinions on compensation levels and relocation sites, 
do you feel this is a good initiative? Why? 
 
Nail households and forced demolition 
26. Some people would say that nail households are people who protest for their legal rights, do 
you agree? Why? 
27. How would you comment on government forced demolition activities? 
28. Do you think forced demolition activities violate residents’ legal rights? In what ways? 
29. Someone might say forced demolition activities are necessary for urban development, do you 
agree? Why? 
30. Are you aware of the central state’s reform initiatives on forbidding the use of forced 







Appendix 4. Interviews with No.19 Fushun Road residents 
Background information 
1. Can you tell me a little about yourself? 
2. How many years have you been living in No.19? 
3. Can you briefly outline the history of No.19?  
 
The neighbourhood 
4. How has the neighbourhood changed in the past two decades? 
5. Do you like the changes and development of the neighbourhood? Why? 
6. Are you familiar with other residents in No.19? How close are you with them? 
7. Will residents in No.19 help each other in daily life? Can you give me an example? 
8. In the past two decades, some of your old neighbours have moved to other communities, why 
are you still living in No.19? 
9. Do you still have contacts with those who have moved out? How often? And through what 
approach? 
 
Relationships with NSRC 
10. Do you know NSRC staff? Are you familiar with them? 
11. How frequently do you visit the committee? For what reasons? 
12. Are you aware of any social events, community meetings, and services such as a charity 
canteen, provided by NSRC?  
13. Have you been part of these? Why/why not? 
14. In your opinion, among the neighbours, who are the people that have close relationships with 
NSRC? 
15. Why do you think so? 
16. Do you feel the committee cares about local people? Why do you think so? 
 
Community’s redevelopment and residents’ participation 




18. Are you aware that in the past decade, local people have submitted several petition letters to 
the municipal government, demanding the (re)development of the community? Are you part 
of this? 
19. No.19’s residents can choose which real-estate evaluation companies they want to use. Do 
you feel this is a good initiative? Why? 
20. No.19’s residents are consulted on their opinions on compensation levels and relocation sites, 
do you feel this is a good initiative? Why? 
21. Are you consenting to the compensation level and relocation sites that are offered to you? 
Why? 
22. If not, what will you do about it? 
 
Nail households and forced demolition 
23. Some people would say that nail households are people who protest for their legal rights, do 
you agree? Why? 
24. How would you comment on the government’s forced demolition activities? 
25. Do you think forced demolition activities violate residents’ legal rights? In what ways? 
26. Someone might say forced demolition activities are necessary for urban development, do you 
agree? Why? 
27. Are you aware of the central state’s reform initiatives on forbidding the use of forced 













Appendix 5. Interviews with private companies in Qingdao 
A. Interview with developer Yi Zhong Real Estate (the developer of No.19 Fushun Road) 
Background information 
1. Can you give me some basic information about your company? 
2. Can you tell me about some of your company’s development projects in recent years?  
3. Please briefly outline what your job entails? 
 
Investment plan in No.19 Fushun Road 
4. Why did you decide to invest in No.19? 
5. Have you been involved in the planning process concerning the community’s (re)development? 
In what ways? 
6. Do you think planning an office building on the site is a good plan? Why do you think so? 
7. How much do you think is the appropriate compensation level for residents?  
8. Does your company have a say in the decision on the compensation levels and relocation sites 
for No.19’s residents? If yes, how does this happen? 
 
Relationships with government authorities 
9. How would you describe your company’s relationships with Qingdao government authorities? 
10. In what ways, and through which approaches, has your company tried to build connections 
with the different government departments? 
11. Will you be given a chance to influence the government’s decision-making process? How 
exactly? 
 
Opinions on forced demolition 
12. How would you comment on forced demolition activities? 
13. Some people would say that nail households are people who protest for their legal rights, do 
you agree? Why? 
14. Do you think forced demolition activities violate residents’ legal rights? In what ways? 




16. Are you aware of the central state’s reform initiatives on forbidding the use of forced 
demolition activities? How would you comment on these reform initiatives? 
17. In your opinion, have these reform initiatives led to changes in the way the land clearance 
process is conducted in Qingdao? In what ways? 
 
B. Interviews with real-estate evaluation companies 
Background information 
1. Can you give me some basic information about your company? 
2. Please briefly outline what your job entails? 
3. Can you tell me a little about the business of real-estate evaluation? 
 
Real-estate evaluation 
4. What are the standard procedures involved in evaluating real-estate? 
5. Which are the standards used in evaluating real-estate? (market price or government’s 
guidance?) 
 
Relationships with government authorities 
6. How would you describe your company’s relationships with Qingdao government authorities? 
7. In what ways, and through which approaches, has your company tried to build connections 













Appendix 6. Information sheet for participants 
 
REC Reference Number: (GSSHM)/11/12-24 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Post-Political Change and Urban Renewal in Qingdao, Shandong Province, China 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project.  You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before 
you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research 
is being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. 
 
Urban demolition and residents’ relocation have long been the focuses of public policy and are 
relevant to citizens’ welfare. This research project aims to study residents’ experiences during 
demolition and relocation, reflecting their feelings, concerns and various actions when facing 
relocation.  
 
By participating in this research you will help me understand the procedure of the urban 
redevelopment project: the changes of concerns over redevelopment policy, how is the policy 
decided and implemented, as well as the effects of urban demolition on residents’ daily lives. 
 
If you agree to take part in the project, you will be interviewed for approximately 120 minutes. 
Interviews will be recorded, and data will be stored subject to your consent. Access to the 
recordings and data will only limited to myself and my supervisor, and all the recordings will be 
deleted as soon as the final report has been completed. The use of interview data will be 





It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to participate, you will be given 
a copy of this information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form which you will be 
given to keep. If you agree to take part you will be asked whether you are happy to be contacted 
about participation in future studies. Your participation in this study will not be affected should 
you choose not to be re-contacted. You have the right to withdraw without giving a reason at any 
time until November 30, 2013, as the final reports will be completed then. A decision to withdraw 
at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. A final 
report will be given to you based on your request. 
 
My Contact details are: 
Name:        Qing Huang 
Email:         qing.huang817@kcl.ac.uk 
Adress:        Department of Geography, 
              King’s College London, 
              Strand, London, WC2R 2LS 
If this study has harmed you in any way you can contact King's College London using the details 
below for further advice and information: Prof. Rob Imrie, Department of Geography, King’s 
College London, Strand Fourth Floor, London, WC2R 2LS, UK. Email: rob.imrie@kcl.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44 (0)207848 2487 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Posts-political change and urban renewal in Qingdao, Shandong Province, China 
  




Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from 
the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you 
decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
· I consent to my interview being recorded. 
 
· The use of interview data will be anonymous in the writing report. Your personal 
information and interview data will not be connectable. 
 
· I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it 
immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to the point of November 30, 2013. 
 
· I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me.  
I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
· Optional: I agree to be contacted by the researcher to participate in a follow up interview 
for this project. (If interested, please check the adjacent box and provide your contact 
details.  
Email:                                                     




agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
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agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information 
Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
 





























Appendix 7. Research Ethics Approval 
 
Qing Huang, 
Department of Geography 
 
Dear Qing,  
 
REP(GSSHM)/11/12-24 ‘Posts-political change and urban renewal in Qingdao, Shandong 
Province, China.’ 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above application has been reviewed by the GSSHM Research 
Ethics Panel that FULL APPROVAL is now granted. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
   
For your information ethical approval is granted until 27/06/14. If you need approval beyond this 
point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to this 
explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will not be 
necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is for one 
year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of the 
research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the study 
description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection when all 
work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data analysis or 
publication of the results. For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, 
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approval must cover any period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating 
individual sensitive and/or un-anonymised records. Note that after the point at which ethical 
approval for your study is no longer required due to the study being complete (as per the above 
definitions), you will still need to ensure all research data/records management and storage 
procedures agreed to as part of your application are adhered to and carried out accordingly. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics 
Office.   
 
Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will 
need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx 
The circumstances where modification requests are required include the addition/removal of 
participant groups, additions/removal/changes to research methods, asking for additional data 
from participants, extensions to the ethical approval period. Any proposed modifications should 
only be carried out once full approval for the modification request has been granted. 
 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to 
the approving committee/panel.  In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full 
report must be made to the Chair of the approving committee/review panel within one week of 
the incident. 
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time 
to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx).  




































Advice on Promoting Urban Community Building in the Country. 2000. Cited in 
http://www.jnqmzj.gov.cn/law/show.aspx?id=456&cid=21, website visited November 15th2011. 
 
Advice on Further Promoting the Work of Building Harmonious Community. 2009. Cited in 
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/fvfg/jczqhsqjs/200911/20091100043909.shtml,website 
visited November 16th 2011 
 
Agbola, T., & Jinadu, A. M. 1997. Forced eviction and forced relocation in Nigeria: the experience 
of those evicted from Maroko in 1990. Environment and Urbanization, 9(2), 271-288. 
 
Allen, J. 2003. Lost geographies of power. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
 
Almatarneh, R. T., & Mansour, Y. M. 2013. The role of advertisements in the marketing of gated 
communities as a new Western suburban lifestyle: a case study of the Greater Cairo Region, Egypt. 
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 28(3), 505-528. 
 
Amin, A. 2005.Local community on trial. Economy and society, 34(4), 612-633. 
 
Anderson, M. 1964. The Federal Bulldozer. A critical analysis of urban renewal, 1949-1962. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Arkaraprasertkul, N. 2009. Towards modern urban housing: redefining Shanghai's li long. Journal 
of Urbanism, 2(1), 11-29. 
 
Atkinson, P., & Coffey, A. 2004. Analysing documentary realities. In D. Silverman (Ed.), Qualitative 
research: Theory, method and practice (2nd ed.). Sage Publications, London. pp. 56–75. 
 
Attoh, K 2011. What kind of right is the right to the city? Progress in Human Geography, 35(5), 
699-685. 
 
Badyina, A., & Golubchikov, O. 2005. Gentrification in central Moscow- a market process or a 
deliberate policy? Money, power and people in housing regeneration in Ostozhenka. 
GeografiskaAnnaler: Series B, Human Geography, 87(2), 113-129. 
 
Ball, M. 2004. Co-operation with the community in property‐led urban regeneration. Journal of 
Property Research, 21(2), 119-142. 
 
Basu, D. K. 1979. The rise and growth of the colonial port cities in Asia. University Press of America 
(Second edition 1985), Lanham. 
 




Bell, D. 2008. The cultural contradictions of capitalism. Basic Books, New York. 
Berry, B. J. 1985. Islands of renewal in seas of decay. In Paul E. Peterson, (Ed.), The new urban 
reality. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. pp. 69-96. 
 
Bhan, G. 2009. “This is no longer the city I once knew”. Evictions, the urban poor and the right to 
the city in millennial Delhi. Environment and Urbanization, 21(1), 127-142. 
 
Bird, C. M. 2005. How I stopped dreading and learned to love transcription. Qualitative inquiry, 
11(2), 226-248. 
 
Blackman, T. 1991. Planning inquiries: a socio-legal study. Sociology, 25(2), 311-327. 
 
Blanchard, O., & Shleifer, A. 2000. Federalism with and without political centralization: China 
versus Russia (No. w7616). National bureau of economic research. 
 
Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L. 2004. Symbolic violence, in Scheper-Hughes, N., & Bourgois, P. I. 
(Eds.).Violence in war and peace . Blackwell, Oxford. pp. 272-274. 
 
Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. C. 1977. Foundations of a theory of symbolic violence. Sage, 
London.Thousand Oaks. New Delhi. 
 
Bourne, L. S. 1993. The demise of gentrification? A commentary and prospective view. Urban 
Geography, 14(1), 95-107. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The forms of capital, In John G. Richardson(Ed.), Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education. Greenwood Press, New York. pp. 241-258. 
 
Bowen, G. A. 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative research 
journal, 9(2), 27-40. 
 
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. 2002. Social capital and community governance. The Economic Journal, 
112(483), 419-436. 
 
Boyatzis, R. E. 1996. Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code 
development. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in 
psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 
 
Bray, D. 2005. Social space and governance in urban China: The dan wei system from origins to 
reform. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
 
Bray, D. 2006. Building ‘community’: new strategies of governance in urban China. Economy and 




Bray, D. 2008. Designing to govern: space and power in two Wuhan communities. Built 
Environment, 34(4), 392-407. 
 
Bryman, A. 2008. Social research methods. Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. 2002. Cities and the geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”, 
Antipode, 34(3), 349-379. 
 
Brenner, N., Marcuse, P., & Mayer, M. (Eds.). 2012. Cities for people, not for profit: critical urban 
theory and the right to the city. Routledge, London. 
 
Breslin, S. G. 1996. China: developmental state or dysfunctional development?.Third World 
Quarterly, 17(4), 689-706. 
 
Burchell, G. 1993. Liberal government and techniques of the self. Economy and society, 22(3), 
267-282. 
 
Butler, T. 1997. Gentrification and the middle classes. Ashgate Publishing, Farnham. 
 
Cai, Y. 2007. Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China: The Case of Defending Home Owners' 
Rights. In Elizabeth Perry and Merle Goldman (Eds.), Grassroots Politics in China. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. pp. 174-95. 
 
Cameron, S. 2003. Gentrification, housing redifferentiation and urban regeneration: 'Going for 
Growth' in Newcastle upon Tyne. Urban Studies, 40(12), 2367-2382. 
 
Cao. 2003. Study on the urban construction of Qingdao during the period occupied by Germany, 
Shan Dong Normal University, Master degree dissertation. 
 
Cao. 2004. Discussion on the characteristic and apocalypse of Qingdao’s urban construction in the 
period occupied by Germany, Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology (Social 
Science), 20(1), 105-8 
 
Carley, M., Chapman, M., Hastings, A., Kirk, K. and Young, R. 2000 Urban Regeneration Through 
Partnership: A Study in Nine Regions in England, Scotland and Wales. Policy Press, Bristol. 
 
Castells, M. 1983. Crisis, planning, and the quality of life: managing the new historical 
relationships between space and society. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1(1), 
3-22. 
 
Castells, M. 1983. The city and the grassroots: A cross-cultural theory of urban social movements. 




Castells, M., & Sheridan, A. 1977. The urban question: a Marxish approach. Edward Arnold, 
London. 
 
Champion, T. 2001. Urbanization, suburbanization, counterurbanization and reurbanization. In 
Ronan Paddison (Ed.), Handbook of urban studies. Sage, London. Thousand Oaks. New Delhi. 
pp.143-160. 
 
Chau, A. Y. 2008. An awful mark: symbolic violence and urban renewal in reform‐era China. Visual 
Studies, 23(3), 195-210. 
 
Charmaz, K. 1995. Between positivism and postmodernism: Implications for methods. Studies in 
symbolic interaction, 17(2), 43-72. 
 
Chen. 2012. De zhan shi qi Qingdao cheng shi gui hua de te se, Science and Technology Vision, 
43(28), 325-6. 
 
Ch'eng Hao  (AD 1032-85,  Erh-Ch'engch'uan-shu  (Ssu-pupei-yao  ed.), ch.70, p.5a. Cited by 
Hsu Dau-lin, op.cit., 35.  
 
Chen, Y. 2006. Peng hu qu: ji yi zhong de sheng huo shi. Shang Hai Gu Ji Press, Shanghai. 
 
Clarke, J., & Newman, J. 1997. The managerial state: Power, politics and ideology in the remaking 
of social welfare. Sage, London. 
 
Colenutt, B., & Cutten, A. 1994. Community empowerment in vogue or vain?. Local Economy, 9(3), 
236-250. 
 
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American journal of sociology, 
S95-S120. 
 
Coleman, J. S. 1990. Equality and achievement in education. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 
 
Cox, K. R., & Mair, A. 1988. Locality and community in the politics of local economic development. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 78(2), 307-325. 
 
Craig, G. 2007. Community capacity-building: Something old, something new...?.Critical Social 
Policy, 27(3), 335-359. 
 
Dagger, R. 1997.Civic virtues: Rights, citizenship and republican liberalism. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
 
Davis, D. S. (Ed.). 2000. The consumer revolution in urban China (Vol. 22). University of California 




De Vaus, D. A. 2001.Research design in social research. Sage, London. 
 
Dean, M. 2002. Liberal government and authoritarianism. Economy and society, 31(1), 37-61. 
 
Dean and Hindess, B. 1998. ’Introduction: society, government, liberalism’, In Dean, M., & Hindess, 
B. (Eds.), Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government. Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne. pp. 1–19. 
 
Dear, M. J. 1999. The postmodern urban condition. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Decision to Accelerate the Remodelling of Inner City Slum Housing. 1993. Cited in 
http://www.cnnsr.com.cn/jtym/fgk/1998/1998060300000038134.shtml, website visited January 
15th 2012. 
 
DeFilippis, J. 2001. The myth of social capital in community development. Housing policy debate, 
12(4), 781-806. 
 
Derleth, J., & Koldyk, D. R. 2004. The She qu experiment: Grassroots political reform in urban 
China. Journal of Contemporary China, 13(41), 747-777. 
 
Desai, V., & Imrie, R. 1998. The new managerialism in local governance: North-South dimensions. 
Third World Quarterly, 19(4), 635-650. 
 
DeWalt, K. M., & DeWalt, B. R. 2010. Participant observation: A guide for fieldworkers. Altamira 
Press,Walnut Creek, CA. 
 
Dikeç, M. 2001. Justice and the spatial imagination. Environment and Planning A, 33(10), 
1785-1806. 
 
Dikecô, M. 2005. Space, politics, and the political. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 
23, 171-188. 
 
Dobbs, S. 2002. Urban redevelopment and the forced eviction of lighters from the Singapore River. 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 23(3), 288-310. 
 
Donald, S. H., Hong, Y., & Keane, M. 2014. Media in China: Consumption, content and crisis. 
Routledge, London. 
 
Dowall, D. E. 1994. Urban residential redevelopment in the People's Republic of China. Urban 
Studies, 31(9), 1497-1516. 
 
Dossal, M. 1989. Limits of colonial urban planning: a study of mid‐nineteenth century Bombay. 




Du Plessis, J. 2005. The growing problem of forced evictions and the crucial importance of 
community-based, locally appropriate alternatives. Environment and Urbanization, 17(1), 
123-134. 
 
Eckstein, H. 2000. Case study and theory in political science. In R. Gomm, M. Hammersley, & P. 
Foster (Eds.), Case study method: Key issues, key texts. Sage, London. pp. 119–163.  
 
Edwards, B., & Foley, M. W. 1997. Social capital and the political economy of our discontent. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5), 668-677. 
 
Ellin, N. 1999. Postmodern urbanism. Princeton Architectural Press, New York. 
 
Elkin, S. L. 1987. City and regime in the American republic. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Engels, F. 1892. The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, trans. Florence Kelley 
Wischnewetzky. Swan Sonnenschein, London. 
 
Fan, Q. 1994. State-owned enterprise reform in China: incentives and environment. In Qi miao Fan 
& Peter Nolan (Eds.), China's Economic Reforms, the Costs and Benefits of Incrementalism. 
Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke. pp. 137-156. 
 
Farouk, B. R., & Owusu, M. 2012. “If in doubt, count”: the role of community-driven enumerations 
in blocking eviction in Old Fadama, Accra. Environment and Urbanization, 24(1), 47-57. 
 
Feldman, M. S., Bell, J., & Berger, M. T. 2004. Gaining access: A practical and theoretical guide for 
qualitative researchers. AltaMira Press, California. 
 
Field, J. 2003. Social capital. Routledge Press, London. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative inquiry, 12(2), 
219-245. 
 
Foley, P., & Martin, S. 2000.A new deal for the community? Public participation in regeneration 
and local service delivery. Policy & Politics, 28(4), 479-492. 
 
Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Allen Lane, London. 
 
Foucault, M., Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. 1991. The Foucault effect: Studies in 
governmentality. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Fogelson, R. M. 2003.Downtown: Its rise and fall, 1880-1950. Yale University Press, New Haven & 
London. 
 




Fukuyama, F. 2001.Social capital, civil society and development. Third world quarterly, 22(1), 7-20. 
 
Gaynor, N. 2011. In-Active citizenship and the depoliticization of community development in 
Ireland. Community Development Journal, 46(1), 27-41. 
 
Geoghegan, M., & Powell, F. 2009. Community development and the contested politics of the late 
modern agora: of, alongside or against neoliberalism?. Community Development Journal, 44(4), 
430-447. 
 
Glass, R. 1964. Introduction to London: Aspects of Change, London, Centre for Urban Studies. 
[reprinted in Glass R (Ed.), (1989). Cliches of Urban Doom (Blackwell, Oxford). pp. 132-158. 
 
Gold, J. R. 1985.‘The city of the future and the future of the city’, In R. King (Ed.). Geographical 
Futures, Geographical Association, Sheffield. 
 
Goffman, E. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Simon and Schuster, 
New York. 
 
Goldman, M. 2005. From comrade to citizen: The struggle for political rights in China. Harvard 
University Press, London. 
 
Gui, Y. 2007. Neighborhood Politics: Power Manipulation Strategies in Urban Grassroots and the 
Patter of Cohesion between the State and the Society. Chinese Public Affairs Quarterly, 3(1), 
91-113. 
 
Gui, Y. 2008. Lin li kongjian: cheng shi ji ceng de xing dong, zu zhi yu hu dong. Shanghai shi ji chu 
ban ji tuan, Shanghai. 
 
Guidance for Conducting Urban Community Building Demonstrations. 2001. Cited in 
http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/zcfg/jsbwj_0/jsbwjfdcy/200611/t20061101_157511.html, website 
visited November 18th2011. 
 
Guo, G. 2009. China's local political budget cycles. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 
621-632. 
 
Haila, A. 1999. Why is Shanghai building a giant speculative property bubble?. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(3), 583-588. 
 
Haila, A. 2000. Real estate in global cities: Singapore and Hong Kong as property states. Urban 




Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. 1995. Insider accounts: Listening and asking questions. In 
MartynHammersley (Eds.), Ethnography: Principles in practice (Second). Routledge, London. pp. 
124-156. 
 
Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. 2007. Ethnography: Principles in practice. Routledge, London 
 
Hamnett, C. 1984. Gentrification and residential location theory: a review and assessment. In D.T. 
Herbert and R.J. Johnston (Eds.) Geography and the urban environment: progress in research and 
applications. Wiley, Chichester. pp. 283-319. 
 
Hamilton, G. G. 1990. Patriarchy, patrimonialism, and filial piety: A comparison of China and 
Western Europe. British Journal of Sociology, 41(1), 77-104. 
 
Hamnett, C. 1991. The blind men and the elephant: the explanation of gentrification. Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers, 16(2), 173-189. 
 
Hand, K. J. 2006. Using law for a righteous purpose: The Sun Zhigang incident and evolving forms 
of citizen action in the People's Republic of China. Colum. J. Transnat'l L., 45, 114. 
 
Harding, A. 1992. Property interests and urban growth coalitions in the UK: A briefencounter. In P. 
Healey, S. Davoudi, M. O’Toole, D. Usher, & S. Tavsanoglu. (Eds.), Rebuilding the city, property-led 
urban regeneration. Spon Press, London. 
 
Harvey, D. 1976. Social justice and the city. E. Arnold, London. 
 
Harvey, D. 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban 
governance in late capitalism. GeografiskaAnnaler. Series B. Human Geography, 3-17. 
 
Harvey, D. 1993. Cities of dreams. Guardian, 15, 18-19. 
 
Harvey, D. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Harvey, D. 2007. Neoliberalism as creative destruction. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 610(1), 21-44. 
 
Harvey, D. 2008. The right to the city. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27, 
939-941. 
 
Harvey, D. 2012. Rebel cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution. Verso Books, 
London. 
 
He, S., & Wu, F. 2007. Socio-spatial impacts of property-led redevelopment on China’s urban 




He, S., & Wu, F. 2009. China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: perspectives from urban 
redevelopment. Antipode, 41(2), 282-304. 
 
He, S. 2007. State-sponsored gentrification under market transition the case of Shanghai. Urban 
Affairs Review, 43(2), 171-198. 
 
Healey, P. 1991. Urban regeneration and the development industry. Regional Studies, 25(2), 
97-110. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1973. Peasants and politics. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1(1), 3-22. 
 
Hoffman, L. 2006. Autonomous choices and patriotic professionalism: on governmentality in 
late-socialist China. Economy and society, 35(4), 550-570. 
 
Hoggett, P. 1996. New modes of control in the public service. Public Administration, 74, 9-32. 
 
Holm, A., & Kuhn, A. 2011. Squatting and urban renewal: The interaction of squatter movements 
and strategies of urban restructuring in Berlin. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 35(3), 644-658. 
 
Home, R. 1996. Of planting and planning: the making of British colonial cities. Routledge, London. 
 
Howell, J. 2004. Governance in China. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. 
 
Hu, X. 1996. Reducing state-owned enterprises’ social burdens and establishing a social insurance 
system’. Policy Options for Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 125-148. 
 
Hu, X. 2000. The state, enterprises, and society in post-Deng China: Impact of the new round of 
SOE reform. Asian Survey, 641-657. 
 
Huang, Y. 2003. A room of one's own: housing consumption and residential crowding in 
transitional urban China. Environment and Planning A, 35(4), 591-614. 
 
Hubbard, P., & Lilley, K. 2004. Pacemaking the modern city: the urban politics of speed and 
slowness. Environment and Planning D, 22(2), 273-294. 
 
Hui, X. X. 2009. The Chinese Housing Reform and the Following New Urban Question. In Paper for 
The 4th Inter-national Conference of the International Forum on Urbanism. 
 
Human Rights Watch. 2004. Demolished: Forced evictions and the tenants’ rights movement in 




Hsing, Y. T. 2009. Urban housing mobilizations. In Hsing, Y-t.and Lee, C.K. (eds.), Reclaiming 
Chinese Society: The New Social Activism. Routledge, London; New York. pp.17-41. 
 
Holston, J. 2009. Insurgent citizenship, Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Hsing, Y. T. 2010. The great urban transformation: politics of land and property in China. OUP 
Oxford, Oxford. 
 
Ikels, C. 1996. The return of the god of wealth: the transition to a market economy in urban China. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
 
Imbroscio, D. 2011. Urban America reconsidered: alternatives for governance and policy. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca. 
 
Imbroscio, D. 2012. The end of (urban) liberalism. Journal of Urban Affairs, 34(1), 35-42. 
 
Imrie, R., & Thomas, H. 1992. The wrong side of the tracks: a case study of local economic 
regeneration in Britain. Policy & Politics, 20(3), 213-226. 
 
Imrie, R., & Raco, M. 1999. How new is the new local governance? Lessons from the United 
Kingdom. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 24(1), 45-63. 
 
Imrie, R., & Thomas, H. 1997. Law, legal struggles and urban regeneration: rethinking the 
relationships. Urban Studies, 34(9), 1401-1418. 
 
Jaeschke, P. 1906. Jiao Ao Development Memo. Qingdao Archives. Cited in 
http://www.qdda.gov.cn/, website visited 15th October, 2011. 
 
Jaeschke, P. 1908. Jiao Ao Development Memo. Qingdao Archives. Cited in 
http://www.qdda.gov.cn/, website visited 15th October, 2011. 
 
Jessop, B. 1994. Post‐Fordism and the state. In A. Amin (ed), Post-Fordism: A Reader. Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK. pp.251-279. 
 
Jessop, B. 2002. Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical 
Perspective. Antipode, 34(3), 452-472. 
 
Jia,H. 2002. ‘Xiao zheng fu da she hui’ dai gei shen zhen shen me? Zhong guo gai ge, 41-42. 
 
Jiang, J. 2008. Lun Zhang dong sun min guo chu nian ‘xiao zheng fu da she hui’ guo jia guan. Jiang 




Jones, P. S. 2003. Urban regeneration's poisoned chalice: is there an impasse in (community) 
participation-based policy?. Urban studies, 40(3), 581-601. 
 
Johnson, P. 2006. Unravelling Foucault’s ‘different spaces’. History of the Human Sciences, 19(4), 
75-90. 
 
Karaman, O. 2014. Resisting urban renewal in Istanbul. Urban Geography, 35(2), 290-310. 
 
Kearns, A. 1995. Active citizenship and local governance: political and geographical dimensions. 
Political Geography, 14(2), 155-175. 
 
Keane, M. 2001. Redefining Chinese citizenship. Economy and Society, 30(1), 1-17. 
 
Keil, R. 1998. Los Angeles, globalization, urbanization, and social struggles. Wiley, Chichester. 
 
Kelly, D. B. 2006. The public use requirement in eminent domain law: a rationale based on secret 
purchases and private influence. Cornell Law Review, 92(1), 1-66. 
 
King, A. 2004. Spaces of global cultures: architecture, urbanism, identity. Routledge, London 
 
King, A. D. 1989. Colonialism, urbanism and the capitalist world economy. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 13(1), 1-18. 
 
Kipnis, A. 2007. Neoliberalism reified: su zhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's 
Republic of China. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 13(2), 383-400. 
 
Klimova, Z. 2010. Public participation in urban renewal projects. International Master’s 
Programme in Environmental Studies and Sustainability Science (Thesis), Lunds University. 
 
Kofman E & Lebas E, 1996, “Lost in Transposition – Time, space and the City,” in Kofman E, Lebas E 
(eds), Writings on Cities. Blackwel, Cambridge. pp, 3-60. 
 
Kurtenbach, E. 2009. Shanghai residents protest train line construction. The Guardian, 27 August. 
URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8677490. 
 
Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. 2009. Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing. 
Sage, London 
 
Labonte, R. 1999. Social capital and community development: practitioner emptor. Australian and 
New Zealand journal of public health, 23(4), 430-433. 
 




Larner, W. 2000. Neo-liberalism: Policy, ideology, governmentality. Studies in political economy, 
63, 5-25. 
 
Lee, C.C. 2003. Chinese media, global contexts. Routledge, London 
 
Lee, C. K. 2008. Rights activism in China. Contexts, 7(3), 14-19. 
 
Lee, R. M. 1993. Doing research on sensitive topics. Sage, London. 
 
Lee, R. M., & Renzetti, C. M. 1990. The problems of researching sensitive topics an overview and 
introduction. The American Behavioral Scientist (1986-1994), 33(5), 510-528. 
 
Lees, L. 2004.The emancipatory city? paradoxes and possibilities. Sage Publications Ltd, London. 
Lefebvre, H. 1991. The production of space. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Leisch, H. 2002. Gated communities in Indonesia. Cities, 19 (5), 341-350. 
 
Leitner, H. 1990. Cities in pursuit of economic growth: The local state as entrepreneur. 
PoliticalGeographyQuarterly, 9(2), 146-170. 
 
Lefebvre, H. 1991. Les illusions de la modernité. La ville partout, partout en crise, 15. 
 
Lefebvre, H. 1996. Writings on cities (Vol. 63, No. 2). Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Li, H., & Zhou, L. A. 2005. Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of 
personnel control in China. Journal of public economics, 89(9), 1743-1762. 
 
Li, J. 2000. Power, money, and media: Communication patterns and bureaucratic control in 
cultural China. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL. 
 
Li, K. 2013. Government work report, State Council executive meeting. Cited in 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/03-05/5912684.shtml, website visited October 17th, 2014. 
 
Li, S. M., & Siu, Y. M. 2001. Residential mobility and urban restructuring under market transition: a 
study of Guangzhou, China. The Professional Geographer, 53(2), 219-229. 
 
Liang, S. Y. 2008. Amnesiac Monument, Nostalgic Fashion: Shanghai's New Heaven and Earth. 
Wasafiri, 23(3), 47-55. 
 
Lichtenberg, E., & Ding, C. 2009. Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in 
China. Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 57-64. 
 
Lieberthal, K. 2004. Governing China: from revolution through reform. W.W. Norton & Company, 




Liew, L. 2005. China's engagement with neo-liberalism: path dependency, geography and party 
self-reinvention. The Journal of Development Studies, 41(2), 331-352. 
 
Lim, G. C., & Lee, M. H. 1990. Political ideology and housing policy in modern China. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy, 8(4), 477-487. 
 
Lin, G. C. S. 1998. China's industrialization with controlled urbanization: anti-urbanism or 
urban-biased?. Issues & Studies, 34(6), 98-116. 
 
Lin, G. C. 2000. State, capital, and space in China in an age of volatile globalization. Environment 
and Planning A, 32(3), 455-472. 
 
Lin, G. C., & Ho, S. P. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in 
contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95 (2), 411-436. 
 
Liu H. & Raine, W. J. 2015. Why is there less public trust in local government than in central 
government in China?. International Journal of Public Administration, Accepted 
 
Liu, Y., & Wu, F. 2006. Urban poverty neighbourhoods: typology and spatial concentration under 
China’s market transition, a case study of Nanjing. Geoforum, 37(4), 610-626. 
 
Logan, J. (Ed.). 2002. The new Chinese city: globalization and market reform. Blackwell Publisher, 
Oxford. 
 
Logan, J. R., Bian, Y., & Bian, F. 1999. Housing inequality in urban China in the 1990s. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(1), 7-25. 
 
Luo, C. & Ding,Y. 2004. ‘Xiao zhengfu da she hui’ si xiang zai wo guo xing zheng gai ge zhong de 
san zhong wu qu. Journal of Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, 2 (2), 44-46. 
 
Lovering, J., & Türkmen, H. 2011. Bulldozer neo-liberalism in Istanbul: The state-led construction 
of property markets, and the displacement of the urban poor. International Planning Studies, 
16(1), 73-96. 
 
Ma. 2009. Study on Tsingtao Urban Planning Ideology Since the Period occupied by 
Germany(189-1949), Xi An University of Architecture and Technology, Master degree dissertation. 
 
Ma, L. J. 1976, September. Anti-urbanism in China. In Proceedings of the Association of American 
Geographers, 8, 114-118. 
 
Ma, L. J. 2002. Urban transformation in China, 1949-2000: a review and research agenda. 




Ma, L. J. 2004. Economic reforms, urban spatial restructuring, and planning in China. Progress in 
Planning, 61(3), 237-260. 
 
Ma, L. J. 2005. Urban administrative restructuring, changing scale relations and local economic 
development in China. Political Geography, 24(4), 477-497. 
 
Maloney, W., Smith, G., & Stoker, G. 2000. Social capital and urban governance: adding a more 
contextualized ‘top‐down’perspective. Political Studies, 48(4), 802-820. 
 
Maravelias, C. 2003. Post-bureaucracy-control through professional freedom. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 16(5), 547-566. 
 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. 1995. Data collection methods. In Designing qualitative research, 
Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. pp. 78-107. 
 
Maskin, E., Quan, Y., & Xu, C. 2000. Incentives, scale economies, and organizational form. Review 
of economic studies, 67, 359-378. 
 
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. 1988. Suburbanization and segregation in US metropolitan 
areas.American Journal of Sociology, 94(3), 592-626. 
 
Maginn, P. 2007. Towards more effective community participation in urban regeneration: the 
potential of collaborative planning and applied ethnography. Qualitative Research, 7(1), 25-43. 
 
May, T. 2011. Social research: Issues, Methods and Process (4th Edition). Open University Press, 
Maidenhead. 
 
May, T., & Powell, J. 2007. Situating social theory. Open University Press, Maidenhead. 
 
Mayer, M. 2009. The ‘Right to the City’ in the context of shifting mottos of urban social 
movements. City, 13(2-3), 362-374. 
 
Mayer, M. and Rankin, K. N. 2002. Social capital and (community) development: a North/South 
perspective. Antipode, 34 (4), 804–808. 
 
Mayo, M. 1997. Partnerships for regeneration and community development some opportunities, 
challenges and constraints. Critical Social Policy, 17(52), 3-26. 
 
McCann, E. J. 2002. Space, citizenship, and the right to the city: A brief overview. GeoJournal, 
58(2-3), 77-79. 
 
McFarlane, C. 2010. The comparative city: knowledge, learning, urbanism. International journal of 




Merriam, S. B. 1988. Case study research in education: A qualitative approach. Jossey-Bass, 
London. 
 
Mieszkowski, P., & Mills, E. S. 1993. The causes of metropolitan suburbanization. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 135-147. 
 
Miller, J., &Glassner, B. 1997. The ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’: finding realities in interviews. In: D. 
Silverman (Ed.), Qualitative research. Sage, London. pp. 99-112. 
 
Mills, E. S., & Price, R. 1984. Metropolitan suburbanization and central city problems. Journal of 
Urban Economics, 15(1), 1-17. 
 
Mitchell, T. M. 1983, August. Learning and Problem Solving. Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1139-1151. 
 
Mitscherlich, A. 1965. Die UnwirtlichkeitunsererStädte: AnstiftungzumUnfrieden. 
Suhrkamp,Frankfurt. 
 
Mok, B. H. 1988. Grassroots Organising in China: The Residents' Committee as a Linking Mechnism 
between the Bureaucracy and the Community. Community Development Journal, 23(3), 164-169. 
 
Molotch, H. 1976. The city as a growth machine: Toward a political economy of place. American 
journal of sociology, 82(2), 309-332. 
 
Molotch, H. 1999. Growth machine links: Up, down, and across. In A. Jonas & D. Wilson (Eds.), The 
urban growth machine: Critical perspectives two decades later. State University of New York Press, 
Albany, NY. pp. 247-265. 
 
Montinola, G., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. 1995. Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for 
economic success in China. World Politics, 48(1), 50-81. 
 
Mouffe, C. 2005. On the political. Routledge, London. 
 
Mowbray, M. 2011. What became of The Local State? Neo-liberalism, community development 
and local government. Community Development Journal, 46(1), 1132-1153. 
 
Munch, P. 1976. An economic analysis of eminent domain. The Journal of Political Economy, 84, 
473-497. 
 
Naughton, B. 1987. The decline of central control over investment in post-Mao China. In: 
Lampton, D. M. (Ed.), Policy implementation in post-Mao China. University of California Press, 




Naughton, B. 1996. Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform, 1978-1993. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Nee, V. 1989. A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in state socialism. 
American Sociological Review, 54, 663-681. 
 
Ngai, P. 2003. Subsumption or consumption? the phantom of consumer revolution in" globalizing" 
China. Cultural Anthropology, 18(4), 469-492. 
 
Njoh, A. J. 2009. Urban planning as a tool of power and social control in colonial Africa. Planning 
perspectives, 24(3), 301-317. 
 
Nonini, D. M. 2008. Is China becoming neoliberal?. Critique of Anthropology, 28(2), 145-176. 
 
Notice of Further Supervision, Inspection and Regulation of the Land Expropriation Process. 2011. 
Cited in http://www.gtjzh.gov.cn/gtj/detail.asp?id=2588, website visited 3rd, March, 2014. 
 
Notice of Further Regulating the Work of Land Expropriation. 2010. Cited in 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201012/t20101219_806154.htm, website visited 3rd, March 
2014. 
 
O'Brien, K. J. 1996. Rightful resistance. World Politics, 49(1), 31-55. 
 
O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. 2004. Suing the local state: administrative litigation in rural China. The China 
Journal, 51, 75-96. 
 
Oi, J. C. 1992. Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China. 
World Politics, 45(1), 99-126. 
 
Okumus, F., Altinay, L., & Roper, A. 2007. Gaining access for research: Reflections from experience. 
Annals of Tourism Research, 34(1), 7-26. 
 
Olds, K., Bunnell, T., & Leckie, S. 2002. Forced evictions in tropical cities: An introduction. 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 23(3), 247-251. 
 
Ostrander, S. A. 1993. “Surely you are not in this just to be helpful” Access, Rapport, and 
Interviews in Three Studies of Elites. Journal of contemporary Ethnography, 22(1), 7-27. 
 
Page, M. 2001.The creative destruction of Manhattan, 1900-1940. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Pan, T. 2002. Neighborhood Shanghai: Community Building in Bay Bridge. Harvard University 




Peck, J. 2001. Neoliberalizing states: thin policies/hard outcomes. Progress in human geography, 
25(3), 445-455. 
 
Peck, J. 2004. Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism. Progress in Human 
Geography, 28(3), 392-405. 
 
Peck, J., & Tickell, A. 1994. Too many partners… the future for regeneration partnerships. Local 
Economy, 9(3), 251-265. 
 
Perrons, D. and Skyers, S. 2003. Empowerment through participation? Conceptual explorations 
and a case study. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27 (2). pp. 265-285. 
 
Perry, E. J. 2008. Chinese conceptions of “rights”: from Mencius to Mao—and now. Perspectives 
on Politics, 6(1), 37-50. 
 
Perry, E. J., & Goldman, M. (Eds.). 2009. Grassroots political reform in contemporary China (Vol. 
14). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA . 
 
People’s Daily. 2011. Cited in http://www.zzdjw.com/GB/165248/178465/16452465.html, website 
visited October 10th 2012. 
 
Pieke, F. N. 2012. The Communist Party and social management in China. China Information, 26(2), 
149-165. 
 
Phan, P. N. 2005. Enriching the land or the political elite? Lessons from China on democratization 
of the urban renewal process. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 14(3), 607-657. 
 
Platt, J. 1992. Case study in American methodological thought. Current Sociology, 40(1), 17-48. 
 
Poland, B. 2000. Social capital, social cohesion, community capacity, and community 
empowerment: variations on a theme. Settings for health promotion: linking theory and practice. 
Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
 
Popple, K. 2008. The first forty years: the history of the Community Development Journal, 
Community Development Journal, 43 (1), 6–23. 
 
Portes, A. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24, 1-24. 
 
Portes, A., & Landolt, P. 1996. The downside of social capital. The American Prospect, 7(26), 
18–23. 
 
Pow, C. P. 2009. Neoliberalism and the Aestheticization of New Middle‐Class Landscapes. 




Pow, C. P., & Kong, L. 2007. Marketing the Chinese dream home: gated communities and 
representations of the good life in (post-) socialist Shanghai. Urban Geography, 28(2), 129-159. 
 
Pritchett, W. E. 2003. The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain. Yale Law & Policy Review, 21(1), 1-52. 
 
Purcell, M. 2002. Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant. 
GeoJournal, 58(2), 99-108. 
 
Purdue, D. 2001. Neighbourhood governance: Leadership, trust and social capital. Urban Studies, 
38(12), 2211-2224. 
 
Putnam, R. 1996. Who killed civic America. Prospect, March, 6, 66-72. 
Putnam, R. D. 2000.Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and 
Schuster, New York. 
 
Qian, Y., &Weingast, B. R. 1997. Federalism as a commitment to perserving market incentives. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 83-92. 
 
Qian, Z., & Wong, T. C. 2000. The rising urban poverty: A dilemma of market reforms in China. 
Journal of Contemporary China, 9(23), 113-125. 
 
Qingdao Island News Archive. Cited in http://news.bandao.cn/topic/b/2011/qdjz/, website visited 
March 10th 2014. 
 
Qingdao Nan Shan Residents' Committee online blog. Cited in http://nssq2007.blog.163.com/, 
website visited May 8th 2013.  
 
Qingdao Government Work Report. 2012. Cited in 
http://www.qingdao.gov.cn/n172/n1531/n32962/120625101822632238.html, website visited 
March 9th 2013. 
 
Qingdao Online Archive. Cited in http://qdsq.qingdao.gov.cn/n15752132/n20546827/index.html, 
website visited May 10th 2014. 
 
Rabinow, P. 1989. Governing Morocco: modernity and difference. International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, 13(1), 32-46. 
 
Ramanathan, U. 2005. Demolition drive. Economic and Political Weekly, 40, 2908-2912. 
 




Raco, M. 2000. Assessing community participation in local economic development—lessons for 
the new urban policy. Political Geography, 19(5), 573-599. 
 
Rancière, J. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. p. 60. 
 
Rancière, J., Bowlby, R., & Panagia, D. 2001. Ten theses on politics. Theory & event, 5(3). Cited in 
http://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2001.0028. 
 
Read, B. L. 2000. Revitalizing the state's urban “nerve tips”. The China Quarterly, 163, 806-820. 
 
Read, B. L. 2003. Democratizing the neighbourhood? New private housing and home-owner 
self-organization in urban China. The China Journal, 49, 31-59. 
 
Ren, X. 2008. Forward to the past: historical preservation in globalizing Shanghai. City and 
Community, 7(1), 23-43. 
 
Rex, J. 1971. The concept of housing class and the sociology of race relations. Race & Class, 12(3), 
293-301. 
 
Richards, D. 1996. Elite interviewing: Approaches and pitfalls. Politics, 16(3), 199-204. 
 
Robinson, J. 2002. Global and world cities: a view from off the map. International journal of urban 
and regional research, 26(3), 531-554. 
 
Robinson, J. 2006. Ordinary cities: between modernity and development (Vol. 4). Routledge, 
London. 
 
Robinson, J. 2008. Developing ordinary cities: city visioning processes in Durban and Johannesburg. 
Environment and planning A, 40(1), 74-87. 
 
Robinson, J. 2011. Cities in a world of cities: the comparative gesture. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 35(1), 1-23. 
 
Rose, L. A. 1992. Land values and housing rents in urban Japan. Journal of Urban Economics, 31(2), 
230-251. 
 
Rose, N. 1993. Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. Economy and Society, 
22(3), 283-299. 
 
Rose, N. 1996. The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government. International 




Rose, N. 1999. Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Rose, N. 2000. Community, citizenship, and the third way. American behavioural scientist, 43(9), 
1395-1411. 
 
Rosen, K. T., & Ross, M. C. 2000. Increasing home ownership in urban China: notes on the problem 
of affordability, Housing Studies, 15(1), 77–88. 
 
Ru, X. 1998. ‘Xiaozhengfu da she hui’ de li lunyushijian. Beijing Social Science Press, BeIjing. 
 
Saich, T. 2004. Governance and politics of China. Palgrave Macmillan, New York . 
 
Sanyal, B. 2005.Comparative planning cultures. Routledge, London. 
 
Schensul, S. L., Schensul, J. J., & LeCompte, M. D. 1999.Essential ethnographic methods: 
Observations, interviews, and questionnaires (Vol. 2). Alta Mira Press, Walnut Creek, CA. 
 
Schiffer, J. R. 1991. State policy and economic growth: a note on the Hong Kong model. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 15(2), 180-196. 
 
Scott, J. C. 1985. Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. Yale University 
Press, New Haven CT. 
 
Schatzman, L., & Strauss, A. L. 1973. Field research: Strategies for a natural sociology. Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
 
Shieh, L., & Friedmann, J. 2008. Restructuring urban governance: Community construction in 
contemporary China. City, 12(2), 183-195. 
 
Shih, M. 2010. The Evolving Law of Disputed Relocation: Constructing Inner‐City Renewalpractices 
in Shanghai, 1990-2005. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(2), 350-364. 
 
Shin, H. B. 2008. Living on the edge: financing post-displacement housing in urban redevelopment 
projects in Seoul. Environment and Urbanization, 20(2), 411-426. 
 
Shin, H.B. 2008. Driven to swim with the tide? Urban redevelopment and community participation 
in China. CASE Discussion Paper series, CASE paper No.130, London, Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion, London School of Economics. 
 
Shin, H. B. 2009. Property-based redevelopment and gentrification: The case of Seoul, South 




Shin, H. B. 2011. Right to the city and critical reflections on property rights activism in China's 
urban renewal contexts. London. 
 
Shin, H. B. 2013. The right to the city and critical reflections on China's property rights activism. 
Antipode, 45(5), 1167-1189. 
 
Shin, H. B. 2014.Contesting speculative urbanisation and strategising discontents. City, 18(4-5), 
509-516. 
 
Shin, S. 2004. Economic globalization and the environment in China: a comparative case study of 
Shenyang and Dalian. The Journal of Environment & Development, 13(3), 263-294. 
 
Shirk, S. L. (Ed.). 2010. Changing media, changing China. Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Shore, C. 2008. Audit culture and Illiberal governance Universities and the politics of 
accountability. Anthropological Theory, 8(3), 278-298. 
 
Shore, C., & Wright, S. 2004. Whose accountability? Governmentality and the auditing of 
universities. Parallax, 10(2), 100-116. 
 
Sibley, D. 1995. Geographies of exclusion: Society and difference in the West. Routledge, London. 
 
Sieber, J. E., & Stanley, B. 1988. Ethical and professional dimensions of socially sensitive research. 
American Psychologist, 43(1), 49-55. 
 
Sigley, G. 2006. Chinese governmentalities: Government, governance and the socialist market 
economy. Economy and Society, 35(4), 487-508. 
 
Simone, A. 2005. The right to the city. Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 
7(3), 321-325. 
 
Smart, A., & Smart, J. 2001. Local citizenship: welfare reform urban/rural status, and exclusion in 
China. Environment and Planning A, 33(10), 1853-1870. 
 
Smith, N. 1982.Gentrification and uneven development. Economic geography, 58(2), 139-155. 
 
Smith, N. 2002. New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy. Antipode, 
34(3), 427-450. 
 
Solinger, D. J. 1999.Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the state, and the 
logic of the market. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
 





Stone, C. N. 1989. Regime politics: governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. University Press of Kansas, 
Lawrence. 
 
Swyngedouw, E. 1997. Neither global nor local: ‘glocalization’and the politics of scale. In Cox, K. 
(Ed.), Spaces of globalization: Reasserting the power of the local. Guilford, New York. 
 
Tan. 2009. The research on the characteristics thoughts in Qingdao planning during the Germany 
occupation. Science and Technology Information, 21, 164-165. 
 
Taylor, C. 2002. Modern social imaginaries. Public culture, 14(1), 91-124. 
 
Taylor, M. 2007. Community participation in the real world: Opportunities and pitfalls in new 
governance spaces. Urban Studies, 44 (2). pp. 297-317. 
 
The Decision to Accelerate East Zone’s Development. 1992. Cited in 
http://laixi.qdda.gov.cn/front/zhengwugongkai/previewGWK.jsp?subjectid=&ID=1811027, 
website visited March 3rd 2014. 
 
The legend of Qingdao’s alley and courtyard. Cited in 
http://www.chinawriter.com.cn/2013/2013-05-06/161667.html, website visited May 5th 2014. 
 
Thompson, R. 1975. City planning in China. World Development, 3(7), 595-605. 
 
Todorov, V. 1995. Red square, black square: Organon for revolutionary imagination. State 
University of New York Press, Albany, NY.  
 
Tsai, K. S. 2004. Off balance: The unintended consequences of fiscal federalism in China. Journal of 
Chinese Political Science, 9(2), 1-26. 
 
Towne, L., & Shavelson, R. J. (Eds.). 2002. Scientific research in education. National Academies 
Press, Washington, DC. 
 
Urban Residents’ Committee Organizational Law. 1989. Cited in 
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/fvfg/jczqhsqjs/200709/20070900001716.shtml, website 
visited May 5th 2014. 
 
Urgent Notice of Further Regulating Land Expropriation Work and Protecting People’s Legal Rights. 
2010. Cited in 
http://oa.ahxf.gov.cn/village/Content.asp?WebID=5359&Class_ID=76978&id=530466, website 
visited March 3rd 2014. 
 
Uysal, Ü. E. 2012. An urban social movement challenging urban regeneration: The case of Sulukule, 









Wakefield, S. E., & Poland, B. 2005. Family, friend or foe? Critical reflections on the relevance and 
role of social capital in health promotion and community development. Social Science & Medicine, 
60(12), 2819-2832. 
 
Wang, S. 1994. Central-local fiscal politics in China. In H. Jia & Z. Lin (Eds.), Changing central-local 
relations in China: Reform and state capacity. Westview Press, Boulder. pp. 91-112. 
 
Wang, S. 1995. The rise of the regions: fiscal reform and the decline of central state capacity in 
China.  In A. G. Walder (Ed.), The waning of the communist state: Economic origins of political 
decline in China and Hungary. University of California, Berkeley. pp. 87-113. 
 
Wang, Y. P. 2000.Housing reform and its impacts on the urban poor in China. Housing Studies, 
15(6), 845-864. 
 
Walder, A. G. 1992. Property rights and stratification in socialist redistributive economies. 
American Sociological Review, 57, 524-539. 
 
Walder, A. G. 1994. The decline of communist power: Elements of a theory of institutional change. 
Theory and Society, 23(2), 297-323. 
 
Walker, R., & Buck, D. 2007. The Chinese Road. New Left Review, 46, 39-66. 
 
Whiting, S. H. 2001. Power and wealth in rural China: the political economy of institutional change. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Weber, R. 2002. Extracting value from the city: neoliberalism and urban redevelopment. Antipode, 
34(3), 519-540. 
 
Weinstein, L., & Ren, X. 2009. The changing right to the city: urban renewal and housing rights in 
globalizing Shanghai and Mumbai. City & Community, 8(4), 407-432. 
 
Wen, J. 2011. Report of Eleventh National People’s Congress. Cited in 
http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825233.htm, website visited March 6th 2013. 
 
Woolcock, M. 1998. Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and 




Wright, G. 1991. The politics of design in French colonial urbanism. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Williamson, T. 2010. Sprawl, justice, and citizenship: The civic costs of the American way of life. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Wu, F. 1996. Changes in the structure of public housing provision in urban China. Urban Studies, 
33(9), 1601-1627. 
 
Wu, F. 1997. Urban restructuring in China’s emerging market economy: towards a framework for 
analysis. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 21(4), 640-663. 
 
Wu, F. 2001. China's recent urban development in the process of land and housing marketisation 
and economic globalisation. Habitat International, 25(3), 273-289. 
 
Wu, F. 2002. China's changing urban governance in the transition towards a more 
market-oriented economy. Urban Studies, 39(7), 1071-1093. 
 
Wu, F. 2003. Transitional cities. Environment and Planning A, 35(8), 1331-1338. 
 
Wu, F. 2003. The (post-) socialist entrepreneurial city as a state project: Shanghai's reglobalisation 
in question. Urban studies, 40(9), 1673-1698. 
 
Wu, F. 2004. Urban poverty and marginalization under market transition: the case of Chinese 
cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(2), 401-423. 
 
Wu, F. 2008. China’s great transformation: Neoliberalization as establishing a market society. 
Geoforum, 39(3), 1093-1096. 
 
Wu, F. 2010. How neoliberal is China's reform? The origins of change during transition. Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, 51(5), 619-631. 
 
Xie, Y., & Costa, F. J. 1993. Urban planning in socialist China: Theory and practice. Cities, 10(2), 
103-114. 
 
Xin Lang News Archive. Cited in http://news.sina.com.cn/z/hnjiahe/, website visited May 5th 2014. 
 
Xu, J., & Yeh, A. 2009. Decoding urban land governance: state reconstruction in contemporary 
Chinese cities. Urban Studies, 46(3), 559-581. 
 
Yan, M. C., & Gao, J. G. 2007. Social engineering of community building: Examination of policy 





Yin-Wang Kwok, R. 1987. Recent urban policy and development in China: a reversal of 
'anti-urbanism'. Town Planning Review, 58(4), 383-399. 
 
Yin, R. K. 1994.Case study research: design and methods. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. 
 
Yin, R. K. 2003.Case study research design and methods (third edition). Sage, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 
London. 
 
Yip, N. M., & Jiang, Y. 2011. Homeowners United: the attempt to create lateral networks of 
homeowners' associations in urban China. Journal of Contemporary China, 20(72), 735-750. 
 
Yuan, R. 1928. Jiao Ao Memo. Jiao Ao Shang Bu Ju, Qingdao Archives. 
 
Zhang, L. 2004. Forced from home: Property rights, civic activism, and the politics of relocation in 
China. Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, 33, 
247-281. 
 
Zhang, L. 2006. Contesting spatial modernity in late-socialist China. Current Anthropology, 47(3), 
461-484. 
 
Zhang, Lv, and Wang. 2004. Xian dai Qingdao cheng shi gui hua yu kong jian jie gou zhuan xing, 
Urban Question, 122(6), 35-8. 
 
Zhang, T. 2000. Land market forces and government's role in sprawl: The case of China. Cities, 
17(2), 123-135. 
 
Zhang, T. 2002. Urban development and a socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai. Urban Affairs 
Review, 37(4), 475-499. 
 
Zhang, X. 2006. Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth 
and inequality. Journal of comparative economics, 34(4), 713-726. 
 
Zhao, Y. 1998. Media, market, and democracy in China: Between the party line and the bottom 
line. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. 
 
Zhao, Y., & Sun, W. 2007. Public opinion supervision: Possibilities and limits of the media in 
constraining local officials. In E.J. Perry and M. Goldman (Eds.),Grassroots Political Reform in 
Contemporary China. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Zheng, Y. 2006. Explaining the sources of de facto federalism in reform China: intergovernmental 





Zhou, L. A. 2005. Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China. 
Economics Letters, 88(3), 421-425. 
 
Zhou, L. A. 2007. Governing China’s local officials: an analysis of promotion tournament model. 
Economic Research Journal, 7, 36-50. 
 
Zhou, M., & Logan, J. R. 1996. Market transition and the commodification of housing in urban 
China. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 20(3), 400-421. 
 
Zhu, J. 1997. The effectiveness of public intervention in the property market. Urban Studies, 34(4), 
627-646. 
 
Zhu, J. 1999. Local growth coalition: the context and implications of China’s gradualist urban land 
reforms. International journal of urban and regional research, 23(3), 534-548. 
 
Zhu, J. 2005. A transitional institution for the emerging land market in urban China. Urban Studies, 
42(8), 1369-1390. 
 
Zhu, J. 2008. Between the family and state: ethnography of the civil associations and community 
movements in a Shanghai li long neighbourhood. Department of Anthrography, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. PhD Dissertation. 
 
